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Introduction
Introduction to the Portfolio
This portfoHo contains a selection of work completed over the course of the three year Psych.D, 
Clinical Psychology Course. The academic dossier comprises five essays which cover both core 
and speciahst topics. The clinical dossier contains summaries of all core and speciahst 
placements undertaken and five summaries of formal clinical case reports. A separate 
confidential appendix to the clinical dossier containing the five formal case reports m full and all 
placement documentation including placement contracts, clinical activity log books and 
placement evaluation forms will be kept at the University of Surrey. The research dossier 
comprises a service-related research project (i.e., research completed on placement) completed in 
Year one, a literature review completed in Year two, and a large scale research project completed 
in Year three.
The work presented in each section of this document reflects the variety of chent groups, referral 
problems, approaches and contexts covered during the course. In each section, work is presented 
in the order in which it was completed in order to reflect how my academic, clinical and research 
skills and interests have developed over training.
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Summary of Academic Dossier
Summary of the Academic Dossier
This section comprises five selected essays, intended to reflect the depth and breadth of work 
covered over the three year course. The essays are presented in the order in which they were 
completed, m order to demonstrate how my academic skills and interests have developed during 
training. There are four essays from the four core client groups studied during the first and 
second years of training, and one essay on a speciahst topic from the third year. These essays 
critically examine the theory and practice of a range of psychological approaches to human 
difficulties throughout the life span, with reference to wider social, cultural, ethical and 
epistemological issues.
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Is depression the cause or effect of negative thinking?
Adult Mental Health Essay 
December 1998 
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Is depression the cause or effect of negative thinking?
Introduction
Depression is one of the most common psychological conditions. It has been estimated that, at 
any one time, between 9 per cent and 20 per cent of the population has significant symptoms of 
depression (Boyd and Weissman, 1981). Depression is defined as a sad mood state with 
associated cognitive, behavioural and physiological symptoms. Symptomology includes sleep 
disturbance, lethargy, feelings of worthlessness, despondency, tearfulness, morbid thoughts and 
on occasions suicide attempts (DSM-IV). The thinking of a depressed person is characterised by 
negative thoughts about themselves, the rest of the world and their future (Beck, 1967).
Several models have been proposed to explain the role of negative thinking in the formation and 
maintenance of depression in individuals. Initially, these models were either based on the 
premise that negative thinking causes depression or alternatively negative thinking is a 
consequence of depression. For example, the medical model suggests negative thoughts are a 
symptom of the depression biasing a person’s thinking in a negative direction, and therefore, are 
caused by the depression (Paykel, 1989). Alternatively, other models particularly from the 
cognitive school of psychology suggest that depression is the effect of negative thinking. The 
way we process and attend to information affects how we perceive a situation, and consequently 
our mood (Beck, 1979).
These two models have led to very different ways of workmg with people with depression. The 
medical model uses pharmacological interventions, whilst the cognitive models try to reduce 
negative thinking. Interestingly, both models are equivocal in their success m reducing 
depression m chents. The empirical evaluation of cognitive interventions for the treatment of 
depression has been shown to be as effective as medication. Although some evidence has shown 
that the cognitive approach is more effective at preventing future relapse (Dobson, 1989). How 
can two treatments that have very different assumptions on the cause and effect of negative 
thinking on depression be equally effective?
There are common factors between the two approaches such as the therapeutic relationship. 
However, these are also components of the other less effective interventions and thus, are not a 
possible explanation of equivocal degree of effectiveness of the medical and cognitive
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interventions (Dobson, 1989).
The findings could also be a reflection of the two interventions being more effective for different 
types and levels of depression. For example, medical approaches could be more effective for 
reactive depression, whilst cognitive approaches could be more effective for endogenous 
depression. However, when these factors are controlled for in the meta-analyses of depression, 
the equivocal effectiveness remains.
Another suggestion is that the improvement in depressive symptomology could be due to the two 
interventions indirectly altering a third factor that consequently reduces depression. For example, 
the pharmacological interventions could be effecting the physiology, which in turn effects this 
third factor, resulting in a reduction in depression. In contrast, cognitive approaches reduce 
negative thinking, which also effects the third factor, which reduces depressive mood.
A further possibility is that depression is the result of an interaction between mood and negative 
thinking. When a person is in a low mood, they have an increased access to negative thoughts. 
These negative thoughts further increase a person’s low mood. This sets up an interactional 
relationship between mood and negative thinking.
In this essay it is suggested that the relationship between negative thinking and depression is not 
as simple as cause or effect. It is argued that it is an interactional relationship between depressive 
mood and negative thinking conceivably mediated by a third factor. 1 have chosen to develop the 
interactional argument of negative thinking and depression using the cognitive models of
depression. Unlike cognitive models, the medical model does not provide an account that
specifically examines the relationship between negative thinking and depressive mood, producing 
testable hypothesis (ref).
There are several cognitive models of depression including; Beck’s cognitive theory of 
depression; Seligman’s (1975) learned helplessness model of depression; Abramson, Metalsky, 
and Alloy’s (1989) hopelessness theory of depression; Lewinsohn, Hoberman, Teri and
Hautzinger (1985) self focused theory and Teasdale’s (1983; 1988) differential activation 
hypothesis. Although, there are differences in emphasis between the cognitive models of
depression, the majority shares an underlying theme.
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Cognitive theories of depression emphasise the importance of cognitive factors, such as attitudes, 
self-statements, images, memories and behefs. They consider maladaptive or irrational 
cognitions and cognitive distortions to be the cause of the disorder, or of its exacerbation and 
maintenance. Negative affect, lack of motivation, physical symptoms and other depressive 
behaviours are regarded as secondary manifestations resulting from maladaptive cognitions 
(Gotlib and Hammen, 1992).
1 wül concentrate on examining the development of Beck’s cognitive model of depression in this 
essay. This is for two main reasons; firstly. Beck’s original model is both predictive and 
explanatory and thus, has been extensively empirically tested over the last thirty years. Secondly, 
Beck’s model has been the most influential on clinical work and the most effective cognitive 
model in evaluative research (Williams, 1992).
In this essay, 1 will suggest that there is some empirical research supporting Beck’s assumption 
that negative thoughts are the causal factor in depression. However, other research suggests that 
his model is unable to explain certain empirical and clinical phenomena.
1 will then illustrate how Bower’s Associative Network model is an attempt to answer some of the 
problems identified by empirically testing Beck’s model. Bower suggests that the relationship 
between mood and negative thmking is interactional (Bower, 1981). However, it is argued that 
his model based on a single representational basis is too simplistic to explain certain research and 
clinical findings.
1 win then briefly introduce Teasdale’s Interactional Cognitive Subsystem model (ICS) which 
offers the best current framework for interpreting the current empirical knowledge of depression 
and it’s interactional relationship with negative thinking (Teasdale and Barnard, 1993).
Therefore, 1 will propose that depression is neither the effect of, nor causal for negative thinking. 
It is the result of a complex interaction between mood, negative thinking and other factors.
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Cognitive models of Depression
Beck’s cognitive model o f  depression
Beck developed his cognitive model of depression from his observations during his clinical work 
in the I960’s. He proposed that the dysfunctional emotions and behaviours found in psychiatric 
disorders are exaggerations of normal adaptive process (Beck et al, 1979). Beck’s cognitive 
model of depression postulates three specific concepts to explain the psychological profile of 
depression: the cognitive triad, dysfunctional schemas and cognitive errors (Beck and Rush, 
1978).
Beck’s Cognitive Model of Depression (1979).
Motivational
Somatic
DEPRESSION
Affective Cognitive
Early Experience
Behavioural
Activation of schemata 
by “matching” 
environmental events.
Dysfunctional Schema in 
vulnerable individuals.
Negative Cognitions 
(negative cognitive triad).
(Figure 1)
Doctorate of Psychology (PsychD) in Clinical Psychology
Adult Mental Health Essay
Beck noticed that clients generally reported a pattern of depressive thoughts that seemed to centre 
on three main themes. These themes are the person’s negative view of self, past and present 
experiencing of the world and a negative view of the future. He conceptualised these themes in 
thinking as the negative cognitive triad (Beck, 1967)). It has since been confirmed with empirical 
evidence that these patterns of thinking do exist in depressed people (Haaga, Dyck and Ernst, 
1991). The negative cognitive triad’s patterns lead to the motivational, behavioural and physical 
symptoms of depression (Nelson-Jones, 1995).
Beck’s model proposes that schemas generate the negative cognitions representative of the 
cognitive triad. They are a relatively stable enduring characteristic of the personality (Kovacs 
and Beck, 1978). Schemas are cognitive structures that are comprised of beliefs and rules, which 
determine the content of thinking, affect and behaviour (Beck et al, 1991). The schema exert this 
effect by guiding attention, expectancies, interpretations and memory searches, so as to “fit” the 
pre-existing beliefs and propositions (Fiske and LinvHle, 1980).
Depressogenic (dysfunctional) schemas interfere with normal cognitive processing in a negative 
and pessimistic direction by biasing perception, recall, inferences and long-term memory (Beck 
and Rush, 1979). When activated the schemas are rigid, extreme and resistant to change. As the 
dysfunctional schemas become hypervalent, the intensity and frequency of negative automatic 
thoughts increases. This results in the reduction of availability of positive information to 
contradict the dysfunctional schema. People become stuck in a cycle of depression unable to 
reality test their interpretations of events (Beck, 1991).
Beck proposes that these schemas develop from early negative experiences m childhood. These 
schemas remain in a latent state as a vulnerability factor to depression. They become activated 
when the individual is exposed to a precipitating factor such as psychological stress, biochemical 
imbalance and/or triggers from the original environmental setting conditions of the schema 
(Fennell, 1998).
Therefore, dysfunctional hypervalent schemas generate negative automatic thoughts, which 
represent the beliefs and assumptions of the dysfunctional schemas. Beck’s model assumes that 
negative automatic thoughts precede emotion. People’s emotional responses to situations follow 
from their interpretation of the events rather than the events themselves. For example, a person is
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ignored by a friend on the other side of the road, they could either attribute the event to the friend 
having a lot on their mind, resulting in concern, or the friend not liking them, resulting in upset.
Thus, Beck assigns a primacy to cognitive factors in depression, and conceptualises the affective, 
behavioural and physiological symptoms of this disorder as the result of schema based negative 
information processing. As Beck et al. (1979) state, “the patient’s negative constructions of 
reality can be postulated to be the first link in the chain of symptoms”.
If this statement is true then several empirical findings should follow. Depressed people should 
have an increase in negative automatic thinking when depressed. If the negative thoughts are 
reduced then the depression should reduce and finally, experimentally increasing negative 
thinking should increase depressive mood. I will examine the validity of each statement in turn 
using empirical evidence.
Many studies that have found that increased levels of negative thinkmg are associated with 
depression (review see: Beck and Rush, 1978). For example, clinical and empirical research has 
shown that depressed people tend to demonstrate negative self-concepts (c.f. Coyne and Gotlib, 
1983; Segal and Shaw, 1986) and secondly to rate their performance on tasks more negatively 
than non-depressed persons (Friedman, 1964; Lewis, Mercatoris, Cole and Leonard, 1980). 
Lloyd and Lishman (1975) in a correlational study found that there was an increase in the ease of 
recall for unpleasant experiences in a depressed state. Therefore, negative thinking does appear 
to increase when a person becomes depressed. However, this increase does not have to be causal. 
It could be an effect of depressed mood.
Empirical evidence has provided some support for the statement that depression is reduced when 
negative thoughts are reduced. The studies attempted to reduce the frequency of negative 
thoughts in depressed people using distraction procedures such as letter cancellation or 
shadowing random digits. They then observed the effect of doing so on mood (Teasdale and 
Rezm, 1978, Teasdale and Fennell, 1982). The common finding was that the procedures had a 
transient effect on reducing the frequency of negative thoughts and depressive affect.
There are several possible explanations for the finding that there is only a transient effect on 
mood. Firstly the procedures for reducing negative cognitions were not strong enough to reduce
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the frequency of negative thoughts to levels that would influence a reduction in depressive mood. 
Secondly, the procedures only temporally disrupted the cycle of depression producing transient 
effects or thirdly, negative automatic thoughts do not produce depressive mood. However, 
Teasdale and Bancroft (1977) instructed depressed patients to think of personally relevant 
thoughts with negative content and found an increase in levels of depression. Other studies have 
shown that when student subjects are asked to read standardised negative self-referent statements, 
their mood becomes more depressed (e.g. Coleman, 1975: Velten, 1968). However, the 
experimental instructions in studies of normal subjects often include strong encouragement to the 
subjects to get into the appropriate mood state. For this reason, it cannot be concluded that only 
the negative self-statements are responsible for the depressed mood. In summary, there is some 
evidence that negative thinking can cause a depressive mood state as predicted by Beck’s 
cognitive model of depression. However, further studies have identified problems with Beck’s 
models central argument that thinking causes depression.
Various studies have found that levels of negative thinking return to normal with the remission of 
an episode of depression even when no attempt is made by the treatment to deal with the negative 
assumptions. For example, antidepressants do not attempt to change environmental events, 
negative cognitions, dysfunctional beliefs or assumptions (Simons, Garfield and Murphy, 1984). 
Interventions aimed at changing interpersonal skills or other behaviours also indirectly reduce 
negative cognitions to the same level as cognitive therapy (Imber et al., 1990). These findings 
lend support to the suggestion that negative thinking could be a consequence of depression rather 
than an antecedent.
Beck’s model suggests that the dysfunctional schemata are relatively stable cognitive structures 
that remain latent when a person is not depressed. This predisposition to depression suggests that 
people develop certain peculiarities in the cognitive organisation of information, which contribute 
to the susceptibility to and the precipitation of the disorder (WiUiams, 1993).
A longitudinal study by Lewinsohn, et al. (1981) was conducted to ascertain whether 
dysfunctional schemas were present in remission. Depression, psychopathology and cognitive 
variables were assessed at the beginning and end of a year. Subjects who became depressed 
during the study did not differ from controls on the cognitive measures at the first testing period. 
Furthermore, subjects who had been depressed at the beginning of the study and were in
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remission at the end of the study no longer showed any evidence of their dysfunctional 
cognitions. The results indicated that people who are vulnerable to depression are not 
characterised by stable patterns of negative thinking. Lewinson et al. concluded that depressive 
cognitions are consequents of depression, rather than antecedents. This finding has been further 
replicated in other studies (Wilkinson and Blackburn, 1981, Silverman et al, 1984).
A criticism of these studies is that Beck proposes that depressogenic schema are only activated in 
situations that resemble the original setting conditions, such as low mood and/or stress (Kovacs 
and Beck, 1978). The studies used generalised questions in non-threatening situations and did not 
monitor stressful life events.
Miranda and Pearsons (1988) adapted Velten’s (1968) mood induction techniques to produce an 
analogue of depression. They examined the relationship between depressives in remission and 
never depressed subjects reporting of dysfunctional assumptions in a neutral mood and in an 
induced depressed mood. There was no difference between the levels of reporting in the neutral 
mood. In the induced mood condition, the depressive in remission reported a significant increase 
in dysfunctional assumptions whereas, the never depressed levels did not increase. This finding 
provides some support for the hypothesis that mood is activating the dysfunctional schema, which 
generates negative thinking.
Further studies have shown a differential effect of experimentally inducing mood state on the 
accessibility of positive and negative thinking. Teasdale and Fogarty (1979) expanded on Lloyd 
and Lishman’s (1975) study and found that the latency of retrieval of autobiographical memories 
of pleasant past events was faster in an elated mood than in a depressed mood. In addition, 
Teasdale et al (1980) found that the probability of retrieving a memory of an unhappy event was 
greater in a depressed mood than an elated mood.
The aforementioned studies suggest that there is some effect of mood state on the relative 
accessibility of positive and negative cognitions and memories. These findings lend support to 
the suggestion that negative thinking is not solely if at all an antecedent to depression but rather a 
consequence of depression. The basic finding of an effect of induced depressed mood, compared 
to happy mood, increasing the relative probability of recall of negative autobiographical 
memories, and decreasing the relative probability of recall of positive autobiographical memories
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has since been widely replicated (Bower, 1981; Madigan and BoUenbach, 1982; Teasdale and 
Taylor, 1981). However, an alternative explanation for the differences found could be due to the 
procedures used to induce the mood states rather than the differences in the mood states 
themselves.
Teasdale and Taylor’s (1981) study to examine this question led them to conclude that the 
differences in accessibility to cognitions are due to the induced mood states. The results are not 
due to factors such as the statements being relevant to the subjects’ life and therefore accessing 
memories. Increased accessibility to negative constructs in an induced depression state appears to 
be a real effect. However, is experimentally induced mood actually analogous to clinical 
depression and thus the results generalisable to clinical populations? Research shows that there 
are psychomotor, verbal communication and motivational changes in people with clinical 
depression. People in induced mood states also showed these changes. This lends some support 
to the fact that induced mood states are analogous to clinical depression (Goodwin and Williams, 
1982).
Further support for the generalisation of the findings from mood induced studies to clinical 
depression comes from studies using depressed people as their own controls. Clark and Teasdale 
(1982) used people who had a strong diurnal presentation of depression. They asked subjects to 
recall memories at both the minimum and maximum times of their depression. The memories 
were rated as happy or unhappy at the same time to avoid confounding effects of mood. They 
found comparable results to the induced mood experiments. Subjects were more likely to recall 
unhappy memories in low mood. The same conclusion was reached in a further experiment 
conducted by Clark (1983) who found that changes in depression over a five week period was 
significantly correlated with changes in accessibility for happy and sad memories in the expected 
direction.
It can be seen that Beck’s original model when subject to empirical analysis has some support for 
the assumption that negative thinking can cause and maintain depression. However, the proposal 
that negative thinking causes depression is not fully supported by the evidence. It has 
considerable problems m explaining some of the resulting phenomena. For example, the model is 
unable to explain how induced mood can increase the frequency of negative thinking and 
accessibility to negative memories. It is also unable to explain why dysfunctional schemas are
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only accessible in an induced mood state and are not a stable personality characteristic. Finally, 
how are interventions that do not address cognitive processes successful in reducing levels of 
negative thinking in remission?
The empirical evidence lends some support to the argument that mood can cause depression and 
consequently an increase in negative thoughts. However, if there were no negative thoughts 
accessible to a person in a low mood, would there only be a transient change in mood. Negative 
cognitions appear to be able to produce depression, and, conversely, depression increases the 
probability of just those cognitions, which will maintain depression. This reciprocal relationship 
between depression and cognition may form the basis of a vicious cycle that wül perpetuate and 
intensify depression.
Thus, research suggests that the relationship between negative thinking and depression could be 
better explained using an interactional relationship. How would such a relationship be 
represented in a model?
Bower’s model o f  depression
Bower’s associative network model is an attempt to explain some of the empirical evidence that 
suggests that mood can cause negative thinking, whilst also, maintaining the assumption that 
negative thinking can cause mood. I wül describe the theoretical basis behind the model adapted 
from Bower’s original paper, and its application to clinical and empirical evidence. I wül then 
examine some of problems with the model that have arisen as the result of further empirical and 
theoretical evaluation.
Bower’s model suggests that concepts, events, and meanings are represented in memory by 
nodes, joined together by associative links to form a semantic network. The representation of an 
event consists of a group of descriptive propositions. These propositions are encoded by forming 
new associative links between nodes corresponding to existing concepts and events. Thoughts 
depend on activation spreading from concept to concept via the associative linkages. We become 
conscious of these concepts when the activation is above a certain threshold. Activation of a 
node can occur by direct stimulus from external sources or as the result of activation from other 
related nodes in the network (Bower, 1981) (figure 2).
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Emotions have their own distinctive nodes in the network. Activation of an emotion node above 
a threshold transmits excitation through its links to the other nodes. These nodes produce the 
patterns of autonomic and expressive behaviour corresponding to that emotion. The activation of 
the emotion node also decreases the thresholds for activation in connected memory nodes.
Bower’s Associative Network (1981).
Time Place
Verbal Labels
Event One
Actors Actions
Emotion
(Happy)
Expressive
Behaviours Evoking
Appraisals
Emotion
(Depressed)
Figure 2
In a current depressed mood all the previous constructs and concepts associated with previous 
times of depressed mood wül be active in interpreting current perceptions of events. Thus, the 
effects of the mood increasing the accessibility of negative interpretative constructs and memories 
of unhappy events account for the negative thinking that is characteristic of depression. 
Therefore, the network theory suggests that negative thinking is a consequence of depressed 
mood (Bower, 1981).
However, the model also suggests that negative thinking can be an antecedent to depression. 
Negative thoughts can send out activation to the connecting emotion node and reduce its 
threshold to activation. If enough thoughts are activating the node the activation will be 
summated and the emotion produced (Bower, 1981).
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The model is therefore proposing that negative thoughts can induce depression as well as being a 
symptom and a maintaining factor via an interactional relationship between thinking and 
depressed mood. Once we are in a depressed mood, we are likely to think negatively because of 
the effects of mood on the accessibility and activation of negative memories and interpretative 
constructs, but that the same negative thinking is likely to maintain depression by continually 
activating the depression node. A self-perpetuating vicious cycle is formed.
The theory can explain the research that shows that negative thinking reduces when depression 
improves as the result of pharmacological or therapeutic interventions that do not act on the 
negative thoughts. As a person’s mood improves, the corresponding node decreases in activation. 
Concurrently, the activation to associated negative conceptual nodes decreases and therefore, are 
not primed to be expressed as thoughts.
Bower’s model can be used to explain the research that only found dysfunctional schema when a 
depressed mood was induced in previously depressed individuals. When in a non-depressed 
mood, the depressed node is not sending out activation to the ‘dysfunctional schema’ and 
therefore, the thoughts are not expressed. However, when a person is depressed, the depression 
node is ‘switched on’ and sends out activation to concepts that it has been associated with on 
previous occasions such as the ‘dysfunctional schema’, which in turn generate negative thoughts.
The model also provides an explanation for the studies that found mood congruent recall of 
autobiographical memories (e.g. Teasdale and Fogarty, 1979). The memories of an event are 
connected to the emotional node that corresponds to the perceived mood at encoding as well as 
the nodes for the contextual cues. When a person is depressed or induced into the mood of 
depression, the depression node is activated. It sends out activation to the connected concepts 
such as the unhappy events decreasing their threshold for expression. Thus, when depressed 
people are asked to recall memories they are more likely to recall memories that were formed in 
the same mood from the past.
A similar explanation is given to explain mood state dependent retrieval. Mood state dependent 
retrieval was the original supporting evidence for the network model. Bower asked subjects to 
rriemorise lists of words in a depressed or happy mood. If a subject learnt and recalled a list in a 
depressed state, they were more likely to remember more words than if they learnt the list in a
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depressed state and recalled in a happy state (Bower, Gilligan and Monteiro, 1978, 1981). Bower 
proposed that when a person learns two separate lists in the same environment, induced emotion 
could aid the later recall of the lists. The emotion is associated with the list and acts as an 
additional source of activation to the information. The activation from the environmental cues 
are summated with the emotion activation on recall producing better recall in the corresponding 
mood.
Although, Bower’s model can explain some of the problems with Beck’s model such as mood 
congruent recall and mood state dependent retrieval, there are theoretical and empirical problems 
with Bower’s model. These suggest that the relationship between thought and emotion is more 
complex than suggested by his single representational model.
Theoretical problems with Bower’s model.
It is suggested that information relating to an event is permanently linked to the emotion node in a 
single representational format. It foUows that when the event is discussed the concepts should be 
sending activation to the emotion node. Consequently, decreasing the threshold and resulting in 
the expression of the emotion. However, people are able to talk about emotive events without 
expressing the emotion (Teasdale, 1993).
A similar problem arises for the model in explaining why people do not necessarily experience an 
increase in the intensity of an emotion when they use emotion-related concepts or remember other 
aspects of an event (Teasdale and Barnard, 1993). This is similar to one of the major problems 
with Beck’s model which also only recognises one level of meaning and for that reason has 
considerable difficulties with the distinction between ‘intellectual’ and ‘emotional’ belief, or 
more generally ‘hot’ and ‘cold’ cognitions. For example, clients often state that ‘they know 
intellectually that they are not unlovable’, but they still believe it emotionally (Beck, 1991).
A further problem with a single representational model is that when a node is activated it sends 
out activation to connecting nodes. These in turn send out activating energy to their connecting 
nodes. Each emotional node must be connected to thousands of related event and concept nodes. 
Therefore, the activation from an emotion node will be divided between all these nodes. 
Consequently, the effect on the thresholds of these nodes would be extremely small. One 
possible explanation of these previous statements is that the activation from the nodes are not
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strong enough to activate the emotion due to this fan out problem, but if this is the case then the 
argument becomes circular.
Emotions in the network theory are treated as similar to semantic concepts and ideas. Thus, 
semantic concepts and emotions are both represented as nodes within the same semantic network. 
This appears to be an over simplified view, because emotional states or moods can be 
experienced in several different intensities ranging from the very strong to the very weak, which 
is not the case for semantic concepts. Since moods typically change relatively slowly over time, 
it is reasonable to assume that activated emotion nodes tend to remain activated for some time. In 
contrast, semantic concepts are usually activated for only relatively short periods.
A related problem with the idea of nodes in general, is that cognitive researchers use the term as 
an analogy to the structure of the brain. Neuropsychology has yet to identify corresponding 
structures in the neurology of the brain (Eysenck and Keane, 1993).
Empirical Problems with Bower’s model
A study conducted by Parrot and Sabmi (1990) used a real Hfe situation of low mood of people 
who had not achieved thek expected mark on a test. When they asked them to recall three 
memories, the subjects reported more happy memories than sad memories. This finding causes 
problems for the model, as it would be expected that the emotion node of low mood would be 
hypervalent and activate more unhappy memories. The authors suggest that people try to reduce 
their own depressive mood in normal situations by activating happy memories to counter their 
mood. This is an example of mood mcongruent memory recall. Bower’s model does not explain 
how people could manage to overcome the priming effect of mood on accessibility to memories.
Studies by Teasdale and his colleagues (Teasdale and Sheppard, 1996: Teasdale et al, 1995) used 
an altered version of the dysfunctional assumption scale m a series of experiments. They were 
testing the hypothesis that depressive thinking is the result of an increase in accessibility to 
negative concepts. Subjects were asked to complete a sentence with the first word that came to 
mind e.g. “If I am right all the time then others would.... me”. The network model would predict 
that depressed people would complete the sentence with a negative concept word such as hate due 
to priming effects of mood on negative concepts. However, it was found that they completed the 
sentence with positive words implying social acceptance i.e. like me. In contrast, the non­
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depressed subjects used a word such as hate. When the depressed people were in remission they 
showed the same results as the ‘normals’. The results suggested that mood-dependent depressive 
thinking reflects changes at a level of cognitive representation concerned with the meaning 
between constructs rather than on one level such as that purported by Bower and Beck. In 
depression it is the higher meaning that is ascribed to information that is effected and not the 
basic information itself.
The empirical and clinical evidence has suggested that there is an interactional relationship 
between negative thinking and depression. Depressive mood can generate negative automatic 
thoughts and negative automatic thoughts can generate depressive mood. However, this 
relationship does not appear to have been explained conclusively by Bower’s Associative 
Network model. For example, it cannot explain how memories can be recalled both with and 
without the emotion and negative thoughts can still be believed without logical evidence. I will 
briefly introduce a model that explains the interactional relationship between negative thinking 
and depression whilst answering the aforementioned problems?
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Teasdale’s model o f  depression
Teasdale’s interacting cognitive subsystem model (ICS) attempts to resolve the empirical and 
theoretical difficulties with the earlier cognitive models. The model supports the argument that 
the relationship between negative thinking and depression is interactional.
The “internal” maintenance of depression bv a self-perpetuating “interlocked” processing 
configuration (from: Teasdale (1996)).
/ I
Sensory
Loop
Cognitive
Loop
DEPRESSION
Bodily
Effects
Proprioceptive 
sensory data 
(Body-state).
Depressogenic 
Schematic Models 
(Implicational).
Negative Specific 
Meanings 
(Prepositional).
Negative Specific 
Meanings 
(Prepositional).
Negative Automatic 
Thoughts (Speech 
level).
Figure 3
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The ICS proposes that all cognitions are in the form of generic implicational (implicit knowledge, 
including emotions) meanings and specific proprositional meanings. Reciprocal interaction 
between the specific information handled by the Prepositional subsystem, and model level 
information handled by the Implicational subsystem constitutes the “central engine” of cognition 
(Teasdale and Barnard, 1993)(figure 3).
ICS suggests that the immediate antecedent to depression is the processing of depression related 
schematic models in the ‘central engine’ of cognition. Depression is maintained by the 
regeneration of depressogenic implicational schematic models. The central goal of therapy based 
on the (ICS) model is to replace the synthesis of such models by the synthesis of more adaptive 
models (Teasdale, Segal and Cooper, 1995).
The depressogenic models are maintained from input from negative specific meanings, negative 
automatic thoughts and bodily effects. Therefore, interventions could either be targeted directly 
at the depressogenic models or the sources of input. Thus, explaining the finding that 
interventions that do not deal with the same goals are effective in reducing levels of depression 
(Williams, 1992). For example, cognitive therapy reduces the level of negative automatic 
thoughts and medical interventions have an effect on the body state which both feed into the 
depressogenic models, consequently reducing depression.
Research that has tried to test this complex model has provided some support (Teasdale and 
Sheppard, 1996:Teasdale et al, 1995a). However, the ‘implicational meanings’ of the model 
could be argued to be unfalsifiable by empirical evaluation, in a similar way to the ‘unconscious 
drives’ in psychodynamic theories.
Conclusion
I will suggest that there is some empirical research that appears to support Beck’s assumption that 
negative thoughts are the causal factor in depression. However, other research suggests that his 
model is unable to explain certain empirical and clinical phenomena. I wiU then illustrate how 
Bower’s model of network of associations is an attempt to answer some of the problems 
identified by empirically testing Beck’s model. Bower suggests that the relationship between 
mood and negative thinking is interactional in nature. However, I believe his model based on a 
single representational basis is too simplistic to explain certain research findings. I will then
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move on to briefly introduce the interactional cognitive subsystem model proposed by Teasdale. 
I will argue that this model offers the best current framework for interpreting the current 
empirical knowledge of depression and the relationship to negative thinking.
I have argued that an interactional relationship exists between negative thinking and depression. 
The relationship is currently best explained by Teasdale’s ICS model.
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What is an autistic spectrum disorder (ASD) and what aetiological models have 
contributed to our understanding of autism? To what extent have these models guided
intervention practices?
Introduction
This essay wül introduce the concept of autistic spectrum disorders and illustrate the common 
associated features. It will then argue that although, the cause of autistic spectrum disorders 
appears to be biological, there are presently, too many ‘unknown’ factors to generate a 
conclusive model. Currently, cognitive theories; ‘deficits in theory of mind’, executive 
functioning deficits, and weak central coherence appear to offer the best explanation of the 
clinical presentation of the disorder. It will be suggested that the current interventions are not 
strongly linked with the theories. However, they have begun to guide the re-evaluation of 
existing interventions and the creation of new interventions.
Infantile autism
Kanner’s seminal 1943 paper, described children sharing ‘fascinating peculiarities’ (Kanner, 
1943). In later papers, Kanner stated the essential and defining symptoms of autism were 
“autistic aloneness” and “obsessive desire for preservation of sameness” (Kanner and 
Eisenberg, 1956). The other symptoms such as; excellent rote memory, delayed echolaha and 
over sensitivity to stimuli, he considered as secondary to, and caused by, these two elements 
and therefore, were not considered essential diagnostic criteria.
Autism, Kanner proposed was a distinctive disorder that differed from other psychiatric 
conditions with a different aetiology, course and response to treatment. Epidemiological work 
validated autism as a coherent and consistent syndrome of behaviours that could reliably 
discriminate between children with autism, mental handicaps or other psychiatric disorders 
(Rutter and Lockyer, 1967; Treffert, 1970; DeMyer et al., 1972; Wing and Gould, 1979). 
Children fitting Kanner’s description of autism are comparatively rare, estimates vary around 
2 -4  per 10000 children (hotter, 1966).
Doctorate of Psychology (PsychD) in Clinical Psychology 30
Learning Disabilities Essay
In the 1950’s clinicians adopted a loose interpretation of Kanner’s criteria, and this coupled 
with the fact that the behaviours are not exclusively found in autism, resulted in extensive 
misdiagnosis of disorders such as childhood schizophrenia as autism (Rutter, 1999). This led 
Rutter to introduce formalised strict criteria and the concept of an onset in symptomology 
before 30 months to differentiate autism from early childhood schizophrenia (Rutter and 
Schopler, 1992). The criteria are impaired social development, delayed/deviant language 
development, insistence on sameness and age of onset before 30 months.
The concept of autistic spectrum disorders
Wing and Gould’s (1979) epidemiological study, selected children with special needs and 
looked for the presence of social impairment and other autistic symptomology. They found 
that if a child showed social impairment, this would always co-exist with impairments in 
communication and imagination and consequently introduced the concept of ‘triad of 
impairments of social interaction’: qualitative impairments in socialisation, communication, 
imagination, and a markedly restricted repertoire of activities and interests as being indicative 
of autism.
Each of the concepts in the ‘triad of impairments vary along a continuum, from the severely 
impaired to the mildly impaired form For example, the different manifestations of social 
impairment range through the aloof indifferent, to the over-formal, stilted child. The 
communication impairment ranges from no communication to formal, long-winded and literal 
conversation. Finally, imagination impairments range from handling objects for simple 
sensations to inventing a stereotyped imaginary world. The behavioural repetitive activities 
also vary along a continuum from simple self-directed acts to abstract repetitive verbal or 
performance actions (Wing, 1996).
The picture that autism presents then, varies greatly, and Wing’s (1988) concept of a spectrum 
of disorders in autism captures this idea of a range of manifestations of the same underlying 
handicap of the ‘triad of impairments’. This wider autistic spectrum ranges from the most 
profoundly physically and learning disabled person, who has social impairment as one item
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among a multitude of problems, to the most able, highly intelligent person with social 
impairment in its subtlest form as their only disability.
A person’s placement within the spectrum depends on their degree of impairment on each 
concept in the ‘triad’. Individuals cluster together, and these groups often represent the 
separate syndromes. Autistic spectrum disorders include Kanner’s classic autism, infantile 
autism, semantic-pragmatic disorder, Asperger’s syndrome, and right hemisphere learning 
disabilities (Rutter, 1999). Which of these fall within the autistic spectrum (differing only in 
degree of impairment) and which represent distinct disorders (different in the nature of the 
underlying impairment), is as yet unclear and the focus of current debate (Happe, 1994).
‘The triad of Impairments of Social Interaction’, coupled with an onset before 30 months 
became the basis for the diagnosis of autism in DSM-IV (Rutter and Schopler, 1992), 
expanding on Rutter’s original strict criteria. The wider spectrum of autistic disorders based 
on Wing’s triad has a higher incidence of 2 per 1000 (Gillberg and Coleman, 1992). Research 
has shown that an autistic spectrum disorder can occur at any level of cognitive functioning 
(Frith, 1989), therefore, this incidence is likely to be an underestimate of the true incidence as 
it was derived from a sample with low cognitive ability.
Throughout, the remainder of the essay, the term autism wiU be used instead of autistic 
spectrum disorder. In summary, Kanner’s original description of autism has been modified 
over time with the recognition that the same handicap may be manifest in a number of different 
ways, and vary across and even within individuals, according to intellectual ability and age. 
The clinical picture of autism depends upon the combinations of different impairments, which 
vary in severity independent of each other, though they interact to produce the overt behaviour 
pattern.
What aetiological models have contributed to our understanding of autism?
A model of autism, firstly, needs to be able to account for the extensive heterogeneity of this 
neurodevelopmental disorder, and secondly, account for all clinical features both 
pathogenomonic, and also those that appear intrinsic to the syndrome, even though they also
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occur in other conditions, for example, epilepsy (Bailey, Phillips and Rutter, 1996), Initial 
investigations searched for a possible causal factor as a base for a model.
Biological causation o f autism
Reviews of the biology of autism conclude that evidence for an organic aetiology is 
overwhelming (Coleman and Gillberg, 1985). Research focused on biological causes due to 
the findings of epidemiological studies. For example, there are significantly greater numbers 
of boys than girls with autism, ratio of 2:1, which suggests possible gene transmission 
(Ciadella and MameUe, 1989), and the high incidence of epilepsy in autistic children often with 
a bimodal onset (Olsson, Steffenburg and Gillberg, 1988), implicating some form of “organic” 
brain dysfunction (Rutter, 1970).
However, investigations of the biological features of autism are often inconsistent in their 
findings (Bailey, Phillips and Rutter, 1996). There has been a lack of methodological rigor 
particularly in replicating results under bhnd conditions, and often no attempt to determine 
whether abnormalities are specific to autism or found in a range of other neurodevelopmental 
disorders (Rutter et al, 1992).
Despite these problems, biological features in the brain and developmental history have been 
identified and proposed as possible causes of autism. There is a high incidence of perinatal 
problems in autism, delayed birth, and delayed breathing or neonatal convulsions. Studies 
have also shown that virus infection for example, herpes and rubella, in a young child can 
sometimes precede the onset of typical symptoms of autism. Abnormalities found in the brains 
and physiology of people with autism, include raised dopamine and serotonin levels, abnormal 
neuron organisation and development particularly in the basal ganglia; and frontal and 
temporal lobes, and some evidence of immune abnormalities. There is an increased incidence 
of abnormal EEG’s and electro-physiological abnormalities compared with other populations 
(Gillberg, 1993).
Currently, it is not clear whether any of the latter findings, either cause autism, are caused by 
another factor that causes autism, or involved in a complex interaction between many factors
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that produce autism. One explanation is that genes are the fundamental causal factor as they 
are ultimately responsible for the body’s construction and final functioning and thus 
vulnerability to external factors. There appears to be substantial evidence that genetics are 
involved in the aetiology.
Evidence fo r genetic causation
Folstein and Rutter’s (1977) twin studies found a strong likelihood of genetic liability. 
Consolidation of quantitative genetic studies elicited figures that translated into a heritability of 
underlying liability of 90 per cent, making it the most genetically influenced of all 
multifactorial child psychiatric disorders (Bailey et al, 1996).
Folstein et al (1977) also observed that family members, who did not fit a diagnosis of autism, 
often showed a range of social and communicative deficits. The assertion that autistic features 
extended beyond the traditional disorder was home out by family studies (c.f. Rutter, 1999; 
Rutter, Maughan, Pickles and Simonoff, 1998).
Explanations that link the high level of inheritabihty of autism and autistic features are based 
on the theory that several genes may be the primary causal factors. These underlie all the 
processes and biological features, possibly mediated by an unknown environmental factor. 
(Pickles et al. 1995). The theories suggest that family members will have some but not all of 
the genes that provide the susceptibility to autism. The presence of certain combinations could 
result in the expression of a behavioural phenotype consistent with autism. However, as they 
do not have the ‘autistic’ combination, they will not develop the clinical disorder. An extension 
of this theory is a person might have a susceptibility to autism due to the presence of certain 
genes but not develop the clinical disorder unless an exogenous event occurs such as birth 
problems or viral infection, triggering the activation of the autism phenotype (Rutter, 1999).
A combination of technological and conceptual advances has meant that it is possible to 
localise susceptibility genes for psychiatric disorders and therefore, potentially identify the 
precise genes involved and determine their functional consequences (Plomin and Rutter, 1998).
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These findings should help to explain the brain abnormalities and elucidate the neural 
processes involved in the causation of autism (Frith and Happe, 1996).
Conclusion
Research strongly indicates that a number of different biological causes may result in autism 
(Gillberg and Coleman, 1992). Although, no unambiguous and universal findings have 
emerged to suggest the genes involved, site of the lesion, or precise nature of the neurochemical 
pathway disrupted in autism, researchers are confident that autism has a primary cause at the 
level of the brain (Herbert, 1998). It would seem then that we may think in terms of a “final 
common pathway”: the multifactorial biological features (birth trauma, genetic abnormality, 
etc.) may affect the same specific component of the brain, resulting in autism.
Following the conclusion that autism has a biological aetiology, the focus of research 
broadened towards the task of integrating the clinical, genetic, neuropsychological and 
neurobiological perspectives in autism within a model, whilst concurrently, investigating the 
precise causal biological agent.
A model of autism
A conceptual model that is applicable to the current knowledge of autism proposes that there 
are multiple causes, and several different behavioural manifestations but a single defining 
cognitive deficit. An example is Morton and Frith’s (1995) four level system in which 
unspecified biological factors cause abnormal brain conditions, which in turn cause cognitive 
malfunction, which cause behavioural symptoms.
Morton and Frith’s model suggests that a single cognitive deficit underlies the ‘triad of 
impairments’, on the premise that if several symptoms co-occur reliably, the simplest 
explanation is they are caused by the same deficit. Therefore, aU the key behavioural features 
of autism are mediated through a single cognitive deficit (although the biological and 
behavioural sequelae might both be multiple).
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The model's strength is its ability to link the cognitive and behavioural level of autism (Morton 
and Frith, 1995). Although, the model’s emphasis on the key role of cognitive deficits in 
autism is well based in empirical evidence, it has been criticised by other researchers due to its 
major limitations. In particular, its failure to provide an explanation of the causal processes 
involved that link biology to cognitive functioning. However, until there are concrete 
biological features in autism such as specific genes involved or brain areas damaged, any 
proposed causal model will be inherently flawed, however, the model provides the best current 
structure for integrating the current knowledge (Morton et al., 1995).
Theories in autism
A theory of autism should generate ways of empirically and clinically testing the theory, 
provide a causal account, explain the specific pattern of deficits and abilities in autism and fit 
with what we know about normal development. A theory should also be able to inform the 
behavioural intervention (diagnosis, management, and education).
At present, there are three major cognitive theories, which have attracted widespread interest. 
These are: theories of impaired social cognition: theories of impaired executive functions: and 
theories of weak central coherence.
This essay wUl show that the theories each have their own explanatory strengths and 
weaknesses in explaining the empirical and clinical evidence from Wing’s triad (Fein, 
Pennington, Markowitz, Braveman and Waterhouse, 1986), and the other behavioural features 
of autism, such as the particular cognitive deficits and abilities, and repetitive behaviours. As 
of yet, no theory of autism has been able to convincingly link the peculiarities of the 
behavioural symptoms to those associated with the ‘triad’ (Gillberg, 1993).
Deficits in Theory o f Mind
Baron-Cohen, Leslie and Frith suggested that social impairments in autism result from a 
person with autism’s inability to “mind read”. Normal children around the age of four develop 
an understanding that people have mental states which can be different from the state of the 
real world and different from their own mental state, a ‘theory of mind’. The “theory of mind”
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explanation of autism suggests that they lack this ability to hold a second order belief 
(metarepresentation). Such a deficit, Frith (1989) suggests, could account for their triad of 
impairments in socialisation, communication and imagination. Researchers confirmed the 
strong association between an impaired ability to understand mental states and autism (Baüey 
et al., 1996; Baron-Cohen and Bolton, 1994; Frith, 1989; Happe, 1994).
The power of this theory is that it can explain at least two of the core symptoms of autism in 
terms of a single cognitive deficit and has predictions, which are both specific and far-reaching 
enough to fit the clinical picture of autism (Frith, 1989).
Theory of mind can make sense of the pattern of socialisation impairments. For example, a 
lack of emphatic social reciprocity would be expected in the absence of the ability to 
understand intentions and beliefs, but general social desire and simple physical contact remain 
intact, as they do not require ‘theory of mind’ (Frith, 1994).
It also predicts that any skül which requires only primary representations (understanding of 
common concrete meaning) should be unimpaired in autism -  thus allowing for the good rote 
memory, and savant abilities.
The communication difficulties in autism show particular patterns of strengths and 
weaknesses: coded communication is possible but ostensive inferential communication is 
impossible without the mentalising ability. In addition, ‘mind blindness, may account for 
difficulties and delays in language acquisition due to a failure to leam words through ostention 
and by reference to the speaker’s intention as well as having no motivation to socially interact 
beyond stating needs (Baron-Cohen, Cox, Baird, Swettenham, Nightingale and Morgan, 1996).
Pretence, Leslie hypothesised, depends on the ability to distinguish between a real state of 
affairs and a playfully pretend state using ‘theory of mind’. Other types of play, such as 
skillfully manipulating mechanical toys, do not depend on this ability and are intact in children 
with autism (Bailey et al., 1996).
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Thus, it can be seen that ‘Theory of mind’s’ particular strength is in explaining the ‘triad of 
social impairments’, however, there are several problems with ‘theory of mind’ that need to be 
resolved (Rutter, 1999).
Problems with the theory o f  mind
Firstly, if the cognitive deficit constituting the basis for autism is so narrow and highly 
specific, why is there such a strong association between autism and learning disabilities (Rutter 
and Bailey, 1993). The majority of people with autism have learning disabilities, more than 
half in the severely disabled range (DeMyer, Barton and Norton, 1972, Lockyer and Rutter, 
1969, Wing et al., 1979).
Secondly, if a deficit in ‘theory of mind’ is responsible, and yet this does not normally develop 
until the age of three or four years, why are the manifestations evident as early as 18 months? 
It could be that autism arises fi'om cognitive mechanisms that are precursors for mentalising 
ability, but currently there is no clear demonstration of a causal relationship between a 
precursor and later theory of mind skills (Happe, 1994).
Thirdly, 20 per cent of verbal children with autism pass theory of mind tests. It remains 
unclear whether they truly have theory of mind skills or use alternative strategies (Frith et al, 
1996).
Fourthly, although it is not difficult to see how impaired ability to understand mental states 
might lead to social and communicative deficits, it is not clear how it produces the ritualistic 
behaviours or unusual cognitive talents found in individuals (Goode, Rutter and Howlin,
1994).
Finally, research has found deficits in the mentalising ability in other populations. This 
suggests that it may not be specific to autism and thus not necessarily the primary cause (Frith 
et al., 1994).
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Deficits in executive functioning
In contrast, to ‘theory of mind’ a specific cognitive deficit, there is a suggestion that autism is 
due to more general difficulties in high-level planning and control of behaviour. In tests of 
executive functioning, people with autism have shown substantial impairments compared to 
controls (Pennington and Ozonoff, 1996). In addition, there is evidence that individuals with 
autism, even those of normal IQ have problems in planning and organisation, switching set and 
perserveration (Bailey et al., 1996).
Executive functioning is defined as the set of abilities involved in maintaining an appropriate 
problem-solving framework (Duncan, 1995). It covers higher cognitive processes such as; 
ability to disengage from context; inhibition of appropriate responses; monitoring performance 
and using feedback (Duncan, 1995).
The theory partially explains non-social behaviours of autism such as, repetitive and 
stereotyped behaviours, since they are predicted if behaviour cannot be flexibly controlled by 
the central executive (Ozonoff and Miller, 1995).
The theory uses ‘theory of mind’ to account for some of features of the ‘triad of impairments’, 
but states precedence in causal direction arguing that extreme executive dysfunction impairs 
the development of ‘mentalising ability’. It suggests that difficulties in cognitive set shifting 
could account for joint attention deficits, which many consider to have a precursor relationship 
to theory of mind impairment (Rutter, 1999). Ozonoff (1991) study provides some support for 
this causal direction he found that deficits in executive functioning were more common than 
theory of mind deficits in the same subjects. However, attempts to reduce theory of mind 
deficits findings to problems in executive functioning have failed (Rutter, 1999).
This led to an alternative possibility that theory of mind impairment causes executive 
dysfunction. However, this argument is not strong, and the evidence for this causal link, i.e. 
individuals with executive functioning deficits should also faü tests of understanding their own 
intentions, has not been examined empirically.
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Executive functioning theory has attempted to explain another aspect of the triad, impairments 
in imagination. Harris (1993) proposed that treating one object as if it were another requires 
the child to ‘ignore’ familiar schema evoked by the object, and instead act according to their 
internal plan. An initial test of this hypothesis failed to find support, but other aspects of 
executive dysfunction, such as a generativity deficit, could also account for pretend play 
impairments.
Problems with deficits in executive functioning
Firstly, problems in executive planning have been found in a wide range of disorders and it 
remains unclear whether a particular type of executive planning deficit is associated with 
autism (Baron-Cohen, 1995).
Secondly, tiie higher cognitive functions concerned are tapped by IQ assessments and are 
expected to be compromised in general learning disabilities. However, deficits are still found 
in clients with normal IQ’s, leading to questions about the relationship between executive 
functions and IQ (Sposato, 1995).
Finally, unlike ‘theory of mind’, precise causal links between executive dysfunction and 
impaired social interaction are not clear. The theory also has problems in explaining aU 
aspects of the non-social impairments in autism. For example, block design is often a peak in 
cognitive testing and a good test of ‘fluid’ intelligence relying on executive abilities (Duncan,
1995).
Weak central coherence theory
A major weakness of the aforementioned theories is their failure to account convincingly for 
the non-social features, such as repetitive activity and behavioural rigidity. Explanations for 
these tend to be in terms of secondary consequences of social impairment.
Weak central coherence theory is a description of cognitive style rather than a deficit account 
of autism (Frith, 1989). Frith proposed that autism is characterised by a specific imbalance in 
the integration of information at different levels. Normal information processing tends to draw
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together diverse information to construct higher level meaning in context -  “central coherence”. 
This universal feature of information processing is proposed to be disturbed, and could explain 
both the assets and deficits shown by people with autism.
Central coherence theory suggests that people with autism are peculiarly free from contextual 
constraints, and predicts that they are good at tasks where attention to local information is 
advantageous, but poor at tasks requiring recognition of global meaning.
Evidence supporting this proposal includes findings that normal and learning disabled people 
show superior processing of meaningful and patterned information over random and 
meaningless stimuli, whilst people with autism appear to show a reduction or absence of the 
benefit from meaning or central coherence (Tager-Husberg, 1991).
Shah and Frith (1993) found that superior performance in Block design was due to an 
advantage in segmenting the original design. People with autism also show particular skills in 
the ‘embedded figures’ test. The ease and speed at which they picked out the figures was 
reminiscent of their rapid style of locating tiny objects and their ease at noticing minute 
changes in familiar environments (Happe, 1994). Frith also suggests that weak central 
coherence may play a role in the development of idiot-savant skills due to abnormal processing.
Therefore, the theory’s strength is its explanation of non-social features, in particular the 
findings from cognitive empirical testing.
Problems with Central Coherence
Happe (1994) points out the main problem with the central coherence account is due to it’s 
recentness. There is a degree of over-extension, and therefore, it is not clear where the limits 
of the theory should be drawn. Currently, there is also limited information about the level at 
which the failure to ‘cohere’ information occurs, for example, local or global levels of 
processing.
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In addition, central coherence does not adequately explain the ‘triad’. Investigations as to 
whether weak central coherence could cause ‘theory of mind impairments’ found results 
suggesting that both weak central coherence and theory of mind impairments exist 
independently in autism (Frith et al., 1994).
Future Investigations
In summary, each of the three theories has its own strengths and weakness in explaining the 
clinical presentation of autism. The idea that there may only be a single cognitive deficit in 
autism has faded in recent years, although there are still strong claims about primacy and 
parsimony of explanation.
Researchers have made tentative and inconclusive suggestions on the relationship between the 
theories. For example, incorporating the three theories in one: disruption at different points of 
one and the same brain system might conceivably result in breakdown characterised by each of 
the theories. Alternatively, Frith and Happe suggested that an understanding of autism might 
rely on the notion of two different cognitive systems being impaired. A modular system 
dedicated to processing mental state information (theory of mind) and a more distributed 
system that determines “cognitive style”, (executive functioning and/or weak central 
coherence).
Theoretical implications for interventions in autism
Interventions claiming to “cure” or be effective, include education, various drugs. Options 
therapy (Kaufman, 1976), Facilitated Communication (Bidden, 1990), Higashi Daily Life 
Therapy (Quill, Gurry and Larkin, 1989), Holding Therapy (Welch, 1983), and many more. 
These treatments differ substantially in their rationale; in most cases systematic evaluations 
have yet to be undertaken and their value remains uncertain.
The majority of these interventions have been formulated by ‘trial and error’ and/or 
‘adaptation from other approaches’ depending on whether they appear to work with people 
with autism, rather than being derived from theories and models of autism.
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Clinicians are beginning to link theories with practice and are consequently, developing new, 
and reflecting on existing interventions. As this essay has illustrated, general consensus is that 
autism has a biological aetiology. Future discovery of an ‘autism’ gene and neural pathways 
may enable the elimination of autism, but until then, despite claims to the contrary (Lovaas, 
1996), autism cannot be ‘cured’. Therefore, emphasis is on management of secondary 
behavioural problems arising from primary impairments proposed by the theories.
General principles for interventions
The knowledge that autism has variations in symptomology, intelligence, and needs (Wing,
1996), has highlighted the necessity for individualised interventions.
Research has informed clinicians that autism is a neurodevelopmental disorder, placing 
importance on deriving appropriate developmental goals, whilst taking into account principles 
of normal psychological development and how autistic deficits might impede that development 
(Rutter and Sussenwein, 1971).
Research findings stress caution when attributing any improvement after an intervention to the 
treatment, as outcome is also dependent on innate cognitive, linguistic, social abilities and 
maturation effects (Rutter, 1999). In addition, Rogers (1996) study showed that intervention 
programs are more effective when started at an early age e.g. 2 to 4 years. Therefore, the 
preferred intervention might vary according to time of diagnosis and individuals ability.
The remainder of this essay will discuss how the theories have influenced educational content 
and methods, particularly the use of behavioural interventions.
Educational interventions
Educational programs guided by the theories and clinical observation have become more 
effective due to alterations in teaching techniques in light of an understanding of the way a 
person with autism learns, and understands the world (HowHn, 1998).
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One change has been in the focus of teaching; increasing priority is given to communication 
and interpersonal areas in response to ‘theory of mind’. A second change is the way that 
people with autism are taught due to the greater understanding of their cognitive functioning 
from executive functioning and central coherence theory. In broad terms, the learning 
environment is adapted to the individual’s learning style, whilst concurrently helping them to 
adapt their own leammg style, so they are better able to understand and operate independently 
in the non-adapted environment.
Content o f teaching
Several programs have been developed to increase interactions and verbal communication 
skills. Mesibov (1984, 1986) and Lord (1984) developed a comprehensive approach to social 
skills training applying cognitive methods, targeting their lack of interaction, difficulties in 
understanding social rules, attention deficits, and communication problems.
However, social skiUs interventions are inherently limited in their effectiveness and 
generalisability due to the difficulty in teaching basic social skills such as making friends, 
knowing what people are feeling and thinking and reacting appropriately. These are 
fundamental human aptitudes and not rule based skills acquirable through teaching.
The notion of a deficit in ‘theory of mind’ has been of particular clinical significance. The 
cognitive theory has given teachers and carers a new insight into the world of the child with 
autism (Ozonoff and Miller, 1995: Swettenham, Baron-Cohen, Gomez and Walsh, 1996), 
inspiring targeted educational interventions. Training packages specifically designed to 
increase the ability to “mind-read” could be an important and valuable addition to the 
educational curricula (Howlin, Baron-Cohen, Hadwin, and Swettenham, in press).
Several studies have found that even after relatively brief intervention programs involving 
computers, pictures or actors, they show improvements in their ability to understand beliefs 
and emotions (Swettenham, 1995; Ozonoff et al., 1995). However, there is typically a lack of 
generalisation to other theory of mind challenges in tests or real life.
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Teaching methods
Traditionally, behavioural methods were used to manage specific behavioural problems, 
including; self-stimulation, aggression, obsessional and ritualistic behaviour and self-injurious 
behaviour. Although, systematic investigations into efficacy show behavioural programs have 
significant value in the treatment of autism, there are criticisms (Howlin, 1998).
Generally, interventions occurred in non-naturalistic settings with no measurement of long term 
gains m normal life. Techniques used were often punitive or used material reinforcers 
(Lovaas, Schaeffer and Simmons, 1965). Gains made by behavioural interventions showed 
limited generalisability, with marked individual differences in outcome (Wolf-Schein, 1994).
Theoretical knowledge has educated clinicians in the application of behavioural principles. 
Research has led to a better understanding of ways to structure and organise the environment, 
thus pre-empting maladaptive behaviours by making it more meaningful and predictable. This 
often reduces the need for intense behaviour programs aimed at negative behaviours (Schopler, 
1976).
If intense programs are required the emphasis is on making the behaviours more acceptable 
and adaptive rather than eradicating them, due to an understanding of the function of 
obsessional and ritualistic behaviours.
The traditional methods of shaping and changing behaviours have also been re-evaluated 
within the theoretical framework. Graded approaches should be done slowly as people with 
autism have problems in learning information, which could increase the duration of extinction 
burst. They also have problems with sequencing, which effects skills building and predicting 
change. Additionally, motivating reinforcers are hard to identify, they have to be explicit, 
concrete, or highly salient (Cooper, Heron and Heward, 1989).
Theories have also informed clinicians of the factors in autism that effect the ability to learn. 
These include; abnormal adjustment to changes in routines, interference from behaviour 
problems and self-stimulatory movements, over-selectivity of attention resulting in them
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focusing on an aspect of a task or situation, leaving other relevant properties un-noticed. 
Finally, possibly due to lack of theory of mind, people with autism do not appear to have 
imitative skills or the interest to model behaviours such as appropriate social behaviour or 
language development from other children.
Educational programs using behavioural principles
An educational program based on behavioural principles making substantial claims about 
efficacy is Lovaas’s (1996) intensive pre-school behavioral program. He states that two fifths 
of children gain normal functioning. There are many criticisms including, limitations in 
subject selection, research design, and in particular the criteria used in ascertaining normal 
functioning. Clinicians are also concerned about cost to families in emotional, financial and 
practical terms. Systematic independent replication of the findings needs to take place before 
Lovaas’s findings can be accepted or dismissed (Rutter, 1999).
Schopler’s (1971) TEACCH program is more sophisticated than Lovaas’s program, with 
better face validity. The program is aimed primarily at designing sheltered settings, with 
structured schedules both in the classroom and home. These help children develop existing 
skills rather than trying to overcome fundamental deficits (Lord and Schopler, 1984). The 
curriculum is behaviourally orientated, using parents as co-therapists, with details worked out 
individually, allowing for the child’s developmental level and the parents’ priorities and 
resources.
Evaluative research showed that the treatment program produced some dramatic changes and 
long-term gains were superior to other methods of treatment. The main benefits seen were in 
behavioral problems and social functioning. However, the program made no difference to IQ 
levels and gains in language development were small. There were also large individual 
differences in outcome (Howlin, 1998).
Final conclusion
The clinical picture that autistic spectrum disorder presents is complex. Attempts to combine 
the three levels of autism (biological, cognitive and behavioural) within a model have had
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limited success due to the unknown factor in the biolo^cal aetiology. Research has had some 
success in generating theories to explain the links between the cognitive and behavioural levels. 
However, attempts to reduce the theories into a single cognitive deficit have failed. Autism is 
likely to be characterised by multiple biological, cognitive and behavioural factors.
The theories main impact has been in helping clinicians gain a better understanding of the 
world of the person with autism, and the various factors that need to be considered in designing 
and modifying interventions and environments for a presently incurable neuropsychological 
developmental disorder.
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What theories have been advanced to explain childhood phobias? Consider their 
strengths limitations and the evidence base that would support their use in clinical and
practice.
Introduction
Theories and interventions for childhood phobias have been predominantly derived from 
empirical and clinical evidence from adult populations. The adaptation of adult theories of 
phobias has face validity from the wealth of literature in childhood fears suggesting that the 
type of stimuli perceived as threatening, and elicited response is the same for fears and 
phobias. The response is comprised of physical, cognitive, emotional and behavioural 
components (Silverman and Rabin, 1994). A distinction is made between normal adaptive 
fears and chronic maladaptive phobias based on the accurate or inaccurate appraisal of 
potential threat posed by a situation or stimulus, not accounted for by developmental factors 
(OUendick, King and Yule, 1994).
Several issues have to be considered when evaluating theories explaining childhood phobias. 
Fhstly, proposed theories have to consider the different developmental and cognitive 
presentations of adults and children. Secondly, the justification for adaptation from adult 
theories is partially based on the belief that there is common symptomology between fears 
and phobias. Research does not unequivocally support this proposal, it cannot be said 
whether individuals with phobic symptoms experience different types of anxiety symptoms, 
or the same types but at different levels of severity, predominantly due to different assessment 
measures used to identify and examine anxiety in fear and phobias (Barrios and O’Dell, 
1989). Thirdly, unlike adults, children often do not see their phobia as marked or 
unreasonable, thus theories should reflect this phenomena (Ferrai, 1986).
A successful theory should be able to explain how a phobia develops, is maintained and leads 
to an effective intervention. Initially, this essay explores the nature of childhood fears and the 
possible implications for theories of phobias. It then examines the strengths and limitations of 
the theories proposed to explain childhood phobia aetiology using evidence from empirical 
and clinical research.
It will be argued that a single theory cannot explain childhood phobia aetiology. Evidence 
suggests that phobia aetiology is multi-modal and subject to individual differences.
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Consequently, interventions for the effective treatment of the phobias reflect this finding 
suggesting a multi-modal approach.
Childhood Fears
Bauer’s (1976) study found that the primary object or situation in children’s fears changed 
over development. Bauer and other authors’ illustrated how children’s fears parallel their 
cognitive and social development (Ferrai, 1986, OUendick, King and Yule, 1994). For 
example, toddlers develop skUls for imagination but not distinguishing reality from fantasy in 
the pre-operational period, hence, their fears centre on imaginary creatures e.g. monsters. As 
formal operational thinking develops in adolescence, predictions are made on the future with 
anticipation of potential threats and hazards, particularly within social relationships 
(Fredrikson, Annas, Fisher, and Wik, 1996).
As fears appear to be common in normal development and foUow developmental patterns and 
narrow and circumscript stimuU, Bowlby (1973) postulated that fears have an evolutionary 
and adaptive function as a protection mechanism from predators and harmful situations.
The aforementioned findings have ramifications for aetiological theories of phobias. Firstly, 
a theory has to explain why some children never develop fears or phobias. Secondly, with 
cognitive and social development, why some chUdren do not ‘grow out o f  their fear and 
develop a phobia. FinaUy, why children appear to only develop fears and phobias defined to 
certain stimuli.
Definitions of Phobias
Three components are common to phobias, firstly, experience of an unpleasant degree of 
anxiety when faced with phobic stimuU or situations. Secondly, a powerful wish to escape or 
avoid contact, and finaUy, when not in the phobic situation, the ability to recognise but not act 
on the reahsation that the fears are exaggerated (Barlow, 1988).
DSM-IV distinguishes between specific phobias, where the class of eUciting stimuli is narrow 
and effects on a person’s adjustment may be circumscribed; and social phobia and 
agoraphobia, where a broader class of stimuli are involved and the impact on the person’s 
adjustment may be more pervasive (American Psychiatric Association, 1994).
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DSM-IV defines a specific phobia as excessive and unreasonable fear of objects or situations 
where avoidance, anxiety or distress is associated with functional impairment or significant 
distress (American Psychiatric Association, 1994). In addition, DSM-IV differentiates 
between four highly prevalent types of specific phobia: animal (e.g. spider phobia), natural 
environment (e.g. phobia of heights), blood-injection-injury (e.g. dental phobia) and 
situational (e.g. claustrophobia).
DSM-IV defines Social phobia as fear of social situations where there is exposure to 
unfamiliar people or scrutiny by others provoking anxiety, which the individual with a phobia 
recognises as excessive. The individual with a phobia avoids social situations and thus 
experiences significant interference with functioning. Finally, Agoraphobia is defined as fear 
of being in places or situations from which escape might be difficult or in which help may not 
be available in event of a panic attack (American Psychiatric Association, 1994).
Prevalence and Epidemiology
Anderson, Williams, McGee, and Silva’s (1987) epidemiological study identified 2.4% of 
children with specific phobias and 0.9% with social phobias, these prevalence figures were 
replicated in a later study (Anderson, 1994). In a study on a clinical sample, 31% were 
diagnosed with phobic disorders; 8.8% had social phobias; 10.5% had specific phobias; and 
16.9% had a specific or social phobia of school (Strauss, Lease, Last, and Francis, 1988). In 
addition, prevalence and onset of the different phobias varies with age, for example, social 
phobia shows a higher prevalence amongst adolescents (Graziano and DeGiovanni, 1979).
Gender differences are consistently reported in prevalence, number and type of phobias (Abe 
and Masuri, 1981; Anderson et al, 1987). Girls tend to report more phobias and fears than 
boys (e.g. Earls, 1980; Lapouse and Monk, 1958). However, sex differences are modulated 
by age, for example, MacFarlane, Allen, and Honzik, (1954) reported that girls display more 
intense fears than boys only after age 11. Sex differences in phobia prevalence cannot be 
explained by assuming that it is more socially permissible for girls to report fear than boys 
(Cornelius and Averill, 1983), as for example, a simple self-report bias is unable to account 
for the balanced sex distribution of blood-injection phobias (Fredrikson et al., 1996). 
Research has also highlighted differences between cultures and socio-economic groups 
(Lapouse and Monk, 1958).
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Therefore, in addition to providing an account of individual differences in phobia 
development, and explanations of phobia acquisition, maintenance and treatment, a theory on 
phobia aetiology should elucidate the differences in prevalence found in age, and between 
gender, culture and socio-economic groups.
Theories of phobias 
Psychodynamic
Freud’s psychodynamic formulation heralded modem theories of phobias. He postulated that 
in phobias, unacceptable feelings are prevented from entering consciousness by being 
transformed into neurotic anxiety and displaced onto a phobic object, symbolising the object 
about which the unacceptable impulses were felt. Freud developed his theory from the ‘Little 
Hans’ case, where Hans had a horse phobia. He argued that the unacceptable feelings were 
castration anxiety, and fear of the father was displaced to the horse, due to the blinkers 
resembling his father’s glasses. According to Freud, the phobia meant that Hans could avoid 
the object, whilst maintaining a loving relationship with his father (Freud, 1909).
Supporting evidence comes from evidence that psychodynamic therapy shows efficacy with 
children who have anxiety disorders (Fonagy and Moran, 1990). Treatment aims to interpret 
the defence, hidden feelings, which are being repressed, and associated neurotic anxiety, 
consequently, eradicating the need to displace the anxiety onto the phobic object or situation 
(Malan, 1979). Therapy is usually conducted in a non-directive play-therapy format with 
young children and within individual psychodynamic psychotherapy with adolescents.
However, evaluative studies were often subject to non-random assignment of patients, lack of 
untreated controls, confounding length of treatment with the interval between assessments 
(spontaneous remission), and unrepresentative sample (Target and Fonagy, 1994).
Criticisms include firstly, that Freud’s analysis of Hans was based on information reported in 
letters written by the father. Secondly, evidence for Hans wanting sexual contact with his 
mother was minimal. Thirdly, there was little evidence that Hans hated or feared his father. 
Fourthly, Hans denied any symbolic connection between horses and his father, which was 
interpreted as evidence for the connection, and fifthly, there is no evidence that sexual 
excitement is translated into anxiety (Wolpe and Rachman, 1960). Moreover, the theory does
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not provide an account of individual differences, the circumscribed nature of phobic stimuli 
or prevalence findings.
Behavioural theory
Various behavioural theories specify different mechanisms and content in phobia 
development. The following discussion will not specify specific types of phobia, as 
Behavioursists take a functional stance considering that they share an identical process of 
development and differ only in phobic object or situation (King, Hamilton and OUendick, 
1988).
Classical conditioning
The core principle for learning theorists developing models for phobia aetiology is classical 
conditioning (Watson and Rayner, 1920). The basic phenomenon of aversive classical 
conditioning (i.e. fear can be conditioned to a CS (conditioned stimulus) by pairing that CS 
with an aversive UCS (unconditioned stimulus) has been documented many times (King et 
al., 1988).
In CampbeU, Sanderson, and Laverty’s (1964) study, subjects listened to a tone (CS) foUowed 
by an injection, producing temporary respiratory paralysis (UCS) and, consequently, 
developed extreme fear (UCR). Even weeks after subjects reacted with a strong automatic 
response (CR) to isolated presentations of the tone. In addition to laboratory produced 
phobia-Uke fears, there is evidence that conditioning processes operate in everyday life 
(Davey, 1989).
Classical conditioning can account for a person’s subjective and physiological fear when 
exposed to a phobic CS, but not a phobic’s persistent avoidance behaviour. Mowrer’s (1960) 
two-stage theory of phobia development attempts to explain the phenomena. In the first 
stage, conditioned fear response develops to the neutral CS, by its pairing to an aversive UCS. 
During the second stage, the person learns to reduce fear levels by avoiding the CS, which 
over time reinforces avoidance behaviour and becomes an integral part of the phobia.
Mowrer’s theory has some support from research showing that subjects develop persistent 
avoidance responding if given the chance to escape when confronted with pairings of light 
(CS) and shock (UCS) (MaUoy and Levis, 1988).
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However, there are problems with the classical conditioning model and its extension, 
Mowrer’s two-stage theory. Firstly, it would be expected that any object can become a 
phobic stimulus (CS), provided an aversive event follows (UCS), and therefore fails to 
explain why specific fears are non-randomly distributed (Seligman, 1971).
Secondly, contrary to the models’ prediction, trauma (UCS) without subsequent phobia can 
occur (Saigh, 1984). Evidence shows that aversive experiences (UCSs) with for example, 
dogs, does not always produce dog phobia (ddSfardo, Guzy, and Bak, 1988).
Thirdly, phobia without preceding trauma (UCS) is possible; people develop a fear response 
to a CS, although it has never been paired with an UCS (Menzies and Clarke, 1995).
Fourthly, Mowrer’s extension of the classical conditioning model implicates active 
behavioural avoidance of the UCS, whereas phobics exhibit passive avoidance of the CS 
(Seligman, 1971).
The theory provides an account of possible acquisition and maintenance processes in phobias. 
However, it cannot explain aU research and clinical evidence, consequently suggesting that 
other processes are implicated in phobia development and individual differences.
Adaptive Evolutionary-Preparedness theory
Garcia and KoeUing (1966) and later supported by Seligman (1970, 1971), proposed Adaptive 
evolutionary preparedness theory, a biological oriented revision of the classical conditioning 
model, to explain why few stimuli induce phobia. It postulates that humans are biologically 
predisposed (or prepared) to react only to certain objects or situations relating to evolutionary 
survival. Aversive conditioning interacts with evolutionary preparedness to produce phobic 
fear. An evolutionary-prepared fear is acquired more rapidly through exposure, extinguished 
with greater difficulty and time, and more resistant to explanation or rationalisation.
Several human and animal studies tested this theory under laboratory conditions and found 
supporting evidence (Mineka and Cook, 1993). Ohman and Soares (1994) conditioned 
autonomic reactions of normal subjects to evolutionary relevant (e.g. spiders) or evolutionary 
neutral (e.g. flowers) stimuli with electric shock UCSs. Once acquired, conditioned responses 
to evolutionary relevant cues were slower to extinguish than evolutionary neutral cues, 
supporting the central tenet of preparedness hypothesis.
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However, authors criticised the ‘adaptionist’ assumption underlying preparedness theory. 
They argue that it is difficult to determine the evolutionary relevance of various stimuh and 
Darwinian arguments run the risk of being ‘adaptive stories’ relying on plausibility. 
Furthermore, several studies have failed to rephcate Ohman’s findings (Merckelbach and de 
Jong, 1996), and there are examples of unprepared stimuli based phobias being difficult to 
extinguish (Rachman & Seligman, 1976). In addition, Davey (1995) pointed out that Ohman 
and Mineka’s results are open to alternative interpretations. For example, resistance to 
extinction effect might be the product of pre-experimental expectancies rooted in culture 
rather than genes.
Adaptive evolutionary-preparedness theory offers an account of phobias circumscribed 
nature, whilst retaining classical conditioning theories strength. However, it is still subject to 
the other problems with classical conditioning theory, such as why phobias develop without 
direct trauma.
Modelling
Modelling theory proposes that as well as acquiring phobias by direct conditioning, they also 
develop via indirect conditioning such as watching or listening to others reacting fearfully to a 
stimulus. Empirical support has come from animal, individual and family studies. Hygge and 
Ohman (1978) demonstrated sympathetic activation m subjects to pictures of snakes after 
they had observed others being frightened by them. Fryer, Mannuzza, Gallops, Martin, 
Aaronson, Gorman, Liebowitz and Klein (1990) found that 33% of relatives of specific 
phobia clients had a phobia compared to 11% of controls, although, the study did not 
distinguish between different etiological mechanisms (e.g. genetic inheritance and modelling, 
etc).
In addition, support is provided by clinical research into efficacy of theory based treatment. 
Specifically three types of modelling procedures: symbolic modelling, live models, and 
participant modelling have been evaluated and tentatively show participant modelling' 
superiority (Barrios and O’Dell, 1989). In participant modelling, a model is seen going 
through a gradual approach sequence -  first, the child watches and then performs the 
responses without the models assistance. Treatment efficacy increases, if used in conjunction 
with gradual exposure and live models (Graziano et al. 1979). However, some authors 
(Graziano and Mooney, 1982) question modelling technique’s efficacy in treating social
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phobia, but, O’Conner (1969) has reported good results in socially withdrawn and fearful 
children.
Unlike direct conditioning theories, modelling theories can account for phobia aetiology 
without direct experience of trauma, but fail to provide a complete model for all phobias. 
Firstly, phobics often do not report becoming frightened after witnessing someone else’s 
distress. Secondly, many people have been exposed to others bad experiences but not 
developed phobias.
In combination, the aforementioned theories can explain many aspects of phobias, such as 
direct and indirect acquisition; phobia maintenance and the circumscribed nature of phobic 
stimuli, as well as generating interventions that show some efficacy. However, they are 
unable to explain individual differences in susceptibility to phobia development, or absence of 
phobia after direct or indirect trauma or conversely, presence of phobia without direct or 
indirect trauma.
Neo-conditioning perspective
Neo-conditioning theories based on learning theory principles, attempt to account for phobia 
acquisition without overt trauma and non-acquisition of phobia with trauma.
Initially identified m animal conditioning, UCS inflation refers to the pairing of a CS with a 
mild UCS learnt through exposure (Rescorla, 1971). However, given the UCS’s low 
intensity, the SS association leads to a weak conditioned fear response. If subsequently, a 
person learns that UCS is more aversive than previous experience suggested, this post 
conditioning information causes an inflation of UCS value in memory, consequently, 
strengthening the Conditioned fear response (Davey, 1989). Thus, UCS inflation can account 
for phobia development without overt trauma.
Several case histories have been interpreted in terms of UCS inflation (Leitenberg et al., 
1973). However, laboratory experiments with human subjects show that it is hard to produce 
robust fear conditioning through UCS inflation (de Jong, Muris, and Mercklebach, 1996). 
Thus, there are theoretical and clinical arguments for the UCS inflation phenomenon, but the 
conditions under which it manifests are ill understood.
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Another neo-conditioning theory, Latent inhibition, may explain why traumatic experiences 
fail to result in phobias. Repeated experience that the CS predicts nothing, and is innocuous, 
and, consequent incidental co-occurrence of CS, and aversive UCS may not be powerful 
enough to change the CS into a predictor of the UCS. Thus prior non-aversive experiences 
with the CS, inhibits fear conditioning (Kagan, Reznick, Clarke and Snidman, 1984). 
Research supporting this hypothesis shows that it is difficult to condition fear responses to a 
familiar CS formerly never associated with an aversive UCS (Booth, Siddle, and Bond, 1989).
To recapitulate, neoconditioning concepts such as latent inhibition and UCS inflation deal 
with some inadequacies of the direct and indirect conditioning approaches. Specifically, 
latent inhibition can explain why UCS trauma does not always lead to phobia, while UCS 
inflation can explain why phobia occurs without pertinent UCS trauma. It should be 
acknowledged that support for the concepts are mixed, with researchers stating that the neo- 
conditioning view is ‘too liberal’ and over inclusive (de Jong et al., 1996).
Operant conditioning
It is proposed that avoidance of an object or situation can lead to positive consequences, and 
subsequent phobia development. For example, school phobia, results in increased contact 
with the family, reducing separation anxiety. Contingency management procedures based on 
the theory advocate exposure to, rather than avoidance of the fear stimulus, followed by 
positive consequences, leading to extinction (Morris and Kratochwill, 1983).
Lietenberg and Callahan (1973) evaluated contingency management’s effectiveness. 
Children exposed to reinforcement were willing to remain in the dark significantly longer 
than the control group. However, the study should be interpreted cautiously because of 
limited subject numbers and the inabihty to quantify degree of fearfulness. Although, many 
positive outcomes have been described in contingency management studies, few have 
assessed the usefulness of this procedure in isolation (OUendick et al., 1994).
Although some phobias may develop because of environmental reinforcement, and there is 
some support from intervention research, general applicability of operant theory is strained 
due to the fact that phobic’s lives become severely limited through their need to avoid 
harmless situations. Operant conditioning is more likely to maintain a developed phobia, as 
in Mower’s two-stage theory (Rachman, 1977).
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Summary
Research attempting to produce or eradicate phobias based on individual behavioural theories 
has shown mixed efficacy, postulated to be due to individual differences in phobia 
acquisition. For example, one person might develop a phobia of snakes after being bitten, 
another from observing someone else being bitten. Therefore, interventions based on direct 
conditioning might not be as effective for phobias acquired indirectly due to the different 
aetiology pathway.
Although, behavioural theories advocate different processes in phobia acquisition; direct or 
indirect conditioning; overt or covert trauma, they all propose that phobia is a learnt response 
and thus can be ‘unlearned’ or extinguished. Therefore, a behavioural intervention using 
techniques derived from both direct and indirect conditioning theories could show increased 
efficacy and thus support the core tenant that phobias are a learnt response.
This proposition has some support in the hterature. Wolpe (1958), systematic desensitisation 
involves three phases: 1) teaching an antagonistic response (e.g. relaxation), 2) constructing a 
fear hierarchy, and 3) pairing the antagonistic response to each hierarchy item. Phobias 
successfully treated with systematic desensitisation include darkness (Jackson and King, 
1981), loud noises (Tasto, 1969), heights (Croghan and Musante, 1975) and needles 
(Rainwater, Sweet, Elliot, Bower, McNeil, and Stump, 1989). Efficacy increased further, 
when used in association with modelling (OUendick et al., 1994).
Despite, behavioural theories apparent strength in informing research and clinical practice, 
they are still unable to account for individual differences in vulnerabihty to phobia 
development, or differences found between gender, age, culture and socio-economic groups.
Biological theories
Biological theories strive to explain individual differences in hability to developing phobias, 
postulating that phobias develop when a person with inherited vulnerabihty is exposed to 
threatening environmental stimuli. This proposition has some support from genetic and 
neurophysiological research.
Several large scale twin studies explored the extent that genetic factors predispose to phobic 
fear (Kendler, Neale, Kessler, Health and Eves, 1992), and found greater concordance for
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monozygotic than dizygotic twins (Torgersen, 1983). Collectively, studies suggest that 
genetic vulnerabihty is based on a general trait predisposing to neurotic complaints. Thus in 
some cases, the predisposition is expressed as specific phobia, and in other cases as social 
phobia or agoraphobia, depending on the environmental trigger (Kendler, et al., 1992). 
Evidence suggests that the genetic contribution is specific for blood phobia (Marks, 1988).
However, results should be interpreted with caution for several reasons, first, close relatives, 
although, sharing genes, also have opportunity to observe and influence one another, and 
second, twin studies did not show total concordance. In sum, although there is reason to 
beheve that genetic factors are involved in phobia aetiology, evidence is needed on their 
contribution and how the disposition translates into neurophysiology.
Neurophysiology
Researchers have attempted to explain how genetic disposition might affect neurophysiology. 
For example, Eysenck (1967) postulated that individual differences in inherent arousal resting 
levels were responsible for vulnerabihty to anxiety and consequently, phobias via learning. 
Evidence supporting arousal theory comes from bioassay research focusing on central 
nervous system’s (CNS) influence on neurotransmitter/peripheral dynamics in emotion. 
Research suggests that anxiety develops because of dysfunctions in Gamma-amino-butyric 
acid (GAB A) producing neurones that modulate arousal levels in the CNS. GAB A is usuaUy 
released once arousal reaches a certain level, binding with GABA receptors on excited 
‘anxiety’ neurons, causing inhibition, reduction m arousal, and a decrease in experienced 
anxiety. Clinical interventions using benzodiazephines, which bind to GABA neuroreceptors, 
have shown some degree of efficacy (Bernstein, 1994).
Clinical trials investigating pharmacotherapy have methodological limitations, such as small 
sample sizes, lack of diagnostic rigor, inclusion of co-morbid diagnosis subjects, and variable 
length of treatment. With children, few controUed trials have been conducted, and findings 
suggest that drugs lead to tolerance, dependence and only margmaUy better rehef than 
placebos (Taylor, 1994: Bernstein, 1994; Gadow, 1992). At this time, evidence for anti­
anxiety pharmacological treatment is inconclusive (Gittelman and Koplewicz, 1986). 
Children who experience a reduction in their perceived level of anxiety from medication 
might increase their willingness to face phobic situations and consequently, augment the 
efficacy of exposure treatment.
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Thus, biological theories have attempted to explain individual differences in liability to 
phobia development. Research is characterised by methodological limitations, thus only 
tentative conclusions can be drawn. It is also impossible to ascertain whether 
neurophysiology is altered due to phobia, or conversely, phobia is caused by 
neurophysiology. However, even if phobias have an underlying biochemical basis, phobia 
development requires an interaction between this hability and an environmental trigger and/or 
conditioning.
Although, learning and biological theories in combination appear to provide strong evidence 
for acquisition, they have problems in explaining phobia maintenance, partially due to the fact 
that phobics recognise the irrationahty of their fears yet continue to avoid the phobic situation 
or object. Family and cognitive aetiological theories attempt to provide a comprehensive 
account of phobia acquisition and maintenance.
Family/Systems theory
Evidence from genetic and learning models could also be interpreted within family theory 
phobia aetiology. It postulates that children develop phobias when sociahsed in famihes 
where significant family members ehcit, model and reinforce anxiety behefs and behaviours. 
Through observing family members articulating these behefs and engaging in family 
interactions premised on these behefs, children may come to intemahse them, developing a 
personal danger-saturated behef system. Anxiety is maintained by family interaction, 
reinforcing the child’s anxiety related behefs and avoidance behaviour. Furthermore, family 
lifecycle transitions and stressful life events may precipitate onset of clinicahy significant 
anxiety problems (Bolton, 1994).
There is substantial evidence that the parent of a majority of children with anxiety disorders 
also have anxiety disorders (Klein, 1994) and modelling and parenting style play an important 
role in anxiety pattern transmission from parent to children (Silverman, Cemy and Nelles, 
1988). In addition, increased incidence of stressful life events and marital discord can be 
associated with onset of anxiety disorders (Klein, 1994).
Research points to the effectiveness of family interventions in anxiety disorders (Estrada and 
Pinsof, 1995; Dadds, Heard and Rappee, 1992), where the aim is to replace dysfunctional
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anxiety producing repetitive patterns with new, more functional patterns (McDermott, Werry, 
Petti, Combrinck-Graham and Char, 1989).
Family theory for phobia aetiology offers an alternative cultural explanation of vulnerabihty 
to phobias, whilst incorporating concepts of behavioural and cognitive theories using 
systematic terms. This later point is reflected in evaluative studies of interventions, where 
systemic methods have incorporated behavioural and cognitive techniques. Therefore, it is 
not clear which is the ‘therapeutic factor’. In addition, the theory is subject to over 
inclusivity, and does not provide a coherent account of phobia acquisition.
In summary, the theories strength hes in its’ abihty to explain, cultural and individual 
differences in phobia maintenance, and providing a framework in which to place other 
theories.
Cognitive Theory
Cognitive theories provide an alternative to biological and family theories in explaining 
individual differences in phobia acquisition. Beck and Emery (1985) asserted that 
overemphasis on anxiety affect and behaviour has obscured underlying cognitive 
preoccupation with danger. Cognitive theories propose that individuals with phobia have 
specific cognitions and coping styles, which increases vulnerabilty to developing and 
maintaining a phobia.
As children grow, they develop increasingly stable schemata of their environment and 
experience. These schemata regulate the behaviour and information processing, and if 
disrupted, cause anxiety (Kagan et al., 1984). Anxious schemata may remain latent until 
triggered by stressful threatening life events, reactivating threat-orientated cognitive schemas 
formed in childhood during threatening experiences. These threat-orientated schemas contain 
assumptions about the dangerous nature of the environment and automatic cognitive 
distortions such as minimismg safety-related events, maximising threat-related, negative 
events, and being hypervigilant for signs of danger. Cognitive distortions maintain anxiety by 
preventing normal affective or behavioural responses, which reduce anxiety. Cognitive 
theory distinguishes between the phobias, proposing that they are characterised by distinct 
schemata and cognitive dysfunctions (Beck and Emery, 1985).
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Supporting Beck’s model, phobics have been found to have cognitive distortions, restricted to 
certain information processes and somatic domains. Firstly, evidence shows dysfunctions in 
attentional and inferential processes. Secondly, attentional and judgemental biases 
accompanying phobias are tied to specific stimuH, relevant to their phobia.
Attentional bias refers to the phenomenon of hyperattention to threatening material and 
hypoattention to peripheral details. Anxious chent’s colour naming for threatening words is 
slower on the Stroop task (Dalgleish and Watts, 1990), postulated to be due to interference 
with the mam task from phobics focusing attention on content of threatening words. 
Rackman and Cuk (1992) found that specific phobias experienced perceptual distortions, 
spider fearful subjects were more inclined to perceive a spider in a bowl as jumping towards 
them than non-fearful subjects. Increased encoding of phobic sthnuh due to attentional bias, 
followed by avoidance of full stimulus elaboration, hinders extinction, maintaining phobias.
Kindt, Bierman and Brosschot’s (1996) study raised the possibihty that attentional bias to 
threat is common in children, but diminishes with time, speculating that non-fearful children 
learn to inhibit selective processing of threat cues. Accordingly, development of childhood 
fears into phobias may be marked by failed inhibition of selective attention.
Two types of judgmental bias might contribute to phobia maintenance; covariation bias, and 
exconsequentia inference. Covariation bias is the tendency to overestimate phobic stimuh 
and aversive outcomes association. Individuals with phobia systematically overestimate the 
contingency between phobic stimuh and aversive outcomes, consequently, attributing 
aversive experiences to the phobic object sustaining phobic fear. There is evidence that 
covariation bias reduces in successfuhy treated spider phobics (de Jong, Merckelbach, and 
Amtz, 1995; Tomarken, Sutton and Mineka, 1995).
Ex consequentia inference is a style of ‘emotional reasoning’ (Beck and Emery, 1985). Like 
other people, phobics correctly assume that dangerous situations elicit anxiety. However, 
unlike many non-phobic subjects, phobics believe that anxiety symptoms imply the presence 
of danger. The inference probably serves to legitimate phobic fear and, thus, maintains 
phobia.
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Cognitive based interventions aim to modify behaviour and emotion by influencing pattern of 
thought, through the alteration of specific perceptions, images, thoughts, and behefs.
Verbal self-instructional training is the most frequently used cognitive approach with phobic 
children and involves helping the child use self-statements reflecting coping and competency, 
or fear-reduction statements (Graziano and Mooney, 1980, 1982). Self-control or 
competency procedures have been effective in reducing children’s nighttime fears (Graziano 
et al, 1980), fear of darkness (Kanfer, Karoly, and Newman, 1975), and pubhc speaking 
(Cradock, Cotier & Jason, 1978). A second technique, cognitive restructuring, has been found 
to have some efficacy particularly with older children (Ghendick, King and Hamilton, 1979; 
Kane and Kendall, 1989).
Unlike learning theories, cognitive theory provides a convincing account of firstly, 
maintenance of ‘normal’ fears and phobias, and secondly, why a child might not grow out of 
a fear with development. However, its explanation of phobia acquisition is not as strong. 
Firstly, why does a child develop a phobia rather than general anxiety. Secondly, the premise 
that non-specific stress provokes activation of schemata leads to over prediction of phobia 
prevalence in adults. Most individuals will experience aversive hfe events in adult and 
childhood, but only a minority develop a specific fear (McNally, 1989). Thirdly, cognitive 
models were derived from adult research. The translation to children does not directly take 
into account cognitive levels of development. Consequently, cognitive therapy has to be 
adapted to match cognitive development when working with children. Finally, family 
structures are postulated to partly maintain cognitive behefs, therefore, there is a need to work 
within the family system.
DSM-IV states that phobic fear is recognised by the individual as excessive or unreasonable. 
Thus, if an otherwise well-functioning person is afraid of something that, intellectually, he or 
she acknowledges as harmless, of what use can it be to alter the person’s thoughts about it? 
Furthermore, there is no evidence that eliminating irrational beliefs, without exposure to the 
phobic situation, reduces phobic avoidance (Wilhams and Rappoport, 1983).
Conclusion
AU theories attempting to explain phobia aetiology have some support from empirical and 
clinical evidence. However, none are able to explain all empirical and clinical research, or
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explain the mixed efficacy of treatments based on the models. It could be argued that, firstly, 
biological models are better at explaining vulnerability to phobia development. Second, 
evolutionary theories appear to be superior at explaining the circumscribed nature of phobias. 
Third, behavioural models could be seen to provide a stronger account of acquisition. Fourth, 
cognitive and family theories show superiority in accounting for phobia maintenance. Thus, 
evidence suggests that phobias are a heterogeneous class of disorders with different 
acquisition pathways both within and between phobias, depending on individual differences. 
This proposal has been supported by retrospective studies on phobia origin, and 
conceptualised by Rachman’s hypothesis that acquisition and maintenance of phobias is 
multi-modal.
Rachman (1977) postulated that phobias were acquired via one of, or a combination of, three 
pathways: 1) direct experience of trauma (conditioning), 2) indirect experience of trauma 
(vicarious exposure), or 3) the transmission of information. Each of these pathways 
represents one of two methods of acquisition: direct acquisition (in the case of conditioning) 
or indirect acquisition (in the case of both vicarious exposure and transmission of 
information). Although, each of the three pathways is represented in the phobia subtypes, 
direct conditioning experiences seem to be predominant in acquisition. However, there are 
differences in route distribution between phobia subtypes (Menzies and Clarke, 1993). 
Secondly, studies (OUendick et al., 1994) found that fearful subjects often report more than 
one pathway, with children reporting these same three acquisition pathways suggesting that 
the mechanisms operate during the early developmental stages.
According to Rachman, phobias based on direct conditioning pathways would be dominated 
by behavioural and physiological symptoms; whereas indirectly acquired phobias would be 
characterised by cognitive symptoms. Consequently, the first class of phobias would profit 
more from exposure based interventions, whereas the second class of phobias would benefit 
more from cognitive interventions.
Thus, clinical interventions need to reflect the suggestion of multi-modal phobia acquisition. 
Thorough assessment and formulation for individual cases, to gain an idea of specific 
idiosyncratic acquisition and maintenance pathways should premise interventions.
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Cognitive behavioural therapy marries the enactive techniques of behaviour therapy with the 
emphasis on thought processes from cognitive therapy, and consequently, directly addresses 
possible acquisition and maintenance pathways as well as physiological, behavioural, and 
cognitive components involved in a multi-dimensional construct of phobic anxiety (Kendall, 
Chansky, Kane, Kim, Kortlander, Ronan, Sessa, and Siqueland, 1992).
Studies of cognitive-behavioural approaches have focused on prevention of night time fears, 
fear of dental procedures, test and pubhc speaking anxiety, and clinical case studies (KendaU 
et al, 1992). Cognitive-behavioural approaches have shown superior efficacy in reducing 
anxiety and avoidance in phobic children (Kanfer et al., 1975). However, effectiveness of this 
technique as a treatment for phobic chhdren requires further investigation.
In conclusion, clinical and empirical evidence suggests that phobia aetiology is multi-modal 
and subject to individual differences. The combination of behavioural, cognitive and family 
therapy approaches address the most sahent acquisition pathways proposed by the hterature. 
Current practice reflects this finding and cognitive-behavioural therapy, with input from the 
famhy appears to be the most effective intervention in the treatment of chhdhood phobias.
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Discuss the difficulties in distinguishing depression and early stage dementia and evaluate 
ways in which these difficulties might be addressed.
EhstoricaUy depression and dementia have been considered mutually exclusive with the emphasis 
on differential diagnosis. Over the decades research has produced guidelines and discriminatory 
indicators that aid the clinician to distinguish clients with moderate and severe levels of dementia 
from people without the syndrome. Currently, the majority of clinical dilemmas occur in 
differentiating between early stage dementia and normal aging, and dementia and depression.
The ability to distinguish depression and early stage dementia has intrinsic importance to the 
older adult. A person presenting with cognitive, behavioural and emotional symptoms due to 
depression, could have these reversed with medication and/or psychological approaches. 
Furthermore, referral to services for a person presenting with the early stages of dementia could 
help individuals, families and clinicians plan future management and implement interventions 
such as the new dementia drugs. These measures could increase and prolong quality of hfe by 
reducing the impact of the identified difficulties in the person’s hfe.
Traditionahy Psychogeriatricians viewed differential diagnosis of dementia as identifying that 
there is a problem with cognitive functioning and then systematicahy ehminating possible causes 
for dechne within a medical model. Athough such distinctions are critical, accurate diagnosis 
must take into account findings that depression and dementia often coexist producing a chnical 
picture of increasing complexity. Furthermore, in addition to organic changes impacting on 
cognitive ability, research has shown that the social environment also influences cognitive 
functioning (Teri and Wagner, 1992; Kitwood, 1988).
In response to the knowledge that social factors can impact on cognitive functioning, 
professionals have recognised the hmitations of the medical model in guiding assessment and 
have begun to work within a Biopsychosocial model. Longitudinal multi-dimensional assessment 
based on a Biopsychosocial conceptual framework provides a fuher picture of a cheat's hfe, for 
example, coping strategies, social support, and personahty. The emphasis has changed from 
differential diagnosis, to identifying cognitive, behavioural, emotional and environmental factors 
that suggest the presence of dementia and/or depression. A particular strength of the model is 
that in contrast to the medical model of dementia which suggests that management of the
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cognitive decline is the only option (Ballard, Bannister, and Oyebode, 1996), information from a 
Biopsychosocial guided assessment can indicate additional areas for intervention (Folstein, 1987). 
As well as decreasing the effect of the individual factors, interventions are aimed at reducing the 
negative interactional effects between the cognitive, behavioural, emotional and environmental 
factors that increase cognitive impairment (Teri and Wagner, 1992).
After describing the clinical presentations of depression and dementia, this essay will firstly, 
illustrate the reasons for the difficulty in distinguishing between the two syndromes, and 
secondly, how research has attempted to aid clinicians in differentiating between the syndromes, 
or identifying co-morbidity by extrapolating syndrome specific behavioural and cognitive 
features.
Definition of dementia
Dementia is defined as an acquired, global condition, with intellectual deterioration, and severe 
short and long-term memory loss. This is accompanied by disturbances of judgement, higher 
order cortical functioning, abstract thinking and personahty in the presence of unimpaired 
consciousness (Lishman, 1978; American Psychiatric Association, 1987).
There are various types of dementia either caused by primary neuronal damage, such as 
AMieimer’s which accounts for 70 per cent of dementia cases (Lachner and Engel, 1994); or 
secondary to disease process elsewhere, such as Multi-infarct dementia which accounts for 
between 8 and 25 per cent of diagnosed cases (Gumming and Benson, 1992). Athough they have 
different aetiologies and progression they are comprised of similar presenting symptoms, which 
groups them in the syndrome of dementia. The essay wiU use the term ‘dementia’ in referring to 
this generic group but indicate if differences between the types of dementias impact on 
assessment.
DSM-IV criteria for the diagnosis of dementia include; (1) development of multiple cognitive 
deficits with both memory impairment and at least one of the following: (a) aphasia, (b) apraxia, 
(c) agnosia, (d) disturbance in executive functioning (plannmg, organising, sequencmg, 
abstraction); and (2) decline does not occur exclusively during delirium. Additional criteria vary 
according to the type of dementia, however, common factors include: (3) the course is 
characterised by continuing and gradual cognitive and functional decline, (4) cognitive deficits
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cause significant impairment in social or occupational functioning from a previous level of 
functioning, and (5) other specific causes of dementia have been ruled out (American Psychiatric 
Association, 1994).
There have been many estimates of the prevalence of dementia in older adults (Henderson, 1994) 
but they are difficult to compare because of differences in samples studied and methods used. 
Jorm et al. (1987) reviewed twenty surveys’ results and concluded that the prevalence of 
dementia is about 5 per cent in people aged 65 years and over, and 20 per cent in those aged over 
80. A more recent analysis reported a prevalence of 30 per cent among 85 year olds (Skoog, 
1993).
Definition of depression
Depression refers to an array of phenomena ranging from the normal expression of sad mood to 
the impaired emotional state of chnical depression (Teri and Wagner, 1992). DSM-IV criteria for 
diagnosis of depression include: (1) changes in appetite and weight; (2) disturbed sleep; (3) motor 
agitation or retardation; (4) fatigue and loss of energy; (5) depressed or irritable mood; (6) loss of 
interest or pleasure in usual activities; (7) feelings of worthlessness, self reproach, excessive guilt; 
(8) suicidal thinking or attempts; and (9) difficulty with thinking or concentration (American 
Psychiatric Association, 1994).
Estimates of the frequency of depression in older adults exhibits wide variabhity due to the 
source of the sample, definition of depression, method of assessment, and rater’s experience. 
Prevalence figures indicate that between 0.8 and 8% of the population over 60 meets criteria for 
some form of clinical depression, with upward to 46% reporting depressive symptoms or mild 
dysphoria (Blazer, Hughes, and George, 1987).
Difficulties in distinguishing dementia and depression
Similarity o f presenting symptoms o f depression and dementia
It is clear from the DSM-IV diagnostic criteria that there are similar presenting symptoms found 
in both depression and dementia, for example, loss of interest and difficulties with concentration 
and thinking. This is particularly true during the early stages of dementia when psychological 
symptoms often predominate, such as personality changes, for example, reduced emotional 
responsiveness and energy levels, difficulty initiating activity, loss of enthusiasm and decreased
Doctorate of Psychology (PsychD) in Clinical Psychology 85
Older Adult Mental Health Essay
affection (Pitt and Yousef, 1997). In addition, both syndromes are acquired, global in 
manifestation and occur in the presence of unimpaired consciousness (Deroisiers, 1992). 
Korczyn (1986) proposed that DSM criteria are more applicable at relatively advanced stages of 
dementia because generally only subtle changes in cognitive functioning are identified in early 
stage dementia. In addition, these minimal changes often remain indistinguishable from normal 
ageing or depression (Morris, McKeel, et al, 1991; O’Carroll, Curran, et al, 1997; Rubin, 1991). 
The intangibility of cognitive changes in the early stages of dementia could lead clinicians when 
adhering to diagnostic criteria to show a tendency to diagnose depression due to the higher 
prevalence of behavioural changes akin to depression.
Clinicians’ difficulties are further compounded by research which has shown that the cognitive 
changes in depression are real and not necessarily prodromi of a lack of motivation as previously 
suggested (Wells, 1979). Studies assessing the degree of cognitive impairment in clients with 
depression as their predominant chnical presentation have identified two types of depressed 
chents presenting with cognitive changes (Ballard et al, 1996). The first group have subjective 
memory complaints without true inteUectual deficits and give T do not know’ answers during 
cognitive assessment, largely due to a lack of interest, poor concentration, or lack of motivation. 
(Wells, 1979). The second group make efforts to participate in cognitive testing but despite this 
show patterns of cognitive abnormahties closely resembling deficits seen in chents with dementia 
(Folstein and McHugh, 1978).
Further comphcating assessment is that dementia also subsumes conditions with and without 
cortical features, with ‘subcortical’ dementia’s sharing many features with depression (Marsden 
and Harrison, 1972; Lishman, 1978; and the Report of the Royal CoUege of Physicians, 1981). 
For example, symptoms such as emotional or personahty changes, memory disorder, defective 
abihty to manipulate acquired knowledge, and slow information processing (Abert, 1978). In 
addition to similar behavioural and emotional changes found in depression and the subcoritical 
dementias, the patterns of cognitive impairment revealed from neuropsychological testing are 
analogous (Caine, 1981).
Clinician and client factors impacting on the diagnostic process
Further to similarities between presenting symptoms introducing difficulties in using diagnostic 
criteria, issues occur in chnical assessment due to factors pertaining to individual differences in
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clients and clinicians. Individual differences in older adults’ expectations and understanding of 
normal aging wiU affect their attendance to and interpretation of changes in functioning. For 
example, a person might expect to have some memory problems with age and only present for 
assessment when other symptoms manifest such as loss of interest in activities. They could then 
selectively report symptoms that are more diagnostic of depression rather than dementia, when 
they could actually be in the early stages of a dementing process.
A further confounding factor is the possibility that clinicians err on the side of caution preferring 
to diagnose depression in early presentation of symptoms indicative of either condition (Bums, 
Jacoby and Levy, 1990). Early studies into ‘Pseudodementia’ show some evidence of the 
aforementioned proposition, where not aU of the depressed chents had complete reversal of their 
inteUectual deficits after treatment. A diagnosis of depression could be viewed as less 
devastating in the short term and provides some scope for treatment within the medical model, for 
example, anti-depressants. Preferential diagnosis appears to occur particularly with General 
Practitioners (Luscombe, Brodaty and Freeth, 1998).
It is important to note that although there might be a tendency to diagnose depression rather than 
dementia during the early stages of the dementing process, depression is also often missed in this 
population. Athough depression symptom consteUation is subject to individual differences in 
chents of ah ages, older adults show particular variation because they often report somatic 
symptoms rather than depressed mood (O’Conner, Polht and Roth, 1990). The existence of 
numerous social and physical problems often obscure or comphcate diagnosis (Folstein, 1997). 
This is particularly tme when depression is secondary to physical illness because both the chent 
and evaluating clinician are often more concerned about concurrent medical conditions (Folstein, 
1997).
Co-morbidity o f dementia and depression
The high prevalence of dementia and depression in older adults would suggest that these 
disorders would co-exist in some individuals, where they would present with many of the 
characteristics of both dementia and depression as defined by DSM-IV. Overah, approximately 
30% of chents diagnosed with dementia also meet criteria for chnical depression (Teri and 
Reifler, 1987). In this group a dementing ihness is indisputably present, but a secondary 
depression also contributes to the chnical picture both functionally and cognitively. In terms of
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DSM-IV, there are two alternative diagnoses for these clients: primary degenerative dementia 
with depression, and organic affective syndrome (Feinburg and Goodman, 1994). These chents’ 
symptoms of depression are similar to those of individuals suffering from depression without 
cognitive impairment. They include; sadness, loss of interest, sleep and appetite disturbances, 
psychomotor changes, guilt feehngs, anxiety and suicidal thoughts (Bahard et al, 1996).
The findings that depression and dementia can co-exist, further comphcates the diagnostic 
process. For example, Teri and Wagner (1991) found that the characteristic underreporting of 
depression found in normal older adults was also present in the dementia chents independent 
from level of cognitive impairment. In addition, a significant body of evidence suggests that 
depression is more prevalent in chents with less severe cognitive impairment (Bahard et al, 
1996). Prevalence rates vary from 5.1% (O’Conner et al, 1990) to 38.1% (Cooper and Schwarz, 
1982), with the rate of depression and complaints about memory loss appearing to be inversely 
related to the level of cognitive impairment (Bums et al, 1990). These findings further 
comphcate differential diagnosis and emphasis the need for chnicians to actively investigate for 
possible depression in a chent already with a firm diagnosis of dementia.
A further ramification of co-morbidity, is that a person could be diagnosed and treated only for 
depression and then continue to display cognitive deficits, consequently receiving a diagnosis of 
dementia. In this way it could seem that one appeared after the other, when in fact initiaUy both 
were present but one when undetected by the assessment process (Katzman and Jackson, 1991). 
This is iUustrated in chents with Multi-infarct dementia who frequently initiahy present and are 
treated for depression, but continue to exhibit cognitive deficits. As many as 60 per cent of 
people with Multi-infarct dementia meet diagnostic criteria for major depression (Rubin, 1991).
Therefore the issue is not as simple as a differential diagnosis. Research has introduced into the 
assessment process, first, that cognitive changes in depression are real, second, that dementia and 
depression can masquerade as each other and third, some chents show co-existence of the 
syndromes particularly in the early stages of dementia. A chent may present with pure dementia, 
depression, or a mix of the two disorders.
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Diagnostic process
Biopsychosocial conceptual framework fo r  assessment
The longitudinal multi-dimensional Biopsychosocial approach to assessment requires clinicians 
to identify cognitive, behavioural, emotional and social factors determining a client’s 
presentation. The model particularly emphasises the impact of environmental and psychological 
factors on the degree of cognitive dechne, and level of functioning. These factors include a 
chent’s personal history, coping strategies, extent of neurological impairment and social 
environment (Kitwood, 1988). Existing knowledge on syndrome specific symptoms are then 
compared to the information gathered during the assessment process resulting in a diagnosis. 
However, if a clear diagnosis is not reached, the individual formulation can guide further 
investigations and chnical intervention aimed at increasing quahty of hfe.
Assessment process
Initiahy, a chnician has to investigate whether a chent’s presenting functional and cognitive 
changes are different from those associated with normal ageing. If differences are deemed 
significant then an assessment is carried out to distinguish between physiological conditions that 
simulate dementia symptomology, depression, and early stage dementia. However, chnicians 
also need to be aware of the possibihty of a mixed diagnosis of the two syndromes and/or the 
confoundmg effect of a physiological condition.
Diagnostic process is one of exclusion rather than inclusion due to the similarity of symptoms in 
the early stages of dementia and depression. Information needs to be obtained from a variety of 
sources due to the heterogeneity of the disorders (Folstein, 1997). In summary, assessment 
ascertains whether there is cognitive dechne and then rules out medical causes fohowed by 
chnical interview and tools, and finahy neuropsychological assessment.
Clinical Assessment
Traditionally chnical assessment was based on the premise that depression producing a dechne in 
cognitive functioning and dementia symptomology was a ‘Pseudodementia’ (Mahendra 1985), 
and therefore was reversable with a lack of progression and functional causation, whereas true 
dementias’ were progressive, irreversible and caused by degenerative brain disease (Wells, 1979). 
Using research hterature and chnical observation, WeUs (1979) formulated chnical criteria for 
distinguishing between ‘pseudo’ and true dementia at the time of presentation. On each criterion
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the client with true dementia was said to differ in a significant way from clients with 
‘Pseudodementia.' However, advances in the understanding of dementia have resulted in a 
change in conceptualisation (Caine, 1991). There is no longer any quaUfication concerning 
progression, irreversibility or aetiological connotation, consequently, these factors cannot be used 
unconditionally in the diagnostic process leaving the term ‘pseudodementia’ unsustainable on 
logical grounds (Mahendra, 1983)\
Athough this change in conceptualisation of dementia has resulted in some of Well’s criteria 
being no longer applicable, current clinical assessment tends to be based on modified versions of 
his criteria. Deroiser (1992) reviewed the literature and evaluated Well’s remaining criteria 
concluding that some of the discriminating attributes (e.g. personal Vs instrumental competence, 
complaint Vs performance) might provide valuable pointers of the conditions, whereas others 
(e.g. history of depression) remain more controversial.
Symptoms and subsequent course of the illness have been proposed as providing indicators of the 
presence of one or both of the syndromes. Wells (1979) suggested date and context of onset of 
illness as a differential factor with ‘Pseudodementia’ showing an abrupt onset (Wells, 1979). 
However, clients with dementia of the Azheimer type can also report abrupt onset of cognitive 
impairment despite the onset being insidious as they often only become involved with services 
following an illness or social trauma (Blessed, 1986; Gustafson, 1985). Furthermore, chents with 
Multi-infarct dementia often only present after a ‘large’ stroke and thus appear to have an abrupt 
onset although they have probably had a history of ‘mini’ infarcts, which occurred without their 
awareness.
WeUs suggested that a high incidence of complaining about memory loss could indicate 
depression. Feehan et al’s (1991) study supported this proposal where dementia chents 
complained less than warranted on the basis of their cognitive difficulties, whereas 
‘Pseudodementia’ chents showed the converse situation. Keedy and Gilhard’s (1995) quahtative 
research investigated explanations for this phenomenon. They found that some chents with early 
dementia reported attempts to keep their memory difficulties secret due to shame. However, this 
is subject to individual difference in behefs, thus stressing the importance of a Biopsychosocial
 ^However, this essay will continue to use the term ‘Pseudodementia’ when referring to depression with 
cognitive impairment.
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approach to assessment in ascertaining an individual’s own beliefs and coping strategies rather 
than basing it on global formulas.
In addition, to dissonance between complaints and memory, ‘Pseudodementia’ clients can show 
incongruence in social and /or personal incompetence where over learned habits appear 
deteriorated out of proportion with measured cognitive difficulties (Wells, 1979). This 
divergence of report and behaviour suggests another way in which clients with dementia and 
‘Pseudodementia’ might be dissociated on standardised tests.
Berrios (1989) stated that dementia’s earlier signs might not only be evident on formal cognitive 
testing, but also in non-cognitive domains such as behaviour and emotions. However, research 
has as of yet not been able to elucidate clear guidelines as to which behavioural and emotional 
symptoms are syndrome specific. For example, apathy is not as specific to depression as initially 
thought as evidence suggests that activity levels in ‘Pseudodementia’ cUents increase towards 
evening with an opposing fluctuation for dementia chents (Pitt and Yousef, 1997).
Social and family background information obtained within a Biopsychosocial assessment could 
provide enhghtenment on possible reasons for current presentation, as for example recent 
bereavements, retirements, and change in social circumstances are often prerequisite to 
depression. A long term history should be taken as Paykel et al (1969) noted that for some 
depressive chents their illness appeared related to major negative hfe events occurring two years 
or more before onset. Although the exact relationship between life events and intrapersonal 
characteristics is stiU not clear, there is a convergence towards a distinction between non fateful 
events impoverishing social networks (e.g. loss of job), which may not be readily extricable from 
factors like personahty, and independent fateful hfe events, such as death of a spouse, physical 
injury or medical illness (Folstein, 1997). It is possible that the recording of such hfe events 
could help distinguish the two groups assuming they are not instrumental in those dementia 
chents diagnosed with depression.
Current and previous mental state can provide clues as to the type of presenting chent. 
Traditionally chnicians thought a previous history of psychiatric iUness was more hkely in chents 
with depressive dementia (WeUs, 1979). However, recent surveys indicate that the likelihood of
Doctorate of Psychology (PsychD) in Clinical Psychology 91
Older Adult Mental Health Essay
previous depressive illness is also increased in people with Alzheimer disease, particularly those 
currently depressed (Rovner et al, 1989).
Wells (1979) remarked that clients with depressive dementia are expected to show pervasive 
change in affect characterised by distress and hopelessness. In contrast, true dementia clients 
often seem unconcerned about their condition with labile shallow affect. However, this factor 
cannot be used for distinguishing between depression and co-morbid depression and dementia as 
significant numbers of dementia chents are given a secondary diagnosis of major depression 
particularly in the early stages of the ihness (Bums et al, 1990).
Chents with mild to moderate cognitive impairments are aware of their depressive symptoms and 
are able to describe them using standardised instruments, thus advocating the use of self-report 
measures in distinguishing chents with co-morbid depression and dementia during chnical 
assessment (Alexopoulas and Abrams, 1988).
However, there is currently debate as to whether the major depression detected in primary 
dementia conforms to the syndrome diagnosed in older adults presenting with depression with or 
without cognitive impairment. This is reflected in the finding that chents with co-morbid 
dementia and depression were distractable and cheered up even when presented as despondent 
(Merriam et al, 1988). Thus, arguing against the presence of the kind of illness seen in functional 
depression where negative views of self, world and future reflect the consistent operation of 
organised negative schema fuelhng the negative affect spiral (Beck, 1969). It is possible that the 
diminished cognitive abihties in chents with dementia prevent them from developing such a 
cognitive style and consequently affective presentation. Further research into the cognitions of 
depressed chents and chents with dementia and depression could elucidate chnical diagnostic 
indicators if specific types of cognitions are found for each group.
As a person with cognitive problems usuahy has difficulty providing a rehable history, it is 
essential to obtain confirming information from other sources such as a relative. Additionally, 
relatives can provide an indication of personahty changes. Roth (1986) drew attention to the 
possible utihty of personahty changes in early dementia. Rubin and Kinscherfs (1989) 
prospective study concluded that such changes were subtle but real prodromal pointers in chents 
originaUy diagnosed with mild dementia.
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In summary research evaluating criteria developed from and by Wells’ work suggests that some 
features could be useful clinical indicators for differential diagnosis but others are more 
controversial with questionable vahdity. Although the criteria can offer assistance in diagnosing 
dementia or depression they are not particularly effective in recognising whether a diagnosis is 
mixed in its presentation. In order to provide more information to aid differential diagnosis, 
chnicians have employed chnical tools.
Clinical Tools
The Mini mental state examination (MMSE) is a scored version of a standard chnical cognitive 
examination that surveys orientation, memory, attention, calculation, and language function. 
Despite it’s popularity the MMSE has problems in identifying cognitive changes in early stage 
dementia and differentiating between dementia and depression (Husband and Tarbuck, 1994). 
The choice of cutoff point between an impaired or normal score remains controversial (Husband 
and Tarbuck, 1994). The MMSE is sensitive to factors such as race, socioeconomic class, level 
of education and advanced age (Folstein and McHugh, 1978). Although, global cognitive 
screening tests such as the MMSE can differentiate between depression and moderate to severe 
dementia such tests are of httle use early in the course of ihness. This is due to mild dementia 
chents’ often scoring in the normal range overlapping with the majority of depressed chents 
(Coen et al, 1996).
The Middlesex Elderly Assessment of Mental State (MEAMS) has attempted to answer some of 
MMSE’s problems. It appears to be more sensitive to mhd or early cognitive impairment and 
focal deficits, and thus can suggest areas for further assessment (Husband and Tarbuck, 1994). 
However, it is stiU subject to the problems of not being sensitive enough to differentiate dementia 
from depression chents.
The utihty of chnical tools aimed at identifying behavioural and emotional factors in dementia 
such as the Chfton Assessment Procedures for the elderly for early differential diagnosis is 
questionable. They are generahy designed to detect difficulties in chents with clear diagnoses 
and therefore are not very sensitive to symptoms of early stage dementia. In addition, they nearly 
ah have low inter-rater rehabihties and are time consuming to carry out which has imphcations 
for an elderly person who is being cared for at home by a relative.
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Medical assessment
Neuroscience
Neuroimaging can be used as an aid to differential diagnosis, for example. Multi-infarct dementia 
infarctions both cortical and subcortical can be seen with computed tomography (CT) and even 
better with Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRl). However, several factors should be 
remembered when interpreting neuroimaging. Firstly, aU older adult’s brains’ show weight loss, 
atrophy and ventricular enlargement (Blessed, et al, 1986). Secondly, CT scan abnormalities do 
not usually appear until the middle stages of Alzheimer’s disease (Folstein, 1997). Thirdly, 
chents with late onset depression have a degree of cortical atrophy and ventricular enlargement 
intermediate between that of normal older adults and those with dementia (Pearlson et al, 1989). 
FinaUy, chents can show signs, of dementia such as neurofibriUary tangles in normal ageing and 
in conditions such as Down’s Syndrome without any sign of cognitive or behavioural dechne 
(Cummings, 1992).
While neuroimaging and laboratory data are useful in diagnosing some of the causes of dementias 
prior to death (metabohc disorders, tumours, strokes e.t.c) others must be diagnosed by exclusion. 
Medical and drug history coupled with extensive blood testing is employed to identify potentiaUy 
reversible causes or exacerbators of dementia symptoms, such as physical illness, delirium, drug 
toxicity, urinary tract infections and hypothyroidism (Gustafson, 1985).
Medication
Although chnical interview and chnical tools can differentiate some chents with early dementia 
from those with depression, they stih miss some cases and are unable to detect a co-morbid 
diagnosis of depression and dementia. Chnicians tend to exclude a co-morbid condition by 
treating the chent with anti-depressants and/or ECT. If symptoms aheviate it is assumed that 
depression was confounding the presentation (Gustafson, 1985). However, both the vahdity and 
ethics of this approach is questionable as firstly, not ah chents respond to medication and 
secondly, should a chent be on medication for a disorder that they might have?
Neuropsychological Assessment
Chnicians have tried to develop other ways of identifying the presence of depression in complex 
cases. Neuropsychological assessment has become an important part of the diagnostic process of 
chents with unclear presentation. Initiahy, research focused on finding differences between
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clients vrith and without dementia and then developed from this research into differential 
diagnosis between dementia and depression.
Distinguishing between normal and abnormal cognitive decline
Historically cognitive decline was inferred from discrepancies in sub-test performance as 
neuropsychological testing could only measure current levels of functioning. Initially this was 
carried out between different aspects of current intellectual functioning, for example, the 
comparison of hold with no hold sub-tests of the WAIS (Weschler, 1995). Diagnostically this 
type of discrepancy analysis is flawed due to various factors such as the wide variations in ability 
occurring in the general population. As a result of these problems, discrepancies were identified 
between current and premorbid functioning using for example, the NART and WAIS-UI. 
However, this technique only differentiates chents in the moderate to severe range of dementia 
from people with normal cognitive functioning. Schlosser and I vison (1989) suggested and 
proved that the discrepancy between NART estimated pre-morbid abihty and current memory 
functioning could detect memory deterioration associated with a dementing process at an earher 
stage. O’Carroh et al (1995) found that although the method differentiated the early stage 
dementia chents from people ageing normally, it did not separate them from depressed chents.
It has been proposed that deficits in psychomotor functions such as reaction time may precede the 
onset of more complex deficits in other cognitive functions and may be useful for early diagnosis 
of dementia (Hofman, Seifiitz, Hock, Hampel, Neuebauer and MuUer-Spahn, 2000; Teng, 1989; 
Morris et al, 1990; Kluger et al, 1997). Unfortunately these psychomotor measures would not be 
rehable in differentiating depression from early stage dementia, as depression is often associated 
with psychomotor retardation. This retardation is exacerbated further by medication such as 
antidepressants, benzodiazepines and/or neuroleptics, which may also have psychomotor and 
extra-pyramidal effects (Teri and Wagner, 1991).
Distinguishing between Depression and Dementia
Although neuropsychology has had some success in differentiating early onset dementia from 
normal dechne, it has been less successful in identifying quahtative differences in specific 
cognitive impairments that distinguish between depression and early stage dementia. In addition, 
researchers have only recently examined whether the coexisting presence of the two syndromes 
leads to increased cognitive disabihty as they might independently compromise intehectual status
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(Coen et al, 1997). If this was a phenomenon it could be used as an indicator of mixed diagnosis, 
as chents could show unusuahy severe deterioration compared to the illness’s time span.
Research indicates that the disproportionate prevalence of the recency over primary effect of 
memory can be used to distinguish dementia from depressive chents. Studies have shown; (a) 
that on free recah verbal tasks dementia chents exhibit a selective disruption of the primacy 
effect, and that (b) both primacy and recency effects are present in pseudodementia (Gibson, 
1981).
Weingartner and coworkers (1981) found that depressed chents experience difficulty in memory 
tasks requiring elaborate or effortful processing of material and organisation. They do not show 
problems in memory tasks involving automatic memory encoding. In contrast, dementia chents 
appear to have difficulty in ah memory tasks including automatic and effortful processing. 
Weingartner and coheagues inferred that dementia chents are distinguishable from depressed 
chents on tasks requiring httle cognitive capacity or effort. However, other studies have shown 
that tasks of high-capacity demand differentiated the groups better than tasks of moderate and low 
capacity demand (Lachner and Engel, 1994).
Depressed chents exhibited a normal learning curve, whereas chents with dementia showed 
noticeable deficits in learning (Emery and Oxman, 1997). Depressed chents could improve their 
performance on a free-recaU task when using organisational strategies such as grouping words 
into meaningful categories, whereas dementia chents did not benefit from such strategies 
(Weingarter and Shberman, 1982).
Some authors described a higher rate of forgetting for dementing chents as compared with 
depressed and healthy chents. Depressed chents showed impaired encoding of information but 
could remember stored material (Hart et al., 1987). In contrast, dementing chents lost a large 
amount of previously encoded information, and Hart (1987) found deficits in retrieval after short 
delays in demented chents but not in depressed and healthy chents. However, Hart et al (1987) 
could not find differences in rates of forgetting between dementia and depressed chents using 
longer time delays.
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Depressed older adult clients adopt a more conservative response strategy than dementia clients 
(Lamer, 1977; Niederehe and Camp, 1985). The presence of several false positive errors on 
delayed recognition appears to be specific to dementia clients, as does near miss errors or obvious 
guessing (Gainotti and Marra, 1994; Post, 1975; Dehs, 1989). Other authors (Dunbar and 
Lishman, 1984, Niederehe and Camp, 1985) have shown that depressed chents adopt a rather 
conservative criterion in the same situation showing the tendency to miss real stimuh rather than 
to make false recognition errors using “do not know."
In summary, empirical data reported in the neuropsychological hterature seems to show: (a) that 
both recall and recognition are equally impaired in dementia chents, whereas recognition is 
selectively impaired in chents with depression; (b) that specific aspects of memory such as: the 
serial position effects, the acquisition rate, the rate of forgetting, the presence of intmsion errors 
on recah, and the number of false positive errors on delayed recognition could help distinguish 
dementia from depression chents. Chnicians have extrapolated from these findings using them to 
aid differential diagnosis of depression and early stage dementia.
Unfortunately, current research has been unable to find any cognitive measures that differentiate 
chents with pure early stage dementia from chents with co-existence of depression and dementia. 
However, studies applying standardised instruments correlating functional and cognitive indices 
could prove useful in telhng dementia chents from depressed dementia chents.
Critique o f Neuropsychological testing.
The vahdity of using neuropsychological measures to differentiate firstly, early stage dementia 
from chents with depression and secondly, chents with coexistent depression and dementia is 
subject to various confounding factors.
Current neuropsychological criteria claim to be stringent and precise in order to prevent an 
individual who is normal or has age associated memory impairment from receiving an incorrect 
diagnosis. However, the success of this philosophy is questionable and could result in tests not 
being as sensitive to the early cognitive changes in dementia. Furthermore, there is often a 
paucity of normative data regarding age, culture and ethnicity for older adults by which to 
compare test performance on neuropsychological tests. Consequently, they often do not have 
estabhshed rehabhity and vahdity for the population, for example, WAIS-R.
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Research studies have generally used moderate or severe dementia chents matched with 
depression chents with a mild cognitive defect. This quantitative difference could partiaUy 
explain the alleged quahtative differences between the two groups.
Cognitive performance of depressed individuals and chents with dementia is subject to individual 
differences due to factors such as education and severity of depression or dementia. Furthermore, 
depressed chents may show lack of motivation and vohtion that may impair general task 
performance affecting the consistency of deficits (Rubin, 1991). Thus accurate measurement of a 
chent with depression’s motivation during testing seems essential if an accurate generahsed 
interpretation of their cognitive functioning is to be elucidated.
In summary, researchers have argued that a comprehensive neuropsychological assessment of 
memory and cognitive deficits can be useful in making a differential diagnosis between 
depression and a primary degenerative brain disorder alone. However, neuropsychology’s 
contribution in making a diagnosis of primary degenerative brain disorder in which depression 
may be a co-morbid feature is hmited.
Conclusion and Clinical Implications
Chnicians have changed the focus of assessment from differential diagnosis to distinguishing 
depression and dementia symptomology with the recognition that the two syndromes can present 
co-morbidly. Currently, assessment occurs within a Biopsychosocial framework that attempts to 
obtain an understanding of the chent’s emotional, behavioural and cognitive functioning within 
an environmental mileu.
The assessment process employs the use of chnical interviews and tools, medical checks, 
neuroimaging, and neuropsychology. These methods ah have specific strengths and weakness in 
distinguishing between the syndromes. However, when combined into a multi-dimensional 
assessment process they appear to be able to differentiate between early dementia and depression. 
However, chnicians’ abihty to identify the co-morbid presentation of the syndromes is hmited. 
Neuropsychology has revealed several possible criteria but these are not always consistent, and 
additionahy the tests are subject to problems with vahdity and rehabihty. Currently in unclear 
cases psychiatrists prescribe anti-depressants and monitor the response as a method of diagnosis 
(Wilcock, Bucks, and Rockwood, 1999).
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Informed interventions are still possible for unclear diagnoses as one of the strengths of this 
assessment approach is that it produces a complex formulation of an individual’s presentation, 
which enables clinicians to implement interventions that will increase quality of life with or 
without the presence of a clear diagnosis.
Although provisional data suggest that the cognitive deficits in depressed clients do resolve with 
appropriate treatment (Walstra et al, 1992), as stated previously depression may occur as 
prodromi of dementia. Therefore, re-evaluation of cognitive performance after the depression has 
been treated should be combined with longer-term monitoring of cognitive function (Bums, 1991; 
Emery and Oxman, 1997).
Research has identified several areas for future investigation that could result in successful 
differentiation between dementia and it’s co-morbidity with depression. Firstly, examining the 
relationship between cognitive and functional indices with the consequent development of an 
assessment tool and secondly, whether depressive cognitions are syndrome specific.
In summary, distinguishing depression and early stage dementia remains one of the most 
important clinical processes in older adults due to the possible ramifications on the clients 
wellbeing. However, research has introduced more new dilemmas and complexities into the 
process than answers, due to the findings that the syndromes can co-exist.
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Introduction
Adolescence depending on defining parameters falls between the ages of ten to twenty. The 
function of adolescence varies according to the psychological theory. However, the common 
theme appears to be separation from the family, the increasing importance of peer influences with 
the stage culminating in the formation of a separate adult identity (Baumrind and Mosselle, 
1985).
Research shows that adolescence is associated with risk taking behaviour (Kandel, 1982). These 
behaviours are seen as a normal commitant of the developmental period, except at the extremes of 
each dimension. These dimensional extremes consist of chronic problem behaviours such as 
substance abuse, anti-social behaviour, high-risk sexual behaviour, and academic failure 
(Newcomb, 1995). These behaviours are often not independent isolated problems (Alexander and 
Pugh, 1996) and appear to be significantly inter-correlated to justify a single problem behaviour 
construct (Donovan et al, 1988; Metzler et al, 1995).
Drug abuse in adolescence is of particular concern to clinical psychologists because it often has a 
negative long-term effect on the individual and an intergenerational effect on their children 
(Wilhams and Smith, 1993). Drug abuse may negatively affect mental and physical health; 
criminal status; educational status; and estabhshment of autonomy from family of origin 
(Newcomb and Rentier, 1988). Drug use varies along various dimensions including pattern of 
drug using behaviour; types of drug used; impact of drugs used; the adolescent’s overall personal 
adjustment; and the presence of other personal and family based problems (Liddle, 1999).
Drug abuse itself is best viewed as a multi-dimensional problem, which may occur as part of a 
wider pattern of life difficulties. Systemic theory, the concepts of which wiU be discussed later, 
fits well with this viewpoint as it recognises the importance of various systems in the ecology of 
the adolescent. For example, from their internal system processes (biological and psychological) 
to the external systems of the family, society and culture (Bry, 1988). It is proposed that it is 
through an adolescent’s interaction with the aforementioned systems that they derive meaning, 
develop their capacities and an understanding of the world outside themselves (Kaufman, 1985).
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This essay will focus on the structural model of family therapy based on systemic concepts, as 
firstly, it has led the other models in the conceptuahsation of adolescent drug abuse and secondly, 
as interventions derived from this model are currently the most influential in clinical practice. 
However, before doing this data wül be presented on: drug use amongst adolescents, diagnostic 
criteria, risk factors and systemic theory.
Drug use amongst adolescents
Prevalence studies of adolescent drug use confirm that a large percentage of adolescents 
experiment or use drugs recreationaUy (Spooner, 1999). Adolescent drug use rather than abuse 
could be regarded as a normal developmental process, given that the adolescent’s social and 
cultural environment condones such behaviour (alcohol and cigarettes) (Baumrind et al., 1985). 
Thus, effective adolescent socialisation can lead to controlled legal drug taking behaviour. The 
temporal sequence of involvement with drugs progresses from use of at least one legal drug, 
alcohol or cigarettes, to marijuana and from marijuana to other dhcit drugs or to prescribed 
psychoactive drugs. This sequence is known as the gateway hypothesis (Kendal, 1982).
A number of UK surveys have shown that by 19 years of age approximately ninety per cent of 
teenagers have drunk alcohol; sixty per cent have tried cigarettes; fifty per cent have used 
cannabis; and twenty per cent have tried other street drugs such as solvents, stimulants, 
haUucinogens or opiates (Spooner, 1999). A conservative estimate is that between five and ten 
per cent of adolescents under age nineteen have drug problems serious enough to require clinical 
intervention (Buckstein, 1995; Liddle and Dakof, 1995; Pagliaro and Pagharo, 1996). It should 
be noted that not all adolescents with drug problems approach services for treatment. However in 
general, epidemiological results show that less than half of those adolescents who experiment 
with drugs develop serious drug problems. The fact that adolescents use drugs recreationaUy 
means that distinctions between use and abuse are of critical importance to the diagnosis of 
substance use disorders (Nathan, 1991).
Diagnostic criteria
DSM-IV requires three factors for a diagnosis of substance abuse to be made, 1) a pattern of 
pathologic use, 2) impairment in social or occupational functioning due to substance use, and 3) 
minimum duration of at least one month (APA, 1994). Drug users are a diverse population in
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terms of age and developmental level, drugs of abuse, presence of co-morbidity, family 
composition and dynamics, ethnicity, gender and socioeconomic status (lOM, 1990).
Problems when using the diagnostic criteria with adolescents
However, whether the current diagnostic schema for substance disorders can accurately represent 
the development of substance abuse disorders in adolescents is unknown (Maisto and McKay, 
1995; Martin et al, 1996) because research on diagnostic criteria has been conducted almost 
exclusively on adults (Winters et al, 1993). For example, descriptions of “patterns of 
pathological use”, would constitute the severe end stage drug abuse for most adolescents 
(Fulkerson, Harrison, and Beebe, 1999). Physical symptoms are related to age or, more precisely, 
to duration of substance use, which is hmited in adolescence. Medical problems and withdrawal 
problems typicaUy take a long time to develop and thus would be expected to be relatively rare, 
as research has documented (Martin et al, 1995,1996). In addition, not ah drug abusing 
adolescents have an occupation and/or show no change in academic performance as they have 
always been below average (Brody, and Waldron, 2000). These aforementioned factors have 
fundamental clinical ramifications as to wait for the adolescent to deteriorate to the point of 
fulfilling DSM-IV criteria might cost them their hves. Furthermore, early detection and 
intervention are of particular importance with adolescents because progression to using the more 
serious drugs, and multiple substances concurrently is often more rapid in young people, with 
increased morbidity (Brody et al, 2000).
Epidemiological studies identifying risk factors for drug abuse
Epidemiological cross-sectional and longitudinal studies although subject to a number of 
methodological problems have identified variables associated with drug abuse. These variables 
wih not be hsted here but discussed later in the context of evaluating the structural model of drug 
abuse in adolescence. However, the key finding is that any variable associated with drug abuse 
could be a risk factor, a protective factor, a correlate and/or a consequence, and that relationship 
can change over time (Bry et al, 1982). Furthermore, risk factors do not exist or operate m 
isolation from each other. Multiple risk factors interact over time, and exert a cumulative impact 
(Bry, McKeon, and Pandina, 1982). Their interaction within one developmental period can create 
synergistic effects with extraordinary levels of risk (higher than would be present with one or two 
risk factors), deteriorating functioning, and powerful development retarding circumstances in 
later developmental periods (Thomberry, Huizinga, and Loeber, 1995). This idea coincides with
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contemporary systemic ideas about reciprocal effects in human relationships (Lemer and Spanier, 
1978; Sameroff, 1975). Thus, according to Alexander and Pugh (1996), “the focus has moved 
from identifying general dispositional risk factors to prioritising the importance of family factors 
in the aetiology of antisocial behaviour”.
General philosophy of systemic theories
Systems theory, initially developed by Von Bertalanffy (1968) proposes that human behaviour is 
inextricably embedded in systems of reciprocally interdependent interactions, and can be best 
understood by studying the structures and processes of systems within which behaviour occurs 
(Bertalanffy, 1981; Miller, 1978). A system consists of a set of elements, the relationships 
between the elements, and the relationships between the attributes or characteristics of the 
elements. Family systems theorists beheve that the family system is the most important system in 
the context of the developing adolescent.
Structural family therapy
Structural theory’s emphasis is on the importance of family hierarchy with parents in charge and 
adolescents as respected but subordinate members (Clark, Neighbours, Lesnick, Lynch and 
Donovan, 1998). The founder of structural family therapy Mmuchin (1974) highlights two 
overall functions that the family serves. Internally, the family is responsible for the members’ 
psychosocial protection, and externally for accommodation to and transmission of that culture. 
He proposes that the family fulfils these functional demands of family life, via the intrinsic 
elements of cohesion, adaptation and control. Cohesion is the degree of emotional bonding that 
exists between family members, and family subsystems. Control can be described as consisting 
of behaviours within a famüy which are concerned with guidance and flexibility in the power 
hierarchy, such as rules and rule negotiation, discipline, power, punishment, permissiveness, 
authority and guidance. Adaptation refers to the family’s ability to moderate internal 
mechanisms, and to change when faced with stressful and/or new pressures (Liddle and Dakof,
1995).
Structural theory proposes that in adolescence, the family is presented with a unique set of 
developmental challenges in renegotiating the roles between the parents and child and 
accommodating the adolescent’s increasing independence (Steinburg, 1990). A healthy family 
system has certain characteristics that enable the members to function adaptively through the
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adolescent period despite relatively low levels of cohesion, control and adaptabihty (Marlett,
1996). Characteristics of these famihes tend to be congruent verbal and non-verbal 
communications, clear but flexible roles and rules, with parents in charge and adolescents m a 
junior role (Synder, 1992). The inter-relatedness and cohesion of family members is a source of 
meaning and provides for both the togetherness and separateness of members. Individuals within 
the system can diminish personal stress by calling on support, understanding, and assistance, and 
by using other resources, including friends and school. The family’s boundaries become 
increasingly flexible with parents permitting the adolescent to move more freely in and out of the 
system, whilst aUowmg for adaptation at a pace that permits assimilation by all members to the 
changes inherent in adolescence (Synder, 1992).
Structural theory of drug abuse
Structural theory of drug abuse imphcates disorganisation in famüy hierarchy, caused by 
problems with control, cohesiveness and adaptabihty in the aetiology and maintenance of 
adolescent drug taking (Hawkins et al, 1992; Stanton and Heath, 1995; Szapocznik and Kurtines,
1989). Symptoms are understood as being related to family functioning, present and past; with 
the conceptuahsation of problems in terms of problematic famüy structures and interactional 
patterns. The theory predicts that a drug abusing adolescents’ famüy is characterised by 
problems in behavioural control, dysfunctional patterns of cohesion between members, and 
difficulties in adapting to changes inherent in adolescence. These factors combine to produce a 
dysfunctional family that has hmited control over the adolescent’s behaviour and behefs, leading 
to the adoption of drug taking behaviour when subjected to peer influence. These same famüy 
factors are proposed to perpetuate and maintain the adolescent’s drug use. Consequently, 
Structural theory predicts that risk factors would relate to the intrinsic famüy elements of 
structure, control, cohesion, and adaptabihty.
Empirical evidence supporting the structural theory of adolescent drug abuse
Empirical evidence for structural theory wül be discussed under the following headings: family 
structure, control, cohesion and adaptabihty, individual and protective factors.
Family structure
Studies show that adolescents from divorced families exhibit emotional distress and behaviour 
disorders, depending on the recency of parental separation (Todd, and Selekman, 1990).
Doctorate of Psychology (PsychD) in Chnical Psychology H 3
Specialist Essay
However, when quahty of the parent child relationship is controlled, the effect of family structure 
is reduced but still significant, possibly due to the intrinsic limitation on degree of support and 
control provided by a single parent (Needle et al, 1990). However, Barnes et al (1995) found 
that family structure and parental alcohol or other substance abuse did not have a significant 
effect on problematic drug taking among adolescents. The finding that family structure is not 
important as an etiological factor is not surprising as structural theory places importance on 
process -  the communications, actions, and interactions of the components in the ongoing system 
-  rather than family composition.
Systemic theorists argue that adolescent drug abuse evolves as part of a broader pattern of family 
disorganisation, which includes parental psychological problems; inter-parental conflict; parent- 
child conflict; lack of emotional cohesion; and the occurrence or imminence of lifecycle 
transitions such as leaving home (Kaufman, 1985). This concurs with the Structural model in that 
within such disorganised famihes, drug abuse may serve an organising function, since it 
introduces predictable routines into family life and provides a focus for parental concern, which 
may increase family cohesion and prevent parental separation through a process of triangulation 
(Stanton and Todd, 1982).
Further supporting the proposal that disruptions in family hierarchy increases the risk of an 
adolescent abusing drugs comes from empirical studies, which show, contrary to Barnes et al’s 
(1995) findings, that in famihes where parents abuse drugs, a greater proportion of adolescents 
abuse drugs than in famihes where parental drug abuse does not occur (Hawkins et al., 1992). A 
parent’s drug using behaviour and the response of spouses to this chronic problem could 
compromise their capacity to provide a weh organised family environment and hierarchy, and this 
m turn leads to the development of drug abuse (Liddle and Hogue, 2000). However, alternate but 
not necessarily mutuaUy exclusive mechanisms have been suggested to explain why adolescents 
adopt drug-using behaviour (Brook et al., 1990). It may be that adolescents learn drug abusing 
behaviour patterns directly through a process of modelling and/or they may acquire positive 
attitudes towards drugs through exposure to their parents’ permissive attitudes to drugs, and this 
in turn may lead them to use drugs when they become available (Winters, 1999).
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Control
Structural theory argues that a lack of clear rules prohibiting drug abuse, lack of consistent 
parental supervision, and lack of clear consistent consequences for rule breaking, lead initially to 
experimental drug use and later to drug abuse (Brook, Brook, Gordon, Whitman, and Cohen,
1990).
Parental monitoring and discipline refer to parenting practices focused on behavioural 
management of the adolescent. Supporting structural theory, Dishion and Loeber (1985) report 
that parental monitoring and discipline practices remain important correlates of adolescent 
substance abuse even after taking into consideration demographic variables, family structure, and 
parental substance abuse.
In several surveys, lower levels of parental monitoring and less consistent discipline practices 
have been linked to higher levels of drug use (Peterson, Hawkins, Abbott and Catalano, 1995; 
Wilhams and Smith, 1993). Liddle (1999) explains the aforementioned finding by outlining 
modes of parental control as major elements in the effect of the family on adolescent drug abuse. 
Direct control is control imposed by discipline, restriction and punishment, whereas indirect 
control is the attachment or affection between parents and child. He points to the hmitation of 
direct control, as it can only be achieved if the adolescent is under parental supervision. As 
adolescents become more involved in activities outside the home, direct control cannot therefore 
be effective by itself. This hypothesis is supported by research which shows that adolescents who 
abuse drugs appear to have experienced inconsistent direct parental control, and are subjected to 
hmited influences from indirect control due to low levels of parent-chhd attachment (Carr, 2000).
Inconsistent control techniques may also contribute to poorer socialisation. If parents fluctuate 
between lax and strict control, lack of consistency can contribute to poor intemahsation and 
subsequent lower adherence to sociahy accepted modes of behaviour (Catalano, Hawkins, Wells, 
and Miller, 1991). Externalisation disorders include attention deficit disorder, conduct disorders 
and oppositional disorder (Henggeler, and Borduin, 1990). As previously mentioned, these 
disorders can often occur co-morbidly with drug abuse.
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Cohesion and adaptability
The adolescent stage is typified by reports from parents and from adolescents of relatively low 
levels of cohesion and adaptabihty (Marlett, 1996), Friedman et al’s (1987) study found that the 
majority of drug abusing adolescents depicted their famihes to be disengaged rather than 
enmeshed, and to be rigid rather than chaotic on the adaptabihty dimension compared to the 
normal sample.
Empirically tested models propose peer influence as the primary reason for an adolescent to 
initially use drugs. However, contrary to popular behefs, research suggests that family influences 
remain comparable with peer influences (Loeber, 1990) with Coombs and associates (1991) 
finding that the primary reason not to use drugs is parental disapproval. The latter finding is 
supported by KandeFs (1982) research, which found that parents ranked higher than peers in 
interpersonal significance throughout adolescence and suggested that the family remains a central 
locus for emotional support and guidance. This supports Structural theory, which proposes that 
perceived family cohesiveness and quahty of the parent-child bond impacts on drug abuse. If the 
family is functional an adolescent should take on the behefs and behaviours endorsed by the 
family rather than peers.
A reflection of the importance attributed to the parent adolescent dyadic relationship by the 
adolescent (Cole and McPherson, 1993) is shown in studies where perceptions of the quahty of 
parent adolescent relationships predict adolescent drug use (Johnson and Pandina, 1991) and 
correlate with level of consumption (Barnes, FarreU, and Banerjee, 1995). It has been suggested 
that this finding is mediated by the fact that behaviour conformity depends on the nature of 
attachment between an individual and the social environment. A positive attachment between an 
individual and significant others within a society lead to the adoption of the social norms and 
behaviour displayed by those significant others. Therefore, a poor attachment bond with a parent 
encourages identification with a deviant group to which an alternative attachment bond is 
established.
Individuals exhibiting drug disorders may not regard their behaviour as contrary to familial and 
cultural influence, particularly if parents use or display ambivalence to drug use. Furthermore the 
family as a social context precedes and predicts the selection of antisocial and substance using 
peers (Biglan, et al, 1995; Kumpfer and Turner, 1991; Newcomb, 1992). These findings show
Doctorate of Psychology (PsychD) in Clinical Psychology H fi
Specialist Essay
that the family has two paths of influence on the adolescent’s beliefs, through their own 
behaviour and their reaction to selected peers.
In summary, if the parent-child attachment bond is weak, the values of the parents are less likely 
to be adhered to and instead adolescents form a strong attachment bond to peers adopting their 
behefs and behaviours.
Individual factors
Individuals like famihes are also systems and thus have their own unique influences on 
behaviour. Thus, problematic processes, not only within the family but also within the adolescent 
as an individual, may contribute to the aetiology and maintenance of drug abuse (Henggeler and 
Borduin, 1990). This conceptuahsation of drug abuse is supported by considerable empirical 
evidence (Hawkins et al, 1992; Henggeler et al, 1991). Research identifies personal predisposing 
factors such as; conduct problems; emotional problems; specific learning disabihties; risk taking 
and sensation seeking; difficult temperament; low self-esteem and external locus of control 
(Newcomb, 1995). These factors lead an individual to be at increased risk when presented with 
precipitating factors such as; availability of and curiosity about drugs; peer pressure to use drugs; 
wish to regulate negative mood states with drugs; child abuse; buhying; hfecycle transitions; and 
loss of peer friendships (Clark et al, 1997). These factors have been exhibited in adolescent drug 
abusers who have been shown to have social skills deficits, behaviour problems and favourable 
attitudes and expectations about drug abuse (Spooner, 1999). Many adolescent drug abusers have 
experienced rejection by pro-social peers in early childhood and have become members of a 
deviant peer group in adolescence (Liddle, 1999). Within a school context, drug abusers show 
high levels of academic failure and low commitment to academic achievement compared to drug- 
free counterparts (Newcomb, 1995).
Protective factors
Protective factors concur with the structural model of adolescent drug abuse. Secure parent-child 
and family attachment (Parker, Rubin, Price and DeRoisier, 1995); authoritative parenting; clear 
family communication (Mahoney and Cairns, 1997); and flexible adaptable family organisation 
within the family is highly protective against acting out behaviours, and high levels of family 
support have been found to reduce the effect of risk factors and increase the effect of protective 
factors (Steinburg, Elmen, and Mounts, 1989). Personal protective factors include; high IQ, easy
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temperament, high self-esteem, internal locus of control, high self-efficacy, and functional coping 
strategies (Spooner, 1999). It is proposed that these factors foster psychological well-being and 
insulate children against negative environmental influences (Steinburg, 1990).
Weaknesses of the model
Although research findings have supported the fundamental premises of structural theory of 
adolescent drug abuse, specifically, family structure, behavioural control, cohesiveness and 
adaptabihty, there are various problems with the model. These problems include; risk factors are 
not exclusive to drug abuse, an inabüity to account for non-famihal risk factors, behaviour change 
does not necessarily relate to family functioning, the existence of individual differences, and 
findings that there is not a single typology of a family of an adolescent who abuses drugs.
Non-exclusivity of risk factors
Structural theory’s concepts could be proposed to be of global application to any adolescent 
behavioural problems and therefore, not a specific theory of drug abuse. For example, all the risk 
factors that are indicative for drug abuse and proposed as support for the theory are also found in 
other behavioural disorders such as conduct disorder (Newcomb, 1995). Therefore, why does an 
adolescent develop drug abuse rather than conduct disorder or even alcohol or drug use. 
Furthermore, why would some adolescents display these disorders co-morbidly as found by 
research?
Inability to account for non-familial risk factors
The theory also cannot account for all the risk factors within such a narrow system such as the 
family. For example, the model takes httle account of the multigenerational risk factors indicated 
in drug abuse, as it focuses on the here and now processes within the family dynamics. Research 
suggests that the family have to be integrated into the larger system, of for example, schools and 
peers to explain all the risk factors. However, this is of course in keeping with the fundamental 
concepts of systemic philosophy and by association of structural theory.
Non-correlation of changes in drug taking behaviour with changes in family functioning
Family interactional patterns concern the transactional systems of parents, family, and the 
adolescent (Diamond and Liddle, 1999). This area is the main emphasis in structural theory, 
which posits that change in family interaction patterns is sufficient to create change in the
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symptomatic behaviour of the adolescent. However, research has shown that a change in parental 
behaviour often does not appear to bear a relationship to the change in the adolescent’s problem 
behaviour. Liddle (1991) found that changes in the family, changed parenting practices for 
example, did not always coincide with changes in the adolescent’s problem behaviours (Schmitt 
et al, 1996). In addition, this over focusing on family factors can create an under appreciation of 
the influences of peer systems, despite knowledge from research that peer pressure is the primary 
reason for initial use and peers can become the key attachment figures and thus influence on 
beliefs.
)
Individual differences
Structural theory also has problems in accounting for the heterogeneous nature of drug abuse, for 
example: different drugs, age of initiation, and degree of dependence. In addition, research has 
also shown incidence of drug abuse in adolescent with seemingly functional famihes (Liddle and 
Dakof, 1995). Thus, the theory firstly, cannot explain why the majority of adolescents from 
seemingly functional famihes develop drug abuse, and conversely why individuals from 
dysfunctional famihes do not develop drug abuse, or secondly, why one adolescent wiU abuse 
drugs, whilst another adolescent in the same family wih not.
Structural theory cannot account for research that has shown that adolescent girls often display 
more intemahsing co-morbid disorders (depression, PTSD) compared to boys who are more 
likely to display extemahsing disorders (conduct disorder) (Buckstein, 1995). In addition, it has 
been suggested that drug-abusing girls may need more attention with regard to family problems in 
that they often experience severe parental rejection and sexual or physical abuse (Clark et al, 
1998). Family dysfunction, therefore, may be a more critical component and indicator of drug 
abuse in adolescent females.
Non-existence of a single family typology
Finally, there does not appear to be a family typology for a drug-abusing adolescent. Research 
has shown that family patterns do not determine the substance of choice but rather the age and 
family role of the substance abuser. This is further confounded by studies that have revealed that 
combinations of abuse of alcohol and various drugs make it difficult to relate specific family 
patterns to specific substances.
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In conclusion, whilst Structural theory appears to have some support from the known risk factors 
for drug abuse, it cannot explain why certain individuals do and do not develop drug abuse 
despite being or not being in dysfunctional famihes. In addition, it cannot explain why an 
individual develops drug abuse rather than the other behavioural problems in adolescence despite 
the presence of the same risk factors.
However, research, theory and clinical practice all inform each other in a reciprocal relationship 
and therefore, findings from studies examining the clinical apphcation of structural theory 
(structural family therapy) could elucidate further support or evidence against the model as a 
complete explanation of adolescent drug abuse.
Clinical applications of systemic theory to adolescent drug abuse
Family based prevention has emerged as a promising intervention modahty for addressing the 
complex web of ecological influences that gives rise to the initiation of severe behaviour 
problems (Hogue and Liddle, 1999). Family based intervention models have considerable 
empirical support for treating existing childhood disruptive and antisocial behaviour and 
adolescent substance abuse (Liddle and Dakof, 1995). The average treated case fares better than 
70% of untreated control cases (Shadish et al, 1993).
Principles of Structural family therapy interventions
General systemic family based interventions ahn to reduce drug abuse by engaging families in 
treatment, helping family members reduce family disorganisation and change patterns of family 
functioning in which drug use is embedded (Hawkins et al, 1992; Stanton and Heath, 1995; 
Szapocznik and Kurtines, 1989). Family system therapists attempt to change these family 
characteristics through; 1) gaining access and influence in the system, 2) interrupting the 
reciprocal relationships between the dysfunctional family characteristics and the adolescents 
problems, and 3) estabhshing new family characteristics to interact with new adolescent 
behaviours (Szapocznik et al, 1988).
Specially, Structural family therapy focuses on the reorganisation of the family into a more 
functional structure in order to solve the presenting problem, for example, enabling family 
members to clarify communications, rules, roles, routines, hierarchies and boundaries; resolve
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conflicts; optimise emotional cohesion; develop parenting and problem solving skills; and 
manage life-cycle transitions (Liddle, 1999; Stanton and Heath, 1995).
Structural interventions are directive with the therapist taking much responsibihty for inducing 
change (Synder, 1992). Classic structural interventions include re-framing situations to change 
perceptions and behefs, and identification and enactment of both spontaneous and alternative 
problem related interactions (Synder, 1992). Structural work also uses play and pretence and 
employs paradoxical interventions in which a directive seems contradictory to the desired change 
but actuaUy puts the individual of family in a kind of therapeutic “bind” inducing change (Carr, 
2000).
Evaluative research on structural family therapy interventions
In the late 1980’s and early 1990’s an increasing number of studies focused on the structural 
family therapy of adolescent substance abuse (Liddle et al, 1995;Liddle and Dakof, 1994 cited in 
Liddle et al, 1995; Friedman, 1989; Lebow and Curman, 1995). Although these studies vary in 
terms of methodological rigor and clinical sophistication, they are ah randomised clinical trials 
and employ weh articulated structural therapy models (Hogue and Liddle, 1999; Kazdin, Bass, 
Ayers and Rodgers, 1990).
Liddle and Dakof s (1995) hterature review examined the efficacy of these intervention studies 
on four dimensions, 1) engagement and retention, 2) reduction of drug abuse symptomology, 3) 
reduction of problem behaviours associated with drug abuse, and 4) improvement in family 
functioning. In these controlled clinical trials, structural family therapy was found to be more 
effective than other treatments in engaging and retaining adolescents in treatment and reducing 
their drug use (Azrin et al, 1994; Henggeler et al, 1991; Joanning et al, 1992; Lewis et al, 1990, 
Liddle et al, 1995; Szapocznik, et al, 1988).
Szapocznik and his coUeagues were the first to estabhsh the effectiveness of structural family 
therapy in treating adolescent drug use (Szapocznik et al, 1983, 1986, 1988). They reported a 
change in abstinence rates from 7% at admission to 80% at termination. In addition to 
significantly reduced adolescent drug use, they found improved family functioning. These results 
were evident at termination and maintained at fohow up, six to twelve months later. A 
supplementary finding was that the intervention was particularly successful in engaging and
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retaining families in treatment. Thus, their work has demonstrated the effectiveness of structural 
family therapy in engaging adolescents and families in treatment and significantly reducing drug 
abuse. However, structural family therapy’s ability to reduce correlated behaviour problems and 
promoting pro-social functioning among adolescent drug users was still in question until later 
research studies (Liddle and Dakof, 1994; 1995).
A central assumption of structural theory is that inappropriate patterns of family functioning 
including; criticism, under/overprotection, inconsistent behaviour control, in/excessive attention, 
or denial of aU other problems maintains drug abuse. These assumptions were supported by some 
of the best-controlled studies of family therapy for adolescent drug abusers. Szapocznik and 
Kurtines (1989) found that drug abuse was associated with lack of clear parental aUiance and 
intergenerational boundaries between the drug abuser and parents; lack of flexibility in problem 
solving strategies; lack of confhct resolution skills; extreme enmeshment or disengagement; and 
difficulty negotiating a lifecycle transition such as a family member leaving home. From their 
meta-analysis of controlled structural family based treatment outcome studies, Stanton and 
Stadish (1997) concluded that structural family therapy is effective in changing aspects of family 
functioning, for example, increasing the use of consistent behavioural control and levels of 
cohesion in families. These aforementioned changes appeared to lead to the family 
demonstrating more adaptabihty to changes both from within and outside the family system. 
However, their final conclusion was that while structural family therapy was effective as a stand 
alone treatment modahty, it could also be effectively combined with other individuahy based 
approaches leading to positive synergistic outcomes.
Thus, in summary research would indicate that structural family therapy can empower family 
members to help adolescents engage in treatment; remain committed to the treatment process; and 
develop family rules, roles, routines, relationships and behef systems that support a drug free 
lifestyle. In addition, family therapy can provide a context within which adolescents could 
benefit from individual, peer group or school based interventions.
Limitations of the studies
However, it is important to note the limitations of these efficacy studies, for example, like most 
psychotherapy studies they are hampered by smah sample sizes. A larger sample size would 
increase statistical power and hence the probabihty of finding efficacy differences between
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interventions. Furthermore, the studies are subject to the influences of different treatment 
contexts and the interaction of different patient population characteristics and cultures. The 
majority of the studies used very specific cultural groups, for example, Hispanic families, leading 
to limited generalisabilty to other groups.
In the structural approach, family relationships because of their presumed causative role in the 
creation of the disorder are the primary target of intervention (Stanton, 1979). This leads to 
criticisms that therapy does not take into account the important influences of peers and other 
aspects of culture impacting on an adolescent’s drug use.
Family therapy efficacy research attempts to introduce systemic theory and corresponding 
methodology into a research arena dominated by studies based on a non-systemic paradigm. One 
view is that at least some of the controversy in mixing paradigms is that researchers do not 
recognise that systems theory along with its constructivist and cybemectic corollaries is more 
elusive in scope than the assumptions underlying traditional research. Therefore, identifying the 
key factor m inducing change in families is difficult to ascertain. Furthermore, structural family 
therapy is still practised inconsistently in contemporary drug abuse treatment settings (DATOS- 
A, 1993), and therefore, the efficacy studies results may not be comparable to each other.
A subtle methodological concern is the treatment philosophy of the researcher, including whether 
the researcher holds an abstinence or harm reduction perspective for treatment intervention 
(MacCoun, 1998; Marlett, 1996). These different treatment goals have important ethical and 
legal imphcations for adolescent participants. On the one hand, a harm prevention philosophy 
could suggest implicit permission from treatment providers for continued substance abuse and 
thus encouraging people to break the law. On the other hand, studies based on the abstinence 
goal, might be perceived as overwhelming and unrealistic to adolescent participants and could 
operate to undermine both treatment motivation and willingness to participate (Meyers and 
Smith, 1995). It is difficult to elucidate from existing literature whether this is a factor, as studies 
do not typically give their overall philosophy of treatment.
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Conclusion on the evaluation of the structural family therapy model of adolescent addiction 
and its clinical application.
Research findings appear to support the fundamental premises of structural theory of adolescent 
drug abuse. Specifically, family structure, behavioural control, cohesiveness and adaptabihty are 
all identified as risk factors mediating the developmental of drug abuse, through various proposed 
mechanisms. The clinical apphcation of structural theory into family therapy with adolescents 
and their famihes also seems to support the theory as interventions aimed at these constructs can 
reduce levels of drug taking by adolescents whilst concurrently changing the famihes functioning 
behaviour.
However, empirical findings both from epidemiological and clinical research reveal that the 
theory and its apphcation to clinical practice are subject to difficulties in explaining specific 
findings. The two main difficulties with the approach appear to be, firstly, ah adolescent 
behavioural problems are subject to the same risk factors and therefore, why does the adolescent 
specificaUy or co-morbidly develop drug abuse? The theory could be argued to be over inclusive 
and fimdamentaUy a model of the aetiology of adolescent behaviour problems. Secondly, the 
theory and its clinical apphcation only focuses on the famhy as the cause of the drug abuse 
despite knowledge of the other influences in the system that impact on the aetiology of drug 
abuse.
Future interventions for adolescent drug abuse
In response to these aforementioned problems with the theory, multi-systemic ecological 
interventions programmes for adolescents have evolved out structural famhy therapy traditions 
(Henggeler and Bouruin, 1990), and represent a logical extension of family therapy (Haley, 1980; 
Mmuchm, 1974). They are based on the theory that problematic processes, not only within the 
family but also within the adolescent as an individual and within the wider social system may 
contribute to the aetiology and maintenance of drug abuse (Henggeler and Borduin, 1990). Thus, 
first, allowing for individual differences within individuals and their famhies, and second, 
incorporating influences from other systems, and thus accounting for residual risk factors. Multi- 
systemic therapy is centred on a family therapy intervention programme, but also includes an 
additional set of individual, school based and peer group based interventions, which target 
specific risk factors identified for the individual and family.
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Preliminary evaluative research has shown positive results with this approach, for example, 
Liddle and Dakof (1995) and Waldron (1996) in hterature reviews of a series of controUed 
clinical trials concluded that multi-systemic family based therapy is more effective than other 
treatments in the reduction of drug use.
Although, this essay has shown that the structural model of family therapy cannot fully account 
for current knowledge about adolescent drug abuse, it remains an influential model in the drug 
abuse field as it has contributed to the development of new models in the conceptuahsation of 
adolescent drug abuse and influenced the interventions derived from these models.
In conclusion, drug abuse intervention development for adolescents is moving towards multi- 
component, comprehensive, broad based treatments (McLehan et al, 1993). Any further 
clarification of the role of family functioning in the aetiology of adolescent drug abuse disorders 
must await the results of longitudinal, prospective research focused on high-risk samples of 
adolescents using more comprehensive family assessment.
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Summary of the Clinical Dossier
This section contains a brief overview of my three years clinical experience, including the name 
and nature of each placement and a description of the range of clinical experience gained. A 
selection of five formal clinical case reports have been submitted in full in a confidential clinical 
volume, which also contains a full record of all clinical activity, placement contracts and 
supervisor evaluation forms for each placement undertaken. These case reports reflect the variety 
of clinical work, chent groups, contexts and theoretical approaches covered during clinical 
placements. A summary of each case report is provided in this dossier. All client names and 
identifiers have been changed to preserve confidentiality.
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An Overview of Clinical Experience During Training:
Core Adult Mental Health, Learning Disability, Child and 
Adolescent Mental Health, and Older Adult Mental Health
Placements.
&
Specialist Addiction and Systemic Adolescent Mental Health
Placements.
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Core Adult Mental Health Placement
Placement details
Dates: September 1998 to March 1999.
Supervisor: Dr Sarah Holroyd (Clinical Psychologist).
NHS Trust: Surrey Oaklands NHS Trust.
Base: Ewell Community Adult Mental Health Team.
Summary o f  experience
This placement provided a thorough experience o f  working from  a cognitive-behavioural 
perspective with a range o f  adult mental health problems, as a member o f  a multi-disciplinary 
community mental health team (CMHT). Clinical experience with clients with more severe and 
enduring mental health problems illustrated the multiple skills, flexibility, and patience needed 
fo r  working with this population. The experience o f  working with clients from  diverse social and 
cultural backgrounds developed my knowledge o f  social, cultural and religious issues and raised 
my awareness o f  their relevance to therapy.
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Overview of experience
Models
This placement provided a thorough experience of working from a cognitive-behavioural 
perspective in the psychological treatment of adult mental health problems. In addition, I used 
systemic approaches as a member of a family therapy both as main therapist and part of the ‘team 
behind the screen’.
Settings
The placement was based within a multi-disciplinary CMHT. Clinical work was undertaken in a 
range of settings including: an outpatient clinic; a psychological department; an inpatient hospital 
ward; chent homes; and in vivo exposure work in community settings.
Clinical skills and experience
Through direct clinical work and observation of my supervisor, I developed my assessment, 
formulation, intervention, and report writing skihs with a range of presenting problems including: 
Anxiety (e.g. panic attacks, social anxiety, generahsed anxiety disorder, obsessive-compulsive 
disorder); Depression (including post-natal); borderline personahty disorder; anger management; 
bereavement; Manic depression; Schizophrenia; and Sexual difficulties. Experience was gained 
in a range of assessment procedures (including the WAIS-HI, WMS-HI, BDI, BAI, SAD, SCQ, 
SABQ, FNE). I also developed and ran a cognitive-behavioural group for anxiety management 
with an Occupational therapist. This group was evaluated for effectiveness and compared to an 
existing service, a relaxation group.
Meetings, observations and seminars
In order to gain an understanding of the roles and skhls of other professionals within the CMHT, 
meetings and observations were undertaken with a Consultant Psychiatrist, a CPN, an 
Occupational Therapist and a Social Worker. In addition to consultative work for CPN’s, 
Occupational Therapists, and Social Workers, I ran a supervision group for SHO’s focused on 
cognitive-behavioural interventions, which consolidated and enhanced my own skills in 
assessment and formulation in this approach. As part of the placement I attended a series of 
seminars on Psychodynamic group therapy.
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Core Adult Learning Disabilities Placement
Placement details
Dates: April 1999 to September 1999.
Supervisor: Barley Oliver (Consultant Clinical Psychologist).
NHS Trust: South London and Maudsley NHS Trust.
Base: Southwark Community Learning Disabihties Team.
Summary o f  experience
This placement provided an opportunity to develop my skills in cognitive and behavioural 
assessment, formulation and intervention procedures. Work with paid and unpaid cares provided 
both a challenge, and an opportunity to leam  specific consultation skills. Experience within a 
specialist challenging behaviour service developed my skills and confidence in working with 
clients with challenging behaviours.
Doctorate of Psychology (PsychD) in Clinical Psychology 141
Overview of Core Learning Disabilities Placement
Overview of experience
Models
This placement provided a good grounding in behavioural interventions and assessments such as 
(functional analysis) as well as developing my existing skills in cognitive-behavioural therapy. 
Work with the complex systems, which surrounded many chents, provided an introduction to 
organisational systemic thinking.
Settings
The placement was based within a multi-disciplinary community learning disabilities team 
(CLDT) and a specialist challenging needs service (CNS). Clinical work was undertaken in a 
range of settings including: an outpatient clinic; day centres: specialist challenging behaviour 
units; an inpatient dual diagnosis hospital ward; chent homes; group homes; and in vivo exposure 
work in community settings.
Clinical skills and experience
This placement developed my skills on a number of levels (e.g., staff training, direct clinical work 
with individuals and groups, joint work with other professionals, and indirect work through paid 
carers and relatives). Clinical work was undertaken with clients with mild, moderate, and severe 
levels of disability and covered a range of issues including: Challenging behaviour; self-injury; 
self-neglect; Depression; Dementia; childhood sexual abuse; Paedophiha; bereavement/loss; 
social skills; and anger management. A range of assessment procedures were used (e.g., direct 
observations, ABC charts, HALO, WAIS-Hl, Raven’s progressive matrices, BPVS, Vineland, 
BADS, Doors and People, Wisconsin Card Sorting), and a comprehensive functional analysis was 
undertaken as part of my work within the CNS.
Meetings, observations and seminars
I was involved in developing the criteria for a funding pohcy between health and social services. 
During the placement, I attended the British Association of Behavioural and Cognitive 
Psychotherapists annual conference.
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Core Child and Adolescent Mental Health Placement
Placement details
Dates: October 1999 to March 2000.
Supervisor: Janina Syndler (Consultant Clinical Psychologist), and Dr Juhe Franklin (Clinical
Psychologist).
NHS Trust: South London and Maudsley NHS Trust.
Base: Priory Manor Child Development Centre, Lewisham Park Child and Adolescent
Service, and Lewisham Hospital Paediatric Department.
Summary o f  experience
This placement provided an opportunity to employ skills in the application o f systemic theory to 
clinical practice with children and families, including skills in fam ily therapy. It also allowed my 
to build on existing behavioural and cognitive skills in assessment, formulation and interventions 
with individuals and groups. The challenges o f  working with some very young children, 
adolescents and parents helped to broaden my repertoire o f  clinical skills.
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Models
This placement provided an opportunity to leam post-Milan models of systemic therapy 
(including Narrative therapy and Solution Focused therapy) and their apphcation to work with 
individuals and families. Broad experience was also gained in behavioural and cognitive 
interventions with children, adolescents and famihes.
Settings
The placement was based within a multi-disciplinary community child and adolescent mental 
health team, a child development service, and a paediatric service. Clinical work was undertaken 
in a range of settings including: an outpatient clinic; paediatric hospital ward: client homes; and 
schools.
Clinical skills and experience
My caseload covered children ranging from neonates to adolescents, and children with 
disabihties. This included cases with: autistic spectmm disorders: school refusal; temper 
tantmms; encopresis; enuresis; attention deficit hyperactivity disorder; pain management, cystic 
fibrosis, diabetes, schizophrenia, and eating difficulties. Working with very young children, 
adolescents and parents presented many challenges and helped to broaden my range of clinical 
skills. In addition, I also developed and ran a parents group with my supervisor, based on the 
Webster Stratton Approach with parents who have children with ‘special needs’. A range of 
formal assessment procedures were used, including assessments for Attention Deficit 
Hyperactivity Disorder (e.g., the TOAD, Strengths and Difficulties questionnaire, and Conners), 
and other psychometric tests and clinical tools (WISC-HI, WORD, WPPSI, McGill Pain 
Scale, Leiter and Vineland).
Meetings, observations and seminars
I attended various presentations at the Psychology Department and presented a talk on Narrative 
therapy. 1 was also involved in setting up a specialist feeding clinic at the hospital. 1 observed 
the assessment procedure in specialist services for depression and autistic spectmm disorders at 
the Maudsley. During the placement 1 was able to expand my knowledge on the legal processes 
in child mental health by attending various seminars on the new government green paper on the 
mental health act.
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Core Older Adult Mental Health Placement
Placement details
Dates; April 2000 to September 2000.
Supervisor: Lynn Beech (Consultant Clinical Psychologist).
NHS Trust: South London Community Mental Health NHS Trust.
Base: Sutton Older Adult Mental Health team, Sutton Hospital.
Summary o f experience
This placement provided an opportunity to further develop my skills and knowledge in 
neuropsychological testing as well as consolidating my abilities in cognitive-behavioural 
assessment, formulation and intervention procedures. Successful work on an inpatient unit 
(changing unhelpful care practices and implementing behavioural programmes) taught me the 
need fo r  persistence, patience and diplomacy when working in settings which are resistant to 
using psychological models alongside more traditional medical models. I  also developed and ran 
a pain management group fo r  older adults based on a cognitive-behavioural approach. The 
group was incorporated into future service provision. The emphasis oh a developmental/life­
span perspective o f  ageing from  my supervisor was particularly helpful.
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Overview of experience
Models
This placement focused on the application of cognitive and behavioural theory to older adult 
work. It also provided an opportunity to develop my skills and knowledge in 
neuropsychological/psychometric testing. Additional supervision focused on a Psychodynamic 
approach to assessment and intervention was also utilised.
Settings
The placement was based within a multi-disciplinary community older adult mental health team, 
day service, and an acute psychiatric admission ward. Clinical work was undertaken in a range of 
settings including: an outpatient clinic; chent homes; day centres; and residential care facUities.
Clinical skills and experience
Clinical experience covered working with individuals, famihes, and carers concerning a range of 
presenting problems including: Depression; loss/bereavement; physical health problems; Anxiety 
(e.g., Generahsed anxiety disorder. Health anxiety, and panic attacks); pain management; and 
dementia. Chents were also seen for cognitive testing with presenting difficulties such as: 
Memory problems; confusion; and dementia. A range of psychological assessment procedures 
were used (e.g., WAIS-IH, WMS-HI, BADS, CAMCOG, MEAMS, AMI, NART). In addition, a 
cognitive-behavioural group for pain management in older adults was developed, implemented 
and evaluated.
Meetings, observations and seminars
An interactive presentation to staff at a residential care home focused on a specific client’s 
formulation and intervention strategies consohdated my abihty to communicate complex 
psychological principles. I also conducted a hterature review on older adult pain management 
and presented the findings to the psychology department. As part of the inpatient ward work, I 
was co-therapist on a support group for former chents of the ward. During the placement, I 
attended the British Association of Behavioural and Cognitive Psychotherapy Conference. As 
part of the supervisory process, extensive discussions on trust merger issues and team 
organisation within the older adult service occurred, furthering my understanding of 
organisational and strategic issues within the NHS.
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Addiction Specialist Placement
Placement details
Dates: October 2000 to March 2001.
Supervisor: Dr Shamil Waringartne (Consultant Clinical Psychologist) and Dr Jenny Corless
(Clinical Psychologist).
NHS Trust: South London and Maudsley NHS Trust.
Base: Community Drug and Alcohol Teams in Camberwell and Woolwich.
Summary o f experience
This placement provided a thorough experience o f  working with adults with complex mental 
health problems and dual diagnosis, within two multi-disciplinary Community Drug and Alcohol 
Teams (CDAT). The complex complex nature o f  this client group taught me the need fo r  
persistence and patience and consolidated my clinical skills particularly, flexibility needed when 
working with this population. It also allowed me to build on existing Cognitive-Behavioural 
skills, whilst combining the approach with Motivational Interviewing and Relapse Prevention. 
The experience o f  working with clients from  diverse social and cultural backgrounds developed 
my knowledge o f  social, cultural and religious issues and raised my awareness o f  their relevance 
to therapy.
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Models
This placement provided comprehensive experience of working within a Cognitive-Behavioural 
approach with chents who had severe and enduring mental health problems. I also employed 
Motivational Interviewing and Relapse Prevention with chents, with the aim of initiating change 
and maintaining progress in the goal of becoming abstinent from drug and alcohol use.
Settings
The placement was based within two multi-disciplinary Community Drug and Alcohol Teams. 
Clinical work was undertaken in a range of settings including: outpatient clinics; in-patient 
settings; and other and community settings. Psychoeducation groups focused on drug and alcohol 
information were also undertaken with adolescents in a school exclusion unit.
Clinical skills and experience
Clinical experience was gained both with chents with problem drug use (Heroin, Cocaine, Speed, 
Codine, Ecstasy) and alcohol use. The chents were primarily dual diagnoses, co-morbid mental 
health problems included: Anxiety (e.g. panic attacks, social anxiety, generahsed anxiety 
disorder, obsessive-compulsive disorder); Depression (including post-natal); Borderline 
personahty disorder; Anger management; Bereavement; Childhood sexual abuse; Marital 
violence and Cognitive problems. This developed my skihs in the apphcation of a range of 
systemic models to assessment, formulation, intervention and report writing. A range of 
neuropsychological assessment procedures were used (e.g. W AIS-III, W MS-III, AM IPB).
Meetings, observations and seminars
The placement was based within an intemationahy renown addiction service and thus I was able 
to work with and observe some of the ‘top’ clinicians and researchers m the field. The placement 
enabled me to be at the forefront of service planning and I became involved in work for the 
Department of Health on pohcy planning for Adolescent drug and alcohol services. The 
experience provided me with a sound grounding in the current and future service issues in 
addictions. In addition to clinical work, I was involved in a multi-centre research project, funded 
and televised by Channel Four. As lead clinician I was responsible for researching and compiling 
a neuropsychological battery for examining the cognitive effect of drugs on clubbers. 
Furthermore, I was involved in the writing and submission of the research papers.
Doctorate of Psychology (PsychD) in Clinical Psychology 148
Overview of Adolescent Systemic Specialist Placement
Adolescent Systemic Specialist Placement
Placement details
Dates: April 2001 to September 2001.
Supervisor: Gloria Martin (Consultant Clinical Psychologist) and Dr Vivien Senn (Clinical
Psychologist).
NHS Trust: South West London and St George’s Mental Health NHS Trust.
Base: Child and Adolescent Consultation Service, Richmond, and Youth Offending
Team, Richmond.
Summary o f  experience
This placement provided a thorough experience o f  working with adolescents with emotional and 
behavioural problems, within both a multi-disciplinary Child and Adolescent Mental Health 
Service (CAMHS) and a Youth Offending Team (YOT). Clinical experience with clients who are 
often referred fo r  therapy by other people, including the courts introduced the complex issues 
surrounding 'coercion'. This factor strengthened my clinical skills particularly, flexibility, and 
patience needed fo r  working with this population. The placements emphasis on the systemic 
approach to clinical and organisational work consolidated and furthered my knowledge o f  theory 
and practice with this approach. Specifically, working systemically with individuals, families, 
and the multi-disciplinary team. Based mainly within a systemic team, the placement provided a 
good experience o f  working in different roles within a specialist fam ily therapy team (e.g. as the 
main therapist, the team, or as part o f  a reflecting team).
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Overview of experience
Models
This placement provided a thorough experience of working from a systemic perspective in the 
psychological treatment of adolescent, their families and the surrounding network. I employed 
various systemic approaches including; Post-Milan, Social Constructionist, Milan, Structural, 
Strategic and Narrative Therapy. In addition, a Cognitive-Behavioural approach was the focus of 
my work with the adolescents within the YOT, specifically. Anger Management.
Settings
The placement was based within a multi-disciplinary CAMHS and a YOT. Clinical work was 
undertaken in a range of settings including; outpatient clinics; in-patient settings; schools, prisons 
and other and community settings.
Clinical skills and experience
Experience was gained both as a primary therapist and member of a therapy team in systemic 
consultations with individuals, couples, and families with a range of presenting problems 
including: Anxiety (e.g. panic attacks, social anxiety, obsessive-compulsive disorder); 
Depression; Conduct disorder; Anger management; bereavement; School Refusal; Eating 
disorders; Sexual abuse; and Self-harm (including risk assessment). This developed my skills in 
the apphcation of a range of systemic models to assessment, formulation, intervention and report 
writing, and provided intensive experience of both observing and receiving hve supervision.
Meetings, observations and seminars
During the placement, I was a regular member of the reflecting team in the multi-disciplinary 
team meetings. I was also involved in the dehberate self-harm service provided to Kingston 
Hospital, risk assessing adolescents for discharge from in-patient wards. I was also requested to 
present my research to the communication clinic within the service, which consequently, 
influenced the team’s clinical practice in assessing and diagnosing children with Asperger 
Syndrome.
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A Cognitive Behavioural assessment and intervention for an adult presenting with travel
anxiety and underlying Social Phohia.
Summary
Presenting Problem
H a sixty-six year old man presented with a thirty-year history of problems with travel anxiety, 
manifesting itself particularly in a fear of travelling in enclosed vehicles. H was experiencing 
weekly panic attacks before travelling. In addition, H was also experiencing panic attacks prior 
to social interactions with men. H had confronted some of the feared situations by employing 
safety behaviours, for example, carrying his anxiety medication, and monitoring his own 
behaviour in social situations.
Assessment
A thorough Cognitive-Behavioural assessment was conducted, including the administration of 
standardised measures. These included: Beck’s Depression Inventory (Beck, Ward, Mendleson, 
Mock and Erbaugh, 1961), Beck’s Anxiety Inventory (Beck, Epstein, Brown and Steer, 1988), 
Fear of Negative Evaluation (Watson and Friend, 1969), Social Avoidance and Distress (Watson 
and Friend, 1969), Social Cognitions Questionnaire (Wells, Stopa and Clark, unpublished), and 
the Safety and Avoidance Behaviours Questionnaire (Wells, unpublished). This information was 
supplemented by self-monitoring data (the frequency of each problem and a diary of thoughts and 
behaviours). Assessment revealed that H had ‘severe’ levels of anxiety and ‘moderate’ levels of 
depression. In addition, H cognitions reflected a fear of social evaluation.
Formulation
Initially, a diagnosis of Agoraphobia was considered but rejected, as H did not meet the criteria in 
DSM-IV. H’s presenting symptoms and history fulfilled a diagnosis of Social Phobia according 
to DSM-IV. The case was formulated within the Cognitive Behavioural model of Social Anxiety 
produced by Clark and Wells (1995).
H described himself as always being an anxious person. An experience with a teacher when 
twelve, and his relationship with an authoritarian father, had resulted in anxiety about interacting 
with men in authority. He became self-conscious, believing they were judging him, thinking that 
he was “boring”, “stupid” and a “naughty little boy”. In situations, where H had to interact with
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men, he felt anxiety symptoms such as a racing heart and hyperventilation. These behefs and 
anxiety symptoms led H to avoid social and work situations with men.
On the morning of his first panic attack, H was apprehensive about returning to work after being 
disciplined by his boss. During the tube journey, he began to notice his physical reaction to the 
anticipatory anxious thoughts. The symptoms caused him concern and thus his anxiety increased 
due to his belief that the people on the tube would notice and judge him. He continued to 
hyperventilate which induced feelings of ‘unrealness’ and ‘faintness.’ The panic attack abated 
after he got off the tube and did not go to work avoiding both situations of social judgement.
H’s social anxiety underlined his fear of travelling for which he was originally referred. The fear 
of having a panic attack in a situation where he could not escape from social judgement and 
catastrophe had transferred to other places, such as lifts, planes, and pubhc seated events. H’s 
safety behaviours perpetuated his beliefs by stopping him from confronting his fear of having a 
panic attack due to his social anxiety. H showed anticipatory and post mortem processing of his 
social interactions with men. He was in a vicious cycle of social anxiety.
Intervention
The intervention was based on the Cognitive Behavioural model of Social Anxiety proposed by 
Clark and Wells (1995). It took place over three months, with eight sessions in total. The model 
was introduced to H, and illustrated with his formulation. Psychoeducation on anxiety and panic 
attacks was presented. H was taught the principles and rationale of progressive muscle 
relaxation, and practised daily. Throughout the intervention, H kept a diary of thoughts and 
behaviours in anxiety provoking situations. Negative automatic thoughts elucidated from the 
diary, were defined and operationahsed by H and challenged using cognitive and behavioural 
reattribution. Safety behaviours were identified and reduced using cognitive techniques and 
behavioural experiments. At the end of the intervention, progress was reviewed and relapse 
prevention issues were discussed.
Outcome
A detailed evaluation of outcome was presented including the re-administration of the 
standardised measures. H had moved from ‘severe’ anxiety levels to the ‘mild’ anxiety range, 
and from moderate to ‘normal’ levels of depression. H had not had a panic attack for two
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months, and he had made some male friends. H was driving around London and had taken the 
tube to the theatre. H no longer utilised any safety behaviours. In summary, H’s original 
presenting problem anxiety surrounding travel had been eradicated, whilst H was able to manage 
his social anxiety. The problems encountered in treatment, the Cognitive-Behavioural 
formulation, and evaluation of the intervention were also considered.
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Longitudinal Cognitive and Behavioural assessment of a client with Down Syndrome to 
ascertain a differential diagnosis of Dementia, Depression or physical problems.
Summary
Presenting IVoblem
J a sixty year old lady with Down Syndrome and moderate/severe learning disabilities had 
presented with behaviour consistent with Alzheimer disease for the last twelve months.
Assessment
The assessment was carried out over a period of five months. The author took the lead, 
requesting input from other professions for specific investigations. Initial assessment information 
was obtained from care staff. Community Learning Disabilities Team professionals, and medical 
records. Initial assessment information covered the following areas; mental state; motivation and 
concentration; communication; memory; changes m vocational and social activities and 
functioning; unusual and challenging behaviours; life events; and medical history.
Initial Hypotheses
1. J’s presenting behaviours were due to an unidentified physical illness, pain, and/or sensory 
impairments.
2. J’s symptoms were secondary to depression caused by various losses in her life; including her 
mother, staff members, loss of social support, reduction in activities, and health problems.
3. J was showing the early symptoms of a cognitive decline in her functioning due to a 
dementia.
4. J’s behaviours were the result of a combination of all or several of the above factors.
The pseudodementia and depression hypotheses had to be fully investigated and ruled out as 
possible causes of the presenting behaviour before a diagnosis of dementia could have been 
determined. Concurrent longitudinal monitoring of behaviour and cognitive skills enabled the 
identification of changes in functioning due to a dementia and/or interventions in the areas of 
physical and mental health.
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The author and medical professionals conducted further investigations suggested by the initial 
hypotheses. Further investigations focused on the pseudodementia hypothesis included; tests for 
urinary tract infection, blood screening, tests of sensory of impairments, brain physiology 
(Computer Topology and Electro E gram), and gastro-intestinal investigations. In addition, a 
Psychiatric assessment of mental state was conducted to investigate the depression hypothesis.
These investigations found evidence supporting the hypotheses that presenting symptoms were 
due to deterioration in physical and mental health. However, a diagnosis of dementia could not 
be dismissed without additional information from a cognitive and behavioural assessment of 
skills and abihties, as problems in physical and mental health could have been co-existing and 
exacerbating an underlying dementing process.
Ohver and Crayton’s cognitive battery was used to assess J’s cognitive functioning. The 
assessment battery comprised; British Picture and Vocabulary Scale, Vineland Social Maturity 
Scale (Survey form). Life events Scale, and Cognitive ability tests (Picture Naming, Picture 
Identification, Orientation, Card Sorting, Action on Request, Object Memory, Picture Memory, 
and Memory for Sentences).
Formulation
J did not show any measurable signs of deterioration in her cognitive and behavioural functioning 
or evidence of brain atrophy, indicative of a dementing process. Assessment of physical and 
mental health indicated that J had symptoms of depression and extensive medical problems, 
which could have been producing symptomology consistent with a dementia, or alternatively 
exacerbating an underlying dementing process. Until, the physical and mental health problems 
had been treated it was difficult to provide a differential diagnosis between the three factors. 
Although, it was impossible to rule out a diagnosis of dementia, the strongest evidence was that 
physical problems and depression were causing her presenting behaviours and loss of skills as the 
change in her behaviour seemed to coincide with her mother’s illness and her own ill health.
Recommendations
Based on the assessment information and formulation, an action plan and recommendations were 
made and are detailed extensively in the report. The problems encountered in assessment and the 
lessons learnt from this case were also considered.
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A Biopsychosocial approach with a Cognitive Behavioural formulation and intervention for
a child presenting with chronic pain.
Summary
Presenting Problem
S aged ten years had multiple breaks on her left arm on shoulder with chronic pain complications. 
Although, S received routine medical interventions including physiotherapy and mild analgesia, 
she had not shown any improvement in reported pain levels or her ability to mobilise her arm and 
shoulder.
Assessment
Assessment aimed to ascertain the pain’s influence on S’s life and her consequent attempts to 
manage the pain. It was structured within a Biopsychosocial framework, and therefore, attempted 
to investigate the interacting cognitive, behavioural, physiological and emotional factors based 
within an environmental milieu, that precipitated and maintained the pain and level of disability. 
Clinical interview was used to obtain information on the history of the pain, previous medical 
history. S’s account of the pain, family issues, social issues, and psychological issues. In 
addition, standardised measures were used including; Paediatric Pain questionnaire (Vami, 
Thompson, and Hanson, 1987), Hospital Anxiety and Depression scale (Zigmond and Snaith, 
1983) and a personal construct wheel.
Formulation
Developmental changes, for example, puberty and changes in education, were confounded by 
lifestyle changes caused by pain. In addition, S” level of skills and independence had regressed 
due to her problems with mobility. Her chronic pain had resulted in her re-evaluating her 
personal construct, from a person who was ‘happy and active’ to a person who was ‘sad and 
passive,’ lowering her levels of self-esteem and personal efficacy.
S experienced anxiety from pain anticipation, her belief that she would not get better and stresses 
related to changes in schooling and development. Her low mood was hypothesised to be due to 
increased levels of social isolation, loss of role, and inability to do everyday activities or things 
she enjoyed. Additionally, S’s chronic pain allowed her to overcome her difficulty in expressing 
negative emotion, such as jealousy about her younger sister and gaining her mother’s attention 
through an acceptable physical medium. S’s hypervigilance to sensations in her arm, it’s
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positioning in relation to others, and anticipating risk in activities, resulted in increased symptom 
recognition. S’s constant pain, subsequent inadequate sleep levels, and emotional state 
influenced pain tolerance, by lowering the pain threshold and increasing pain perception. Thus, 
sleep deprivation, anxiety and depression resulted from pain and in turn, intensified it, resulting in 
hypersensitivity to touch and a vicious circle.
In summary. S’s chronic pain affected her developmentally, biologically, and on sensory, 
emotional, cognitive, behavioural and interpersonal dimensions. Factors in each of these areas 
had predisposed, precipitated and maintained her chronic pain. The factors were interacting, 
causing the current presentation of emotion, cognition and behaviour.
Intervention
The intervention was based on a Cognitive Behavioural approach for chronic pain management. 
It took place over a period of four months, with eight sessions in total. A behavioural programme 
(activity cycling and graded hierarchies of activities) was introduced to increase activities and 
reduce avoidance of tasks. This programme involved both the family and school. An additional 
behavioural programme (relaxation and graded hierarchy of touch) focused on decreasing the 
arms hypersensitivity and muscle tension. Personal construct work was employed to increase 
self-esteem and focus on changes in role and relationships. A guided discovery approach, 
allowing for her cognitive and developmental level, was used to present S with the cognitive 
behavioural model of chronic pain. Cognitive therapy focused on anxiety and depression. 
Cognitive strategies were introduced such as, imagery, distraction, and cognitive restructuring to 
overcome her anxiety, self-doubt and feelings of helplessness. Thoughts were challenged using 
cognitive and behavioural reattribution. Integral to the intervention was continued 
communication between the family, doctors, physiotherapy and psychology.
In addition, to the individual intervention with S, the author’s supervisor saw Mrs S for two 
individual sessions. These sessions focused on explaining the formulation, intervention rationale 
and families contribution to treatment, emphasising ignoring pain behaviours and praising well 
behaviours. The impact pain had had on the family was discussed.
Outcome
S reported decreased levels of pain and increased mobility. S had started to do all her self-care, 
chores around the house and helping with her younger sister. S was back in all the school teams
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and was able to enjoy all her old activities. S felt that her concentration, motivation, and 
confidence had returned to pre-fracture levels. She no longer felt depressed, anxious or irritable. 
At the end of the intervention, S had successfully completed all of the hierachies (activity and 
hypersensitivity) and was able to tolerate touch on her arm and shoulder.
Standardised assessment tools supported the aforementioned self-stated changes. S’s score on the 
HADS, depression sub-scale had reduced from 12 to 5 and on the anxiety sub-scale had reduced 
from 12 to 5, placing her in the non-significant clinical range. The Vami-Thompson Paediatric 
questionnaire validated S’s verbal accounts of her pam distress levels and location. In addition, 
personal construct wheels indicated that the negative characteristics had decreased whilst the 
positive characteristics had increased to ‘before pain’ levels.
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Neuropsychological assessment of autobiographical memory loss in an older adult. 
Summary
Presenting Problem
S a seventy year old gentleman had problems in recalling autobiographical memories. S felt that 
he had no “autobiographical memories to speak o f’. The memories that he did have were vague 
and informational in nature with rninimal emotional context. S reported that he had no problems 
with his short or .long term memory for facts. An associate speciahst Psychiatrist had assessed S 
and found no indication of mental health problems. The Psychiatrist had inferred that S’s self- 
reported autobiographical memory problems were due to psychogenic amnesia due to an 
unknown traumatic event in S’s life and referred him to Clinical Psychology for counselling.
Assessment
Clinical interview was used to elucidate the history of S’s problems with autobiographical 
memory. In addition, information on S’s personal history, personality, and medical history was 
obtained to inform the initial hypotheses.
Hypotheses
The presenting problem with autobiographical memory could have been the result of one or a 
combination of several of the following hypotheses :-
1. S had an autobiographical memory that fell within normal limits, but S had unreahstic 
expectations about the quahty and content of his memories.
2. S’s epilepsy and medication history had effected the processing of his memories over his 
lifetime, effecting the quality and abihty to retrieve memories.
3. S had specific memory problems that were effecting his abihty to access autobiographical 
memories.
4. Reported memory problems could have been the sahent feature of underlying organic 
impairment, such as an infarct.
5. Psychogenic amnesia caused by an unknown traumatic incident in his childhood.
Neuropsychological Assessment
S’s presenting problem was with his autobiographical memory and thus initial investigations into 
his memory for past personal events would be expected, employing a test such as the
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Autobiographical Memory Interview (AMI). However, it was felt that his fear of finding out 
about a ‘traumatic incident‘ and or ‘false memory syndrome’ would confound the results from 
such a tool due to his anxiety impacting on his ability to recall information (Lezak, 1995). 
Therefore, initial investigations were aimed at ruling out general memory problems particularly in 
recall, addressing the hypothesis that his presenting difficulties were due to specific memory 
problems, organic impairment and/or the result of medication.
Tests employed during assessment
• Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale -  Third Edition (WAIS-Hl).
• Wechsler Memory Scale -  Third Edition (WMS-HI).
• Autobiographical Memory Inventory (AMI).
Summary of Neuropsychological Findings
S was functioning cognitively within the top two percent of the population as indicated by the 
WAIS-IH. In addition, his general memory skills placed him within the top seven per cent of the 
population and inside the expected range predicted by his score on the WAIS-IH. S showed a 
specific weakness compared to his other scores firstly, for Picture Arrangement in the WAIS-IH, 
and secondly, for visual memory tasks. However, although, performing below his average abihty 
in these areas, the findings were not significant and S was still functioning within the top 21 per 
cent of the population. In summary, S was a very able man with no apparent problems with his 
general level of cognitive functioning or memory.
Further Medical Examination
The MRI scan was carried out after testing had been completed due to hospital waiting hsts. The 
scan revealed no ventricular dilation or displacement and no abnormal signs, infarcts or mass 
lesions were found in the cerebral hemispheres. This finding indicated that the self-reported 
memory problems were not due to organic impairment.
Formulation
The combination of S’s personahty style, cognitive abihty, hmited number of significant life 
events, and epilepsy could have resulted in an autobiographical memory that although within 
normal limits, was a collection of events that were weakly interconnected due to the lack of 
reflection that produces elaborated memory traces and themes. Thus his memory retrieval
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produced specific events rather than a chain of connected occurrences, possibly resulting in the 
paucity of ‘narrative’ to his memories. In addition, the lack of significant events in S’s life 
provided an additional difficulty in locating and relating events to a specific time period and other 
memories. The quality and depth of S’s original memories could also be subjected to problems 
with encoding due to the effect on concentration and information processing caused by his 
epilepsy and medication. In summary, the combination of his unreahstic expectations, ‘low 
average’ autobiographical memory, and stage in life, resulted in him becoming preoccupied with 
his memory and creating a new ‘memory project’.
Intervention
The formulation was explained to S, with particular emphasis on the fact that his perceived 
paucity of autobiographical memories could not be due firstly, to a traumatic event on account of 
the inconsistency of his pattern of memory ‘loss’ to a ‘psychogenic’ presentation or secondly, the 
result of organic impairment supported by the neuropsychological testing and CT and MRI scan.
It was emphasised that S’s autobiographical memory was in the normal range. This was 
illustrated using Psychoeducation to explain how memory works with particular reference to 
‘autobiographical memory’. The influence of personahty, life history and medication was 
introduced into the model ihustrated by examples from his case. S was given a comprehensive 
handout on autobiographical memory and additional references if he wished to further his 
understanding. The intervention was aimed at changing S’s expectations of his autobiographical 
memory.
Techniques were introduced that would aid S in retrieving some of his memories (taken from; 
Lishman, 1990). These included; using photographs, objects, films, reading family diaries and 
historical books and visiting places from his past as visual cues to retrieval; auditory cues, for 
example, talking to other people, specificaUy his sister and son, and listening to historical tapes 
and music; and using stimuh from other sensory formats such as smells and tastes. It was 
stressed that not all of these methods would be helpful to S and therefore it was a process of ‘trial 
and error’. In addition, S was reminded that his original memories might not be as ‘salient, 
emotive or narrative’ as other peoples due to the effects of his medication and personality 
characteristics.
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A Cognitive Behavioural assessment and Motivational Interviewing and Cognitive- 
Behavioural intervention for a male adult with Generalised Anxiety Disorder and co- 
morhid alcohol dependency and depression.
Summary
Presenting Problem
M aged forty-five was referred for a twenty-year history of anxiety problems, manifesting itself 
particularly in a fear of social and vocational situations. He stated that he could not socialise with 
unfamihar people or go to work without using alcohol to control his anxiety. In addition, he 
became anxious when thinking about his life and family situation. When anxious, M stated that 
“I can’t breathe, my heart races, and I break into a sweat”. In addition, M had had symptoms of 
depression for six months.
Assessment
A thorough Cognitive-Behavioural assessment was conducted, including the administration of 
standardised measures. These included: Beck’s Depression Inventory (BDI), (Beck, Ward, 
Mendleson, Mock and Erbaugh, 1961), Beck’s Anxiety Inventory (BAI), (Beck, Epstein, Brown 
and Steer, 1988), Beliefs about substance use, (Wright, 1993), Inventory of drug taking situations 
-  Alcohol, (Annis and Martin, 1985), Alcohol use questionnaire (ADS), (Skinner, Horn, 
Wanberg, and Faster, 1984). This information was supplemented by self-monitoring data (the 
frequency of each problem and a diary of thoughts and behaviours). Assessment revealed that M 
had ‘severe’ levels of anxiety and ‘moderate’ levels of depression. In addition, M’s cognitions 
reflected Generalised Anxiety Disorder specifically, issues of acceptance; competence; 
responsibihty; control; and the symptoms of anxiety themselves. In addition, M had beliefs about 
his alcohol use, for example, that alcohol could control his anxiety. Furthermore, M was 
physically dependent on alcohol with his consumption and pattern of use had remaining constant 
over the year.
Formulation
Initially, a diagnosis of Social Anxiety was considered but rejected, as M did not meet the criteria 
in DSM-IV. M ’s presenting symptoms and history fulfilled a diagnosis of Generalised Anxiety 
Disorder according to DSM-IV. The case was formulated within the cognitive behavioural model
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of Generalised Anxiety Disorder and Substance Abuse proposed by Beck, Emery, and Greenburg, 
(1985) and Beck, Wright, Newman and Liese (1993).
After his parents’ divorce, M had minimal contact with his mother because of an acrimonious 
relationship due to her choice of partner. M could have felt pressure to be the perfect son to make 
up for her loss, leading him to try and please her wishes and avoid rejection. In childhood and 
adult social interactions, he had transferred this need to please to avoid rejection and thus found it 
impossible to refuse people’s requests for assistance, without inducing anxiety.
M’s father was a strong character who provided for his family and promoted the importance of 
emotional residence. M’s bullying experience at school threatened his view of himself as a man 
who could cope with adverse situations. This was further confounded when he lost his job and 
was unable to provide for his family, reducing his confidence and inducing anxiety by triggering 
the activation of his core beliefs that he was unable to cope and was not a real man. In addition, 
to medication not providing relief from anxiety symptomology, it was a further public sign that he 
could not cope. M discovered that alcohol could amehorate his symptoms, as well as being a 
socially acceptable behaviour for a man, and providing him with social acquaintances in the pub.
M’s tolerance for alcohol increased leading to a reduction in its effectiveness in controlling 
anxiety symptoms resulting in his drinking escalating. As the alcohol worked, M did not develop 
other strategies for coping with unpleasant emotions. Fundamentally, M appeared to have a low 
frustration tolerance for anxiety possibly due to his behefs that men should not show negative 
affect, and that alcohol was the only way to cope.
As M’s alcohol use increased it had contributed to, and caused additional life problems, 
threatening his perceived abihty to cope, for example, financial concerns, and family difficulties. 
In addition, continued drinking and withdrawal from day to day management led his wife to adopt 
the leading role in the family unit, further threatening his seh-concept as a man. M also appeared 
to have drinking related cognitions, which maintained his use and further reinforce his feelings of 
low self-esteem related to his inabihty to cope. M ’s current life problems and feelings of low 
control, low self-esteem and hopelessness at his situation had resulted in him exhibiting signs of 
co-morbid clinical depression.
Doctorate of Psychology (PsychD) in Clinical Psychology 163
Specialist Case Report Summary
Intervention
The intervention was based on the Cognitive Behavioural model of Generalised Anxiety Disorder 
and Substance Abuse proposed by Beck, Emery, and Greenburg, (1985) and Beck, Wright, 
Newman and Liese (1993). It took place over three months (two assessment, four intervention). 
M cancelled four sessions for reasons discussed in the case report. The model was introduced to 
M, and illustrated with his formulation. Principles of motivational interviewing were used in an 
endeavour to address M’s ambivalence about his drinking and thus his abüity to use the 
formulation and subsequent intervention. Psychoeducation on anxiety and panic attacks was 
presented. M was taught the principles and rationale of progressive muscle relaxation, and 
practiced daily. Throughout the intervention, M kept a diary of thoughts and behaviours in 
anxiety provoking situations, specifically those that triggered his use of alcohol. Negative 
automatic thoughts elucidated from the diary, were defined and operationahsed by M and 
challenged using cognitive and behavioural reattribution. Intervention was not completed at the 
end of placement due to the missed appointments.
Outcome
A detailed evaluation of outcome was presented including the re-administration of the 
standardised measures. These indicated that the intervention produced a shift in M ’s anxiety and 
alcohol behefs and behaviour. M had moved from ‘severe’ anxiety levels to the ‘mild’ anxiety 
range and from moderate to ‘normal’ levels of depression. M had reduced his drinking levels 
over the intervention. In summary, M’s original presenting problem, Generahsed Anxiety 
Disorder and problems with alcohol had reduced. At the end of the intervention, M was referred 
to his drug worker for ongoing anxiety management, detoxification* and relapse prevention, with 
supervision from a Chnical Psychologist. The problems encountered m treatment, the Cognitive- 
Behavioural formulation. Psychodynamic re-interpretation, and evaluation of the intervention 
were also considered.
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Summary of the Research Dossier
Summary of the Research Dossier
This section comprises three research components completed over three years. These are 
presented in order in which they were conducted in order to show how my research skills have 
developed during training. The first component is a service related research project which was 
completed in year one. This examines the efficacy of a Cognitive-Behavioural Anxiety 
management group with adults. This research was conducted in the context of a placement and 
so the implications for service provision are considered as well as theoretical aspects. The 
second component is a literature review from year two. This examines whether clinicians should 
throw out a theory informing clinical understanding if it cannot explain everything? Advanced 
Theory of Mind in Autistic Spectrum Disorders; The way forward? This theme is continued in 
the final component of the research dossier, the large scale research project, completed in year 
three. The research entitled: Happe’s ‘Strange Stories’ - An advanced test of ‘Theory of Mind’: 
Understanding of story characters’ thoughts and feelings by typically developing children and 
children on the autistic spectrum, examines these two groups responses to the stories. The main 
aims of which were obtaining a normative data set, and a comparison of the two groups 
performance on the stories.
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An evaluation of the effectiveness of a Cognitive 
Behavioural anxiety management group within an adult 
Community Mental Health Team.
Service Related Research Project 
July 1999 
Year One
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Abstract
An anxiety management group based on Cognitive-behavioural theory was developed to meet 
increased demands on existing services identified by an audit within an adult Community Health 
Mental Team. The study aimed to evaluate the comparative effectiveness o f  this group with an 
existing relaxaton group.
Participants referred by GP’s and multi-disciplinary team members were assigned to one o f  the 
groups and measures were taken at pre-intervention, post-intervention and three month follow  
up. Main outcome measures were the BAI, BDI, STAI, Cognitive Checklist and Coping Response 
Questionnaire.
No data was obtained fo r  the relaxation group at post-intervention and follow-up due to 
participant drop out. The loss o f participants was an important finding in itself and resulted in 
service changes.
The Cognitive-behavioural anxiety management group was evaluated fo r  changes in anxiety 
outcome measures. Results suggested that the intervention was successful in reducing levels o f  
anxiety (BAI) and anxious cognitions ( Cognition Checklist). There was a downward trend fo r  all 
the other measures, but this did not reach significance. These mixed findings on outcome were 
interpreted with caution due to the small size, and discussed in relation to future service 
development and provision.
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An Evaluation of the effectiveness of a Cognitive Behavioural anxiety management group 
within an adult Community Mental Health Team.
Introduction
Theoretical underpinnings of Cognitive Behavioural Therapy and Relaxation for anxiety.
Cognitive behavioural theory (CBT) proposes that anxiety disorders are characterised by themes of 
danger: anxious patients tend to misread their experiences as constituting either a physical or 
psychosocial threat and to overestimate both the probability and intensity of anticipated harm in 
future situations (Beck, Emery, and Greenburg, 1985). The main clinical implication of CBT is 
that effective interventions should help patients identify, challenge and change their cognitive 
misinterpretations of experiences of anxiety (Salkovskis and Clark, 1991; Barlow, Craske, Cemy, 
and Klosko, 1989).
Interventions within a cognitive behavioural framework, emphasise exposure to feared somatic 
sensations of anxiety (interoceptive exposure), in conjunction with cognitive-restmcturing as the 
primary elements of treatment (Barlow et al, 1989; Beck, Sokol, and Clark, 1992; Clark, 
Salkovskis, Gelder, Koehler, Martin, Anastasiades, Hackmann, Middleton, and Jeavons, 1994). 
Secondary elements include somatic symptom management skills (relaxation), and situational 
exposure assignments that challenge dysfunctional cognitions (Gould, Otto, and Pollack, 1995).
In contrast, relaxation as an intervention is not firmly grounded within one theory on the aetiology 
of anxiety. Various theories, includmg behavioural and physiological, propose that anxiety results 
in increased autonomic system arousal, but postulate different explanations as to how this occurs. 
For example, Lacey’s (1967) autonomic liability theory proposes that anxiety is due to a 
genetically inherited hypersensitive autonomic system.
Relaxation as a treatment is endorsed by these theories as a method of reducing the body’s arousal 
level, inhibitmg physical anxiety symptoms (Jacobson, 1938). There is no emphasis on di*ectly 
examining and restructuring cognitions. However, researchers have argued that cognitions are 
indnectly effected by relaxation. They postulate that reductions in psychophysiological autonomic 
reactivity may also facilitate exposure and habituation. This results in therapeutic extinction of 
anxiety and promotes greater emotional processing (Borkovec and Costello, 1993; Rackman and
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Wilson, 1980), which may facilitate remediation of maladaptive core beliefs and dysfunctional self­
schemas. However, the empirical evidence for this theory is minimal (Prior, 1998).
Thus, the two theories state different mechanisms as responsible for the reduction of anxiety and 
consequently their efficacy; changing cognitions in CBT, and changing physiological arousal in 
Relaxation. When the theory is applied clinically, research has shown that both CBT and 
relaxation have some efficacy in the treatment of anxiety.
Evidence for the effectiveness of Cognitive Behavioural Therapy and Relaxation for anxiety.
Early indications that CBT was an effective intervention for anxiety came from nine uncontrolled 
case series (Waddell, Barlow, and O’Brien, 1984; Clark, Salkovskis, and Chalkley, 1985; 
Salkovskis, Jones and Clark, 1986; Kopp, Mühaly, and Vadasz, 1986; Shear and Frances, 1988; 
Sokol, Beck, and Greenburg, 1989; Michelson, Marchoine, Greenwald, Glanz, Testa, and 
Greenwald, 1990; Shear, Ball, and Fitzpatrick, 1991; and Welkowitz, Papp, and Cloitre, 1991). 
These cognitively based series successfully reduced anxiety in a number of disorders including; 
Panic, Agoraphobia, Generalised Anxiety (GAD) and Phobias. Two of the studies (Clark et al, 
1985, Sokol et al, 1989) found that the gains made in treatment were maintained at six month 
foUow-up. In addition. Beck et al (1992) showed that CBT is more effective than supportive 
therapy. The results of these case series have been confirmed in three controlled trials (Sharp, 
1996).
Studies into the efficacy of Relaxation have also found that it can be effective in reducing anxiety. 
Studies have found that on average 55% of clients experience clinically significant improvement 
(although this does not represent complete remission), with a 15% -20% relapse rate, yielding an 
overall, long term efficacy index of 35%-40% (Ost, 1987).
Although, relaxation has been shown to have a significant short-term anxiolytic effect, unlike CBT, 
evidence for substantial long-term effects is limited (Matthews and Gelder, 1969). This may be 
because patients do not practice persistently (Hoelsher, Lichstem, and Rosenthal, 1984), or 
because relaxation training fails to deal with cognitions and avoidance behaviour which maintain 
anxiety (Michelson, et al, 1996).
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Thus, research shows that both relaxation and CBT have some efficacy in reducing anxiety 
(Michelson and Marchione, 1991). Existing service provision within the Adult Community Mental 
Health Team (CMHT) was grounded in this evidence base, clients were seen individually for CBT 
and/or medication, and/or attended a relaxation group.
Impetus for introduction of Anxiety Management Group
An audit identified increasing numbers of referrals from local GP practices and other mental health 
professionals to the CMHT, which led to increasing waiting lists for individual CBT and the 
relaxation group.
The decision to introduce group CBT to meet referrals, rather than expand existing services was 
based on research and various service factors. Increasing medical intervention was not a solution 
as it is generally agreed that anxiety disorders should not be treated for long periods with anxiolytic 
drugs. Firstly, they may cause side effects or dependence and there is limited evidence for long 
term efficacy (Tyrer and Owen, 1984). Secondly, pharmacotherapy may be associated with higher 
monetary costs over time than other interventions (Otto, Pollack, and Gould, 1997). Financial 
constraints prevented the employment of additional therapists for individual CBT, and a second 
relaxation group was not possible due to the therapist having other contractual commitments.
Research evidence suggests that firstly, CBT may be more effective than relaxation in the 
management of anxiety and secondly, can be successfully delivered in a group format. For 
example, Barlow et al (1989) compared CBT with another cognitive treatment (cognitive 
restructuring plus exposure), progressive muscle relaxation training and a waiting list control 
group. Both cognitive groups were consistently superior to waiting list and were significantly more 
effective than relaxation in reducing panic frequency.
Butler, Fennell, Robson and Gelder’s (1991) study compared CBT and behavioural therapy (BT - 
incorporating relaxation) for GAD. Results showed that outcome after CBT was consistently 
better than outcome after BT whether measured immediately after treatment or 6 months later.
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CBT’s superiority was reflected in all three sets of measures used: anxiety, depression and level of 
anxiety related cognitions.
Clark et al (1994) confirmed the superior long-term effects of CBT for panic disorder and GAD, 
showing that a significantly greater percentage of clients receiving CBT were classified as anxiety 
free (85%) at the 15 month follow up, compared with clients in the other two treatment conditions 
(60% and 47% for Imipramine and applied relaxation, respectively).
In addition to showing superior long-term effects, Stanley, Beck, Averill, Baldwin, Deagle, and 
Stadler’s (1996) study indicated that overall CBT was associated with a more rapid improvement 
than relaxation when they compared CBT and relaxation training, which were both delivered 
without exposure as an element of treatment.
Research appears to show that although relaxation is an effective intervention for anxiety, CBT is 
more effective both in the short and long term. Participants in CBT interventions also show a more 
rapid improvement. Studies have provided some evidence for the proposal that CBT’s superior 
efficacy is due to the addressing of the cognitions and avoidance behaviour in anxiety, which 
produces a greater reduction in levels of anxious cognitions that maintain anxiety according to the 
cognitive model (Salkovskis et al, 1991). At the present time it is not clear whether this is due to 
the cognitive techniques, exposure or alternatively a combination of the two components (Brown 
and Barlow, 1995).
Thus, CBT has been shown to be a more effective therapy than relaxation when administered 
individually. The superior efficacy has also been found in controlled studies of the group 
application of CBT. For example, Gilbert and Strong (1994) researched the effectiveness of a 
CBT group for anxiety. There was statistically significant evidence that participants had improved 
after the intervention. Childs-Clarke, Whitfield, Cadbury, and Sandu (1989) employing a CBT 
group approach also found that there was a significant reduction in anxiety symptoms after 
intervention. These reductions were maintained three months after treatment.
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Penava, Otto, Maki, and Pollack (1998) stated that well-controUed trials and meta-analytic 
comparisons of pertinent studies provide consistent evidence for the efficacy of group cognitive- 
behavioural therapy for anxiety (Clum, Clum, and Surls, 1993; Gould, Otto, and Pollack, 1995).
Thus, the service decided to introduce an anxiety management group based on cognitive- 
behavioural principles and wanted an evaluation of comparative effectiveness with the relaxation 
group in reducing anxiety within their particular context for future service provision.
Previous research findings predict that, firstly, in comparison to relaxation, CBT should show a 
superior treatment effect in reducing anxiety. Secondly, there will be a greater reduction in the 
number of cognitive thoughts homologous with anxiety. Thirdly, an increase will be seen in the use 
of cognitive coping strategies such as problem solving that are integral techniques in therapy. 
Finally, participants in the CBT group should have a better prognosis in the long-term.
Unfortunately, a comparison study became impossible after intervention, as no data on post or 
follow-up for the relaxation group was available either participants did not attend consistently, or 
left the group before the end of treatment for reasons discussed in appendix one. However, the loss 
of the participants was an important factor in itself and resulted in service changes, which are 
elaborated on in the discussion.
The existing data allowed the examination of changes in anxiety within the CBT anxiety 
management group.
Null Hypothesis
‘There will be no difference between the participants levels of anxiety or use of coping strategies as 
the result of the cognitive-behavioural anxiety management group intervention.’
Hypothesis
‘The anxiety management group’s participants will show a reduction in over all levels of anxiety 
and a change in the coping strategies employed to manage anxiety’
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Method
Design
Participants were initially assigned to an anxiety management group or a relaxation group. 
Participants receiving anxiety management had eight two-hour sessions of treatment in the first 
three months and a final session three months later. Participants in the relaxation group also had 
eight two-hour sessions over the same duration of time. Measures were taken at pre-treatment, end 
of treatment and at three months.
Participants
To recruit participants, all members of the multidisciplinary team were sent a letter and structured 
referral form requesting referrals for an anxiety management and relaxation group. Referred 
participants were assessed for suitability using a pre-group structured interview (appendix two).
Participants were accepted i f  they met the following criteria:
• Primary diagnosis of anxiety (DSM-4R).
• No evidence of a dual diagnosis other than depression.
• Consider anxiety to be their main problem.
• Age 18-65 years.
• Anxiety medication when taken had to be at a stabilised dosage for several months.
• No evident speech problems (due to concerns about appropriateness of a group intervention for
those with impaired speech).
• Current episode duration at least six months (this criterion was intended to rninirnise
spontaneous remission; a previous study (Catalan, Gath, Edmonds, & Ennis, 1984) of recent-
onset anxiety disorders suggested spontaneous remission is common in the first 6 months).
• Motivated to work on their anxiety.
• Willing to work in a group situation.
Doctorate of Psychology (PsychD) in Clinical Psychology 174
Service Related Research Project
Participants in the study:
• Twenty participants referred for possible inclusion.
• Eight did not meet study criteria.
• Reasons for exclusion were speech problem (1), non-stable medication (2), not willing to work 
in a group (2) and primary diagnosis of depression (3).
• Twelve participants met acceptance criteria.
• Four had Generalised Anxiety disorder.
• Eight had Panic disorder (four with a primary diagnosis of panic disorder and co-morbidity of 
depression).
• Six participants were on medication that had been stable for several months (two in anxiety 
management group and three in relaxation). They were all on either beta-blockers or low- 
potency benzodiazepines.
Treatments
Each treatment comprised of eight weekly sessions over three months and a booster session three 
months after the final session. Participants received no further input between end of group and 
booster session.
Relaxation sroup (n=6, men=2, women=4).
The relaxation group was an ‘open’ group, which taught various methods of relaxation including; 
breathing exercises; progressive muscle relaxation, guided imagery and autogenic relaxation. 
Techniques are detailed in appendix three. Homework required participants to use relaxation twice 
a day, and employ a technique if they became anxious, with the rationale that anxiety is due to the 
body being hypersensitive to stress and therefore, produces a severe reaction even for minor 
stressors. Relaxation overtime reduces the bodies’ hypersensitivity. This behavioural explanation 
was given to prevent overlap with the cognitive component of the anxiety management group.
The Occupational therapist was sole therapist for the relaxation group.
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Anxiety Manasement Group (n=6, men=l, women=5).
Sessions were based on the cognitive and behavioural techniques of Clark, (1989), and Salkovskis 
and Clark, (1991).
• Psychoeducational component.
• Cognitive procedures included;
a) Eliciting negative automatic thoughts.
b) Identifying and challenging participants’ evidence for their misinterpretations of symptoms and 
situations.
c) Substituting more realistic interpretations and thoughts.
d) Restructuring images.
• Behavioural procedures included (with an underlving; cognitive rationale);
a) Graded exposure.
b) Stopping safety behaviours.
c) Modifying selective attention.
d) Distraction and activity scheduling.
e) Relaxation (same techniques as taught in the relaxation group).
Homework assignments included relaxation twice a day, keeping a daily record of negative 
thoughts and rational responses, and conducting behavioural experiments to test these thoughts. 
Appendix four contains the complete treatment package (structure of sessions, handouts, 
homework tasks).
Facilitators of the anxiety management group were a Clinical Psychologist in training and an 
Occupational therapist. The Occupational Therapist taught the relaxation techniques. Regular 
supervision from an experienced Clinical Psychologist was given to the trainee, particularly 
relating to the application of the cognitive and behavioural techniques.
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Measures
Participants were asked to complete outcome measures pre-group, post-group and three months 
after the end of group. In the final session, participants were asked to complete an evaluation 
questionnaire/client satisfaction.
Measures o f  symptomolosy
•  Beck’s anxiety inventory (BAI; Beck, Brown, Epstein and Steer, 1988) -  21 item self-report 
scale designed to measure the severity of physiological and cognitive anxiety symptoms.
• Beck’s depression inventory (BDI; Beck, Ward, Mendleson, Mock and Erbaugh, 1961) -  21 
item self-report scale measuring severity of depressive symptoms.
• Speilbergers stait-trait anxiety inventory (STAI; Speüberger, Gorsuch and Lushene, 1970) -  
measures two anxiety constructs on separate subscales. Stait-anxiety is the intensity of an 
emotional state of anxiety at a given moment in time. Trait-anxiety is a relatively stable 
individual difference in anxiety proness.
Measures ofm ediatins factors
•  Cognitive checklist (Beck, Brown, Eidelson, Steer and Risldnd, 1987)- measure of the 
frequency of automatic thoughts relevant to anxiety and depression.
• Coping responses questionnaire (CRQ; Billings and Moos, 1981)- 48-item questionnaire based 
on eight subscales of coping strategies and responses.
Evaluation
•  Evaluation/feedback questionnaire. -  participants dis/satisfaction with structure and content of 
course and its applicability to their anxiety.
The questionnaires and a discussion on their selection, reliability and validity are in appendix
five.
Statistical Analysis
Independent variable in the study was treatment (anxiety management group or relaxation group). 
Dependent variables were the measures of anxiety, depression, cognitions and coping strategies. 
Measures were completed pre-group, post-group and at three month follow up.
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Repeated Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) was planned between groups to identify differences in 
outcome, with related t-tests within groups to monitor change over time and unrelated t-tests 
between groups to ascertain superior efficacy.
However, statistical analysis was changed as no data for the relaxation group was available at post 
or follow-up. Obtained data did not meet parametric assumptions, and therefore, Friedman was 
used to identify any significant changes in outcome measures for the anxiety management group. 
Post-hoc test, Wilcoxon signed ranks were employed to identify the direction of any significant 
findings, and set at a level of 0.05 significance. This level was not adjusted for multiple 
comparisons, because the sample was too small to find any difference, and direction of change was 
predicted between pre-intervention and follow-up.
Due to the small sample size the final design has a power of 0.12. This means that any results 
have to be interpreted with caution, as to whether the effect is due to the intervention itself, or 
random variation.
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Results
The mean age of the fourteen clients included in the study was 42.1 years (S.D. 6.4) and mean 
duration of most recent episode of anxiety was 3.2 years (S.D. 1.7). Seventy-five per cent were 
female. There were no significant differences between groups on any of these characteristics.
Comparison between the two treatments at pre-intervention
To identify any differences between groups pre-intervention, initial scores were compared with 
separate Mann-Whitney’s for each outcome measure. All participants were in the severe range on 
the BAI. No significant differences were found between the groups on any of the measures 
(Appendix six).
Impact of the Cognitive-Behavioural Anxiety Management Intervention.
Symptom Outcome Measures
Table 1 - Summary of statistical findings for Anxiety Management Group on the symptom 
outcome measures, Pre/Post Intervention and Follow-up.
Outcome Measure
Intervention
Post . -  
Intervention
Follow -  up Statistic P-Value
BDI Mean (S.D) 
Median
20.33 (10.5)
20.00
18.33 (10.95) 
20.50
14.17 (7.83) 
13.50
X^(2) = 
2.818
0.244
BAI Mean (S.D) 
Median
35.33 (9.65) 
34.50
18.00 (6.45)
17.00
8.33 (4.41) 
6.50
X2(2) = 
10.333
0.006
STAI Mean (S.D) 
(Trait) Median
60.83 (3.87) 
59.50
54.33 (7.63) 
53.50
47.17 (14.66) 
49.50
X:(2) =
5.478
0.065
STAI Mean (S.D) 
(Stait) Median
52.50 (3.27)
52.50
42.33 (11.52) 
36.50
35.83 (16.36) 
32.00
X2(2) =
3.000
0.223
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Table 2 - Post-Hoc Wilcoxon Paired Rank for significant results.
Z Significance
BAI Score Post-Intervention -  
BAI Score Pre-Intervention
-1.992 0.046
BAI Score Follow-Up -  
BAI Score Post-Intervention
-2.201 0.028
BAI Score Follow Up -  
BAI Score Pre-Intervention
-2.201 0.028
Friedman statistical analysis showed a significant result for BAI (X  ^= 10.33, d.f. = 2, p = 0.006), 
indicating that anxiety had reduced due to the intervention. There were no significant results for 
the other outcome measures.
Wilcoxon Paired Rank tests were carried out between pairs of time points for the BAI and are 
presented in Table 2. These showed that there was significant changes between all measurement 
times for the BAI, indicating that there was improvement during the intervention, with continual 
development until follow-up.
Graphs to show the change in scores on outcome measures (BDI, BAI, and STAI) Pre/Post 
Intervention and Follow-Up.
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Individual BDI scores at Pre/Post 
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Although, only a statistically significant result was found for BAI, the graphs indicate that in 
general, there was a downward trend in scores for all the symptom outcome measures over pre/post 
intervention and follow up. A larger sample size is required to ascertain whether these trends are 
an actually effect of intervention or a random variation.
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Dvsfunctional Cognitive and Coping Strategies
The CRQ divides into cognitive coping (Logical Analysis, Positive Reappraisal), behavioural 
coping (Seeking Support, Problem Solving) and avoidance coping (Cognitive Avoidance, 
Acceptance, Seeking Alternative Rewards and Emotional Discharge) subscales. On the cognitive 
and behavioural scales, a higher score represents improved coping while the reverse is true for the 
avoidance scale. These subscales were analysed individually for change over time.
Table 3 - Summary of statistical findings for Anxiety Management Group on the mediating 
outcome measures, Pre/Post Intervention and Follow-up.
Outcome Measure Pre
Intervention
Post
Intervention
Follow -  up Statistic P-Value
Cognitive Mean (S.D) 
Checklist Median
19.17(5.12)
18.50
12.33 (4.41)
11.50
8.67 (4.50) 
8.00
%z(2) = 
12.00
0.002
CRQ Suhscales
Logical Mean (S.D) 
Analysis Median
10.33 (3.14) 
10.50
8.17 (1.72) 
8.00
6.83 (3.49) 
6.00
X2(2) = 
4.33
0.115
Positive Mean (S.D) 
Appraisal Median
6.83 (2.71) 
7.00
9.83 (3.31) 
9.50
9.00 (4.57)
10.50
X^(2) = 
2.67
0.260
Seeking Mean (S.D) 
Support Median
8.67 (3.01)
9.50
8.67 (3.39) 
7.00
8.83 (2.32) 
9.00
X^(2) = 
1.00
0.607
Problem Mean (S.D) 
Solving Median
6.83 (2.64)
7.00
9.17 (5.00) 
8.50
10.50 (3.57)
10.50
X2(2) = 
7.00
0.030
Cognitive Mean (S.D) 
Avoidance Median
9.42 (3.99)
9.00
9.00 (5.59) 
8.50
6.67 (4.41) 
6.00
X:(2) = 
4.57
0.102
Acceptance Mean (S.D) 
Median
9.50(1.88)
9.00
7.83 (4.62) 
7.00
5.83 (4.70) 
4.50
X2(2) = 
5.33
0.069
Alternative Mean (S.D) 
Rewards Median
6.92 (3.28) 
6.50
6.33 (2.42) 
7.00
6.33 (3.20) 
5.50
X2(2) = 
2.45
0.293
Emotional Mean (S.D) 
Discharge Median
7.83 (3.27) 
9.00
6.67 (2.42)
7.00
5.50 (2.43)
5.50
XZ(2) = 
4.33
0.115
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Table 5 - Post-Hoc Wilcoxon Paired Rank for significant results.
Z Significance
Cognitive Checklist Score Post- 
Intervention -  Cognitive Checklist 
Score Pre-Intervention
-2.201 0.028
Cognitive Checklist Score Follow- 
Up -
Cognitive Checklist Score Post- 
Intervention
-2.214 0.027
Cognitive Checklist Score Follow 
Up -
Cognitive Checklist Score Pre- 
Intervention
-2.214 0.027
Coping Responses (Problem 
Solving) Score Post-Intervention -  
Coping Responses (Problem 
Solving) Score Pre-Intervention
-1.265 0.206
Coping Responses (Problem 
Solving) Score Follow-Up -  
Coping Responses (Problem 
Solving) Score Post-Intervention
-0.054 0.34
Coping Responses (Problem 
Solving) Score Follow-Up -  
Coping Responses (Problem 
Solving) Score Pre-Intervention
-2.207 0.027
Friedman statistical analysis showed a significant result for Cognition Checklist (X  ^= 10.33, d.f. = 
2, p = 0.006), indicating that levels of anxious cognitions had reduced due to the intervention. 
Wilcoxon Paired rank tests showed that there was a significant change between all measurement
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times for the Cognitive Checklist ,  suggesting  that there was im provem ent during  the intervention, 
with continual development until follow-up.
Friedman statistical analysis showed only a significant result for Problem Solving Subscale of the 
CRQ (X^ = 7, d.f. = 2, p = 0.03). The significant time of effect was between pre-intervention and 
follow-up (Z = -2.2, d.f. = 2, p = 0.027), suggesting that participants used this technique 
increasingly after the intervention.
Graph to show the change in scores on mediating outcome measures (Cognition Checklist and 
CRQ) Pre/Post Intervention and Follow-Up.
The graph of means indicates a general trend over time, towards an increase in the use of cognitive 
coping and behavioural coping strategies, particularly problem solving and positive reappraisal. 
Conversely, there is a general trend in the reduction of avoidance coping styles. Interestingly, 
scores on Logical Analysis appear to decrease as the result of the intervention. It is impossible to 
ascertain whether this trend signifies a real effect due to the small sample size in the intervention.
Figure to show the change in scores on m ediating outcom e m easures (Cognition 
Checklist and CRQ) Pre/Post In tervention and Follow-Up.
Figure 2 - Group Mean Scores in Coping Strategies Pre/Post 
Intervention and Follow-Up.
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times for the Cognitive Checklist, suggesting that there was improvement during the intervention, 
with continual development until follow-up,
Friedman statistical analysis showed only a significant result for Problem Solving Subscale of the 
CRQ (X^ = 7, d.f. = 2, p = 0.03). The significant time of effect was between pre-intervention and 
follow-up (Z = -2.2, d.f. = 2, p = 0.027), suggesting that participants used this technique 
increasingly after the intervention.
Graph to show the change in scores on mediating outcome measures (Cognition Checklist and 
CRQ) Pre/Post Intervention and FoUow-Up.
The graph of means indicates a general trend over time, towards an increase in the use of cognitive 
coping and behavioural coping strategies, particularly problem solving and positive reappraisal. 
Conversely, there is a general trend in the reduction of avoidance coping styles. Interestingly, 
scores on Logical Analysis appear to decrease as the result of the intervention. It is impossible to 
ascertain whether this trend signifies a real effect due to the small sample size in the intervention.
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Anxiety Management Course Evaluation Feedback.
In general, participants felt that the length of sessions and course was about right. The number of 
members allowed them to feel relaxed, confident and trusting within the group. All the participants 
stated that knowing other people were going through the same difficulties and problems was very 
reassuring, a common finding from group therapy (Cadbury, Childs-Clarke, and Sandu, 1990). 
Participants seemed to value the intervention and felt that they had learnt from the sessions and 
were able to apply it to their everyday hves.
Summary o f  the other findings:
•  Four participants felt that the content of the sessions was very relevant to them (primary 
diagnosis of Panic anxiety), whilst two of the participants only found some of the material 
relevant (primary diagnosis GAD, these chents were also the most depressed individuals).
• Four out of the six participants felt that the sessions dealing with cognitive distortions and 
negative thinking were most instrumental in reducing their anxiety.
• One participant mentioned that the relaxation component was the easiest part of all the sessions 
to apply to everyday life.
• Homework tasks were regarded as essential, but several participants felt that they had 
problems in identifying negative automatic thoughts on their own.
• All participants found the handouts useful, for two main reasons, firstly, as a reminder of the 
session, and secondly, as an aid to completing the homework tasks, “without them, it would be 
hard to remember everything”. There was also a general feeling that they had been useful 
when the intervention had ended and they were in “times of need”.
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Discussion
There is mixed evidence that the group was successful at reducing anxiety. There was a 
statistically significant decrease in overall anxiety as measured by the BAI from severe to normal 
levels, and a reduction in anxiety cognitions, with continued improvement after the end of the 
intervention period as shown by the significant findings of time of effect. This supports existing 
empirical evidence that CBT is effective at reducing levels of anxiety and maintains gains over time 
(Brown, Antony, and Barlow, 1995). Additionally, there was a general increase in the use of 
adaptive coping strategies with a concurrent reduction in maladaptive strategies, but only Problem- 
Solving reached a level of significance, effective between pre-intervention and follow-up, 
suggesting that participants used this technique increasingly after intervention.
Although, STAI scores showed some reduction, this did not meet significance levels. It would be 
expected that trait-anxiety might not change as the result of an intervention as it is a relatively 
stable concept based on an individuals proness to anxiety, it would have been expected that Stait- 
anxiety would decrease due to the intervention. However, other studies have found that significant 
changes in scores on stait anxiety only tend to occur after periods of about six months to a year 
(Prior, 1998). They propose that this is because individuals take longer to modify and recognise 
changes in behefs about self in relation to anxiety, than changes in symptomology as measured by 
the BAI.
There were no significant results found for any other of the outcome measures. However, there 
appeared to be a downward trend in scores over time for each of the measures and significant 
results might have been attained with a larger sample size and thus higher power.
Depressive symptomology as measured by the BDI decreased but not significantly. The 
intervention was based on the cognitive-behavioural model of anxiety rather than depression and 
thus, focused on challenging anxiety rather than depressive specific cognitions. Therefore, it could 
be postulated that the reduction ia anxiety would only have an effect on depression if it was caused 
by the anxiety and not for depression due to other factors.
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Anecdotally, participants with higher levels of depression pre-treatment did the least well at follow- 
up on all outcome measures. The degree of depression could effect their motivation, level of 
positive thinking and concentration for the group, consequently affecting efficacy. Butler’s (1993) 
study found comparable findings that level of depression is a negative factor in predicting outcome.
In terms of coping strategies only the problem solving scale of the CRQ showed a significant 
change after the intervention. The time of this effect was between pre-intervention and follow-up. 
This could suggest that participants continued to develop their feelings of self-control over their 
anxiety and found ways to manage their anxiety. This mirrors the final session philosophy of 
fostering independence and the belief that future problems were manageable using the knowledge 
and skills gamed from the group. One participant’s evaluation sheet reflects this by stating that the 
handouts would be invaluable in “times of need”.
Maladaptive coping strategies were still employed but to a lesser degree, although this reduction 
did not meet significance. Interestingly, Logical Analysis, an adaptive coping strategy also 
appeared to be used less after the intervention. This strategy could be seen as a contrast to 
Problem solving. Logical Analysis relates to thmking around a problem and is more akm to worry, 
whereas. Problem Solving involves thinking about a problem and then acting on a possible 
solution, analogous to CBT.
Advantages/Strengths of the Cognitive-Behavioural anxiety management group.
As discussed, the results indicated that the group was effective in reducing levels of anxiety to 
normal levels on some measures.
The group situation enabled participants to identify with other members and so feel less isolated 
and ‘abnormal’. They appeared to experience the group as supportive, and empowering. Group 
structure facilitated members being ‘co-therapists’ for each other. This increased their skills at 
making theory practice links and self-confidence.
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The presence of two therapists enabled the utihsation of two different skill basis to aid therapeutic 
intervention and overcome problems. In reflective discussion on sessions, additional information 
was elicited due to the combination of observations.
DisadvantagesAVeaknesses of the Cognitive-Behavioural anxiety management group.
The group format made it difficult to meet individual needs and compensate for differences m the 
acquisition of concepts. For example, members varied in the ability to identify critical NAT’s and 
safety behaviours, crucial for individuahsed formulation and successful intervention. Additionally, 
the dynamics of the group meant that some members tended to be more confidant in speaking and 
revealing information. These factors resulted in only certain members’ anxiety being precisely 
formuhsed possibly affecting efficacy.
The therapists were aware of this problem but were constrained by factors controlling the time 
spent on individual problems and stumbling blocks, whilst maintaining the relevance to other 
members and remaining on task. This was reflected in the desire for additional sessions shown in 
participant feedback.
Relaxation Group
Although, there is no data on the efficacy of the relaxation group, the fact that participants 
withdrew or did not attend regularly is an interesting finding in its own right.
The relaxation group was run on the philosophy of an open group, possibly leading participants not 
to perceive regular attendance as critical in recovery, with important clinical ramifications. Firstly, 
relaxation has to be practiced daily to be effective, if no results are perceived, motivation to attend 
decreases creating a vicious cycle. Secondly, group size will vary weekly, and thus participants 
may not feel as safe or contained as in the CBT group, decreasing motivation to attend and the 
benefits of non -specific therapeutic factors.
Services changes
The CBT group is now part of service provision for clients with anxiety, run by the Occupational 
Therapist and alternating professionals, increasing the MDT’s skill base and resources.
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The research findings and participant feedback have resulted in modifications to the group. An 
additional session focuses on eliciting negative automatic thoughts and challenging the evidence 
and coping strategies. An individualised formulation of each participant’s anxiety is obtained in 
the pre-group interview, providing the therapist and client with some knowledge of their 
idiosyncratic cognitions and safety behaviours for later group sessions. Finally, depressive 
symptomology is treated before acceptance to the group.
The service has retained the concept of a relaxation group, but has changed it’s philosophy and 
format in response to the research. The group is now ‘closed’ with a fixed number of sessions, and 
compulsory supportive session at the end of the relaxation exercises. Effectiveness is reviewed at 
the end of the contract, with the referrer and client. Discussion focuses on the value of further 
sessions or a different intervention.
The service plans to test the original hypothesis of this study with the ‘new relaxation’ group and 
the Cognitive-Behavioural group.
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Appendix One 
ANXIETY MANAGEMENT GROUP 
ASSESSMENT INTERVIEW
Name:
D.O.B:
Date:
Administer BDI and BAI
How often do you experience anxiety?
How long have you had anxiety?
What are your symptoms o f anxiety?
What is the intensity o f the feelings?
Do you know what activates your anxiety?
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What things have you tried to manage your anxiety?
What do you know about the group?
What do you hope to get from the group?
Have you had any previous experience o f group work?
Did you find this a positive experience?
Do you get nervous about talking in a group?
There will be individual work between sessions. Will you find this a problem?
What support do have available at home?
Any other questions?
Risk Assessment
Interviewers: Lorraine Lynch Anne Johnson.
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ANXIETY MANAGEMENT GROUP 
Feedback Sheet
Session Number:
Date:
Name:
Attended/Did not attend 
Participation within the group:
Ability to grasp concepts in session:
Homework:
Successes/Problems
Other comments:
Anne Johnson Lorraine Lynch
Clinical Psychologist in training Occupational Therapist
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ANXIETY MANAGEMENT GROUP 
EVALUATION SHEET 
The Course
1. Was the length o f each session.
Too long About right Too short
2. Was the entire course
Too long About right Too short
3. How relevant was the material covered to you?
4. How did you feel about the size of the group?
Too large About right Too small
5. Did you feel that the therapists’ involvement was
Too much Adequate Too little
6. How did you find the homework tasks?
7. How useful were the handout sheets?
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A ppendix  Tw o
Name....................................
R E C O R D  O F  R ELA X A TIO N  PR A TIC E
Time spent 
on
Relaxation
Type of 
Relaxation
Tension Level 
Before 
Relaxation 
0 - 3
Tension Level 
after Relaxation
0 - 3
Date & Day
Morning
Afternoon
Ev ening
Date & Day
Morning
Afternoon
Evening
Date & Day
Morning
Afternoon
Evening
Date & Day
Morning
Afternoon
Evening
Date & Day
Morning
Afternoon
Evening
Date & Day
Morning
Afternoon
Evening
Date & Day ,
Morning
Afternoon
Evening
0 = Not at all tense /  1 = Slightly tense / 2 = Moderately tense / 3 = Extremely tense
rccord/l>nch/adw
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Appendix Three
Anxiety Management Group -  Session One 
What Is Anxiety?
Types o f anxiety
Tension and anxiety are common problems. One in ten people will visit their doctor 
every year because they feel tense or anxious. In the past doctors have traditionally 
prescribed drugs for such problems, but over the last few years research has shown 
that there are more effective ways of treating anxiety. This new approach involves 
teaching people how to cope, and these methods are similar to learning a new skill 
such as learning to drive.
These approaches can help a variety o f  people whose problem s on the surface may take 
a different form, bu t who underneath suffer similar unpleasant feelings. Examples 
include
• the house bound person who is terrified of going out, the person who is afraid of 
spiders, lifts, aeroplanes, or small spaces (these problems are called phobias)
• the person who experiences panic attacks
• the person who obsessively checks things such as aU the electrical appliances or 
compulsively washes their hands.
• people who feel generally anxious and who cannot tie their feelings down to 
anything specific.
A nxiety is a normal reaction
Anxiety is a normal healthy reaction. It happens to everyone at times of danger or in 
worrying situations. When you are anxious your bodily systems speed up. In certain 
circumstances this can be a definite advantage. It means that you are ready for action 
and enables you to respond quickly if necessary. Moderate amounts of anxiety actually 
improve your performance, spurring you on to greater achievements, for example 
sportsman and actors.
Anxiety becomes a problem when it interferes with our performance or our everyday 
lives. This is when it becomes necessary to learn how to control it. However, it should 
be remembered that anxiety is a normal healthy reaction. It cannot be banished 
completely from your life but it is possible to learn to manage it.
Doctorate of Psychology (PsychD) in Clinical Psychology 202
Service Related Research Project
A nxiety and your body
When we feel anxious a chain of automatic events occurs in our bodies, which prepares 
us for action. This reaction is often termed the ‘fight or flight’ response and can be 
traced back to our evolutionary past. Imagine the primitive caveman threatened by a 
wooly mammoth. He needs to be prepared for vigorous action: either to run or to 
fight. We still possess this survival reaction, although it is now triggered by more 
subtle situations -  some of which we are not even consciously aware.
The reaction itself consists of the brain sending a message to pump adrenalin into the 
blood stream and into the large skeletal muscles of the arms and legs. The heart beats 
faster as it is working harder. Because it is working harder, it needs more fuel so we 
breathe more oxygen. To cool down the body sweat and capillaries come to the 
surface. The body ideally needs to be as light as possible so a visit to the toilet might 
be necessary. When this chain of events occurs in a normal situation, for example, if 
we are pushing a trolley around a supermarket or sitting in a business meeting, it can 
be very fiightening. The important thing to remember is that the physical symptoms 
are natural and not harmful, but are happening in an inappropriate situation.
The three systems o f anxiety
Anxiety is often referred to as if it is a single phenomenon, but this is not the case. 
There are three parts to the feeling of anxiety:
1. Bodily sensations: these have already been mentioned -  they include irregular 
breathing, churning stomach, sweating, trembling, racing heart and the need to visit 
the toiler.
2. Behaviour: this means the way you behave -  that is what you do when faced with 
the situation you fear. Especially important is the behaviour of avoiding the 
situation, either not going into the situation, or getting out of it as quickly as 
possible.
3. Thinking: this includes your ideas and beliefs, your mental comments to yourself, 
or your mental pictures about what might happen to you in the situation you fear.
Looking at these parts separately, and learning new skills in each area, is an important 
part of anxiety management. Over the next eight weeks we will look at each aspect 
and learn to manage each area.
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Diary Sheet - Week One
Please make an entry whenever you notice a definite increase in anxiety.
Date/
Time
Description of 
Situation
Anxiety
Ixvel
0- 100%
Description of
a) Physical symptoms 
b) thoughts
How did you 
manage the anxiety?
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Anxiety Management Group — Session Two
What starts and maintains anxiety?
There is usually a combination of causes. Two of the most important are:
1. The amount o f  stress you are under: You may have a single major problem, or 
more likely a number of smaller problems which all add up to a large amount of 
stress. Stress can be measured to some extent by the amount of changes that have 
taken place in your life recently. Being physically tired, run down and having many 
changes or traumas makes you more vulnerable to anxiety.
2. The kind o f  person you are: Some people have more sensitive emotional nervous 
systems. Their bodies’ arousal response might be triggered more quickly and take 
a longer time to calm down. Some people have learned from their parents in their 
early experiences how to get anxious and how to worry.
What maintains anxiety?
Why does anxiety stay with you? What keeps it going? There seem to be two
reasons:
1. Because of the way you behave, especially because you avoid the situations you 
fear.
2. Because of beliefs you have about the situation and its consequences.
Lets look at some examples:
• ‘Lift phobic’ people never go in a lift because they may believe it will fall to the 
bottom of the lift shaft.
• ‘Agoraphobics’ never go out because they may believe that they wiU collapse and 
die of a heart attack.
• ‘Social phobics’ may avoid meeting others because they believe that in a 
disagreement, they will lose their temper and hit people.
• ‘Obsessive compulsives’ obsessively check the locks on the doors and windows 
repeatedly before going to bed because they are certain that burglars will break in.
These examples make clear two things:
1. There may be an exaggerated, irrational belief (and the person may realise that it 
is just that) ahout what will happen in the feared situation.
2. There is an avoidance of the feared situation, which, of course, allows the 
irrational belief to continue because it is never proved wrong.
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The body’s arousal reaction
Physical reaction: The brain sends a biochemical message to the pituitary gland, which 
releases a hormone that triggers the adrenal gland to release adrenalin.
Symptom: Headaches, dizziness.
Physical reaction: Pupüs dilate.
Symptom: Blurred vision.
Physical reaction: Mouth becomes dry.
Symptom: Difficulty swallowing.
Physical reaction: Neck and shoulder muscles tense -  large skeletal muscles contract 
ready for action.
Symptom: Aching neck, backache.
Physical reaction: Breathing becomes faster and shallower, supplying more oxygen to 
muscles.
Symptoms: Overhreathing, chest pains, tingling, palpitations, and asthma.
Physical reaction: Heart pumps faster and blood pressure rises.
Symptoms: High hlood pressure.
Physical reaction: Liver releases stored sugar to provide fuel for quick energy. 
Symptoms: Excess sugar in blood, indigestion.
Physical reaction: Adrenalin and noradrenaline are released.
Physical reaction: Digestion slows or ceases as blood is diverted away from the 
stomach.
Symptoms: Nausea, indigestion, and ulcers.
Physical reaction: Muscles at opening of anus and bladder are relaxed.
Symptoms: Frequent urination, diarrhoea.
Physical reaction: The body cools itself by perspiring: blood vessels and capillaries 
move close to skin surface.
Symptoms: Excess sweating, blushing.
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Diary Sheet ■ Week Two
Please make an entry whenever you notice a definite increase in anxiety.
Date/
Time
Description of 
Situation
Anxiety
Level
0- 100%
Description of 
a) Physical symptoms
b) thoughts
How did you 
manage the anxiety?
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Anxiety Management Group -  Session Four
D I S T R A C T I O N
Thinking about unpleasant symptoms will tend to make them worse. We begin the
‘fear of fear’ cycle, provoking further symptoms as well as preventing existing ones
from disappearing.
It is difficult simply to turn your attention away from unpleasant feelings. To do so,
two things are necessary.
• Be determined not to think about or dwell on the symptoms
• Fill your mind with other things; distract yourself.
D IS T R A C T IO N  T E C H N IQ U E S
Î M ental Games - Doing puzzles, crosswords or other word games, reciting a poem,
singing a song or counting backwards from one hundred, are all useful distraction 
exercises. The important thing is that they take your attention away from the panic 
thoughts.
2 Environmental Focus - Concentrating on a specific detail of the world around you, 
for example, making words out of the number plates of cares or guessing what 
people do for a living. Focusing in the outside world will prevent you thinking 
about what is going on inside.
3 Using a bridging object - This might be a photograph or a special brooch or a 
souvenir from a happy time. Looking at the object generates positive anxiety- 
reducing thoughts.
4 Physical Activity - Giving yourself a task to do takes your mind off worrying 
thoughts, for example, handing drinks out at a party, changing the music, or 
washing up after a meal. On a more general level, keeping yourself physically 
active and mentally distracted from worrying thoughts by pursuing sporting 
activities is one of the best insulators against stress.
5 Medication - Techniques derived from eastern meditation can also be very useful. 
Sometimes a mantra or a special word can be used. The meditator focuses the 
mind upon the mantra in an effortless, relaxed way and with practice can block out 
other thoughts; and ideas and achieve a level of relaxation.
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P o s i t i v e  s e l f  t a l k
Worrying thoughts can make us feel physical anxious (heart racing, muscle tension 
e.t.c), which then leads to us worrying more. (Here we go again, Fm going to panic”.) 
A vicious circle soon gets established, running faster and faster under its own 
momentum.
Sometimes we are aware of these thoughts but often we are not. They may take the 
form of fleeting images or half-formed pictures in our minds. The thoughts tend to 
flash by automatically and very quickly.
Imagine you are running upstairs w hen you feel a sudden sharp pain in the chest. I t  
gives you a fright, and the thought goes through your head, “ maybe there’s som ething 
w rong with my heart” . T he thought itself makes you m ore afraid, your heart beats 
faster, and the pain seems to take a long time to die away. Later that day the same 
thought comes back to you. Again your heart beat increases and you feel afraid. T he 
symptoms produced the thought, which made you anxious and added to the symptoms.
Positive self talk is a coping strategy which involves breaking this vicious circle where 
negative thoughts lead to increased symptoms. It involves a number of stages.
How T O  P R A C T IS E  P O S IT IV E  S E L F  TALK.
Find out exactly what you are thinking: This is not always easy, as thoughts tend to 
flash thought our minds so quickly and automatically that we are not always aware of 
them. Try writing these thoughts down on a diary sheet.
Challenge the thoughts for how rational they are: Research suggests that when 
people are under stress their thinking can often get distorted. Question your thoughts. 
Are you exaggerating? Are you thinking in all-or-nothing terms? Are you ignoring the 
positive?
Replace negative thoughts with positive ones: After you have challenged your 
existing thoughts, rewrite them in a more positive reahstic language. It is sometimes 
useful to carry these positive challenges around with you on an index card.
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A n x i e t y  M a n a g e m e n t  G r o u p  -  S e s s i o n  F i v e
C o m m o n  t h i n k i n g  d i s t o r t i o n s
We are all prone at times to ‘distorted thinking’, but when we are either under excess
stress, or are depressed, these distortions become more exaggerated.
All or nothing thinking
• Thinking in absolutes, as either black or white, good or bad, with no middle 
ground. WiU judge people or events using general labels, for example, “he’s an 
idiot”, “I’m hopeless. I’U never leam to drive”, “if I can’t get it 100% right then 
there is no point in doing it at aU”. You may condemn yourself completely as a 
person on the basis of a single event.
Catastrophising
• You tend to magnify and exaggerate the importance of events and how awful or 
unpleasant they wiU be, overestimating the chances of disaster; whatever can go 
wrong wiU go wrong.
Personalising
• You take responsibility and blame for anything unpleasant even if it has little or 
nothing to do with you. “It is my fault”.
Negative focus
• You focus on the negative, ignoring or misinterpreting positive aspects of a 
situation. You focus on your weaknesses and forget your strengths, looking on the 
dark side.
Jumping to conclusions
• You make negative interpretations on the basis of inadequate evidence either by:
1 Mind reading -  concluding that someone is reacting to you without checking out 
what they are reaUy thinking.
2 Fortune telling -  predicting that things wUl turn out badly and feeling convinced 
that the prediction is an already established fact.
Living by fixed rules
• You tend to have fixed rules and unrealistic expectations, regularly using the words 
‘should’, ‘ought’, ‘must’, and can’t’, this leads to unnecessary guilt and 
disappointment.
Emotional reasoning
• Confusing feelings with facts, i.e. I feel it so it must be true.
Doctorate of Psychology (PsychD) in Clinical Psychology 210
Service Related Research Project
C h a l l e n g e s  t o  u p s e t t i n g  t h o u g h t s  
What is the evidence?
• What evidence do I have to support my thoughts?
• What evidence do I have against them?
What alternative views are there?
• How would someone else view this situation?
• How would I have viewed this situation in the past?
What is the effect of thinking the way I  do?
• Does is help me, or hinder me from getting what I want? How?
What thinking error am I making?
• Am I thinking in all or nothing terms, ignoring the middle ground
• Am I catastrophising, overestimating the chances o f  disaster?
• Am I personalising, blaming m yself fo r  something that is not my fault?
• Am I focusing on the negative, looking on the dark side; ignoring my strengths?
• Am I jumping to conclusions, predicting the fu ture and mind reading?
• Am living by fixed rules, fretting about how things ought to be; overusing the 
words should, must and can’t?
What action can I  take?
• What can I do to change my situation?
• Am I overlooking solutions to problems on the assumption they won’t work?
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A n x i e t y  M a n a g e m e n t  G r o u p  -  S e s s i o n  S i x
Ten Rules for Coping with Panic
1. Remember panic feelings are only normal reactions that are exaggerated.
2. They are not harmful and nothing worse will happen.
3. Notice what is happening in your body now. Stay with the present. Slow down, 
relax, but keep going.
4. Thinking about what might happen is unhelpful. Only now matters.
5. Accept the feelings. Let them run through you and they will disappear more 
quickly.
6. Monitor your levels of anxiety: 10 (worst) to 0 (least). Watch the levels go down.
7. Stay m the situation. If you run away, avoid or escape, it will be more difficult in 
the future.
8. Take a few slow, deep breaths.
9. Consciously relax your tense muscles. Feel yourself relaxing.
10. Now begin to concentrate again on what you were doing before.
Why do I feel good one day and bad the next?
Everybody's moods go up and down. Sometimes we have a bad day. Very often these 
changes in mood are so small we don’t notice them. When you have been feeling 
anxious or depressed you are sensitised to your own reactions. You are on the 
lookout for any minor changes that might occur. When normal fluctuations occur, 
which you may have paid little attention to previously, you notice them. This attention 
with its associated worrying thoughts means that those minor changes become 
exaggerated and magnified. Your mood tends to do up and down like a roller coaster 
with high peaks and low troughs.
To counteract this tendency, first you have to recognise that it is happening. Then 
watch out for your thoughts. Are you allowing ‘all or nothing thinking’ or 
‘catastrophising’ to take place? Do you think when the day starts badly, “Oh no, 
today’s going to be terrible, I might as well not bother. I’m not getting any better”? 
Challenge that thought and change it to, “It’s just a bad day, no more, no less. 
Everybody has them.”
H ow  long do I need to keep practice going?
Sometimes when people confront a fear or phobia they expose themselves to the 
anxiety-provoking situation once or twice and say “I’m cured. I’ve cracked it”, and 
then stop putting themselves back into that situation. Research suggests that for a fear 
to be truly banished, you have to return regularly to the avoided situation, otherwise 
there is a tendency for the fear to return. So, keep practice going. Watch out for 
subtle avoidance when you say to yourself, “I’ve done it once. I’m OK now, I don’t 
need to do it again.”
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Dealing with setbacks
Expect setbacks and you won’t be disappointed. Be aware of saying to yourself: “I’m
fine now, everything is OK.” Even when you are doing well expect a setback - Plan
for it.
G u i d e d  P r a c t ic e
1. List a number of situations, which you avoid because of your anxiety.
2. Describe the situations in as much detail as possible. Be specific. Rather than 
saying, “going on a bus”, say, “travelling, alone on the number 29 bus, into town, 
on a weekday afternoon”.
3. Rate how much anxiety you anticipate each situation will create on a scale on 0-10 
where 0 = low anxiety, 5 = moderate anxiety and 10 -  extreme anxiety.
4. Rearrange the situations in ranked order with the most difficult at the top.
5. Start with the easiest situation and practise it. If practice is to be helpful it must be
(a) regular, (b) frequent, (c) prolonged -  you must go on practising until the
anxiety has died down.
6. If something is too hard, look at ways of breaking it down into intermediate stages.
7. Do not be put off by feeling anxious. Remember you are learning to master anxiety 
rather than avoid it.
8. Reward yourself for your successes.
E x a m p l e
Going into a lift in a department store, on my own, on a weekday afternoon. 6
Catching the no. 29 bus to the station, on my own, on Saturday morning. 5
YOUR TARGETS Anxiety rating 
Oto 10
1 (most difficult) %
2 %
3 %
4 %
5 %
6 %
7 %
8 %
9 %
10 %
Doctorate of Psychology (PsychD) in Clinical Psychology 213
Service Related Research Project
St r e s s  C o n t r o l
Stress is the result of an imbalance between the demands made on our personal 
resources and us to deal with these demands.
The balance between a person’s resources and the demands being made on them can 
be compared with a bank account. If too many demands are made on the account we 
go into the ‘red’ and become overdrawn, which is comparable to being under stress. 
In normal circumstances we can cope with the everyday demands of life such as 
maintenance of job and relationships, which is comparable with the way routine 
standing orders regularly diminish our financial account. It is only when extra stresses 
or demands come along that we can tip over ‘into the red’. Sometimes a crisis may be 
the result of a ‘last straw’ which just tips the balance and we fall ‘into the red’ or 
stress.
Recommendations
1. Some stress is good for you. Identify your own resources and situations, which 
you find stressfiil. Leam to identify your own optimal level of stress and do not be 
pressurised beyond it.
2. Anticipate stress by balancing your demands and resources in advance. Decide 
what is important -  have priorities.
3. When experiencing stress make sure that you:
• Do not withdraw from social support;
• Keep communicating -  ventilate your feelings;
• Keep areas and times for relaxation.
4. Reduce demands:
• Do not expect too much of yourself;
• Do not feel that you have to live up to others’ expectations of you;
• Think twice about how important tasks are. Try saying “No”;
• Break your goals down into manageable proportions;
• Think positively about your abilities.
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W o r k  St r e s s
It is estimated that stress-related illnesses cost British Industry £7 billion per annum, 
and account for 40 million lost working days. These are conservative estimates and do 
not take into account more indirect effects of stress. Research has shown that high 
levels of occupational stress are linked to absenteeism, high staff turnover, high 
accident rates, job dissatisfaction and poor productivity. A model of work stress, 
which includes a number of specific factors, can help us make sense of our experiences, 
enabling us to plot our own work stress profile.
A model of work stress
Coping
strategies
Personality
Sources o f  
work stress
Effects o f  
stress
Relevant factors involved in work stress
Sources o f work stress Coping strategies
Quantity/quality of work 
Role issues
Level of responsibility/authority 
Social/relationships 
Job satisfaction 
Organisational issues 
Domestic issues
Assertiveness
Social support
Self-organisation
Rationality
Hobbies/leisure
Self-care
Maladaptive
Effects o f stress on the individual
Mental
Physical
Emotional
Behavioural
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Anxiety Management Group — Session Seven
A s s e r t i v e n e s s
The word assertiveness is used to describe a certain kind of behaviour. It is behaviour 
which helps us to communicate clearly and confidently our needs, wants and feelings to
other people without abusing in any way their human rights. It is an alternative to
passive, aggressive and manipulative behaviour.
It inwlves:
1. Respecting yourself.
2. Taking responsibility for yourself.
3. Recognising you own rights/needs independently of others.
4. Making clear ‘F statements.
5. Allowing yourself to make mistakes.
6. Allowing yourself to enjoy your successes.
7. Changing your mind.
8. Asking for ‘thinking it over’ time.
9. Asking for what you want.
10. Setting up clear boundaries.
11. Giving constructive compliments.
12. Giving criticism when it is due.
13. Accepting compliments/constructive criticism.
14. Respecting other people.
Problems encountered when trying to be assertive.
Some people find it very difficult to say no. Others can only say no indirectly,
softening the blow with excuses and apologies. The inability to say no means that you
lack some control over your life. This can lead to an increase in stress. Saying no 
directly and openly gives greater control and boosts self esteem.
C o m m o n  m y t h s -  Saying no is callous, uncaring, mean and selfish
Saying no directly is rude, aggressive, too abrupt and blunt. 
Saying no will hurt and upset.
Saying no is rejecting of the person.
Saying no over ‘little’ things equals pettiness.
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R e a s o n s  w h y  w e  m i g h t  s a y  y e s  w h e n  w e  m e a n  n o .
Guilt Fear
Habit Conflict
Need for approval
F E E L IN G S  T H A T  M IG H T  B E  EV O K ED  W H E N  W E HAVE TAKEN O N  T O O  M ANY TASKS 
BECAUSE W E C O U L D N ’T  SAY N O .
Anger Resentment
Irritability Depression
Isolation Exhaustion
Anxiety Stress
Seven points to remember, when saying No.
1. You are refusing a request not the person.. .much depends on the way things are
said.
2. Accept responsibility for refusing a request I don’t want to
3. Provide explanation if you feel the need to.
4. Don’t overestimate the difficulty the other person wiU have in accepting the refiisal.
5. Our bodies express themselves, so saying yes when you mean no will be evident.
6. Self disclose e.g. I feel guilty.........
7. If difficult, use the broken record technique (repeating the same statement over and 
over).
Refusing requests
I f  y o u  ARE SURE- Keep reply short.
Use self-disclosure.
Say no.
Give reason if you want to.
Don’t apologise profusely.
After refusing -  change topic.
If YOU ARE NOT SURE -  Ask for clarification.
State limitation/possibilities.
Ask for more time.
I f  REQUESTER BECOMES PERSISTENT - Rep eat refusal.
Use self-disclosure.
Do not search for better reasons.
Don’t hang around -  change topic.
Doctorate of Psychology (PsychD) in Clinical Psychology 217
Service Related Research Project
Appendix Four
:k Anxiety Inventory 
aotffiB gi
le Date
V is a list of common symptoms of anxiety. Please read eacfi item In the list carafulty. indicate how much 
lave been bothered by each symptom during the.PAST WEEK, INCLUDING TODAY by placing an X In the 
spending space In the column next to each symptom.
Not 
at alt
MlIdlY 
It a id  not 
tsom erm a
f>(od«rat«ly It 
WM very ut>- 
pJeasant but I 
could s tan d  8
S avarety  
1 could 
baroty 
swan
N um bness or tingling.
Feeling hoL
1
W obbliness in legs. !
i i
Unable to relax. | j ■■ i
Fear of the worst happening j 1
C izr/ Of lightheaded. I ■ 1 ■ i
Heart pounding or racing. j i
U nsteacy. j  j !
Terrified.
1
! 1
Nervous.
-•’^;i.".gs of choking.
i-îînds Ifêmoiing. j I
Shaky.
r.;-ôr of losing control. ! - !
1. 
1
S;irit:uit'/ breathing. ! . j 1
F r.if :l dying. j 1 . ■ i
. . . . .  ! i 1
! - 'C .g O ' l 'c n  Of d i s c o m f o r t  
.T c c 'o m o n .
r . i in t .
r3C0 flushed.
T vejllng  (.not due to heat).
' M * /  Î ,  « .! .« »  t .  3 t< < . V .O .
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Name: Marital Status: 
Education: _
Age: Sex:
Occupation:  _____________________________ _
Instructions: This questionnaire consists of 21 groups of statements. Please read each group of statements carefully, and 
then pick out the one statem ent in each group that best describes the way you have been feeling during the past two 
weelâ, including today. Circle the number beside the statement you have picked. If several statements in the group 
seem to apply equally well, circle the highest number for that group. Be sure that you do not choose more than one 
statement for any group, including Item 16 (Changes in Sleeping Pattern) or Item 18 (Changes in Appetite).
1. Sadness
0 I do not feel sad.
1 I feel sad much of the time.
2 I am sad all the time.
3 I am so sad or unhappy that I can’t stand it.
2. Pessimism
0 1 am not discouraged about my future.
I feel more discouraged about my future than I 
used to be.
1 do not expect things to work out for me.
I feel my future is hopeless and will only get 
worse.
1
3. Past Failure
0 I do not feel like a failure.
1 I have failed more than I should have.
2 As I look back, 1 see a lot of failures.
3 1 feel I am a total failure as a person.
4. Loss Of Pleasure
0 I get as much pleasure as I ever did from the 
things 1 enjoy.
1 1 don’t enjoy things as much as 1 used to.
2 1 get very little pleasure from the things 1 used 
to enjoy.
3 1 can’t get any pleasure from the things 1 used 
to enjoy.
5. Guilty Feelings
0 1 don’t feel particularly guilty.
1 I feel guilty over many things 1 have done or
should have done.
2 1 feel quite guilty most of the time.
3 1 feel guilty all of the time.
6. Punishment Feelings
0 I don’t feel I am being punished.
1 I feel I may be punished.
2 I expect to be punished.
3 I feel I am being punished.
7. Self-Dislike -
0 1 feel the same about myself as ever.
1 1 have lost confidence in myself.
2 1 am disappointed in myself.
3 1 dislike myself.
8. Self-Criticalness
0 1 don’t criticize or blame myself more than usual.
1 I am more critical of myself than I used to be.
2 I criticize myself for all of my faults.
3 1 blame myself for everything bad that happens.
9. Suicidal Thoughts or Wishes
, 0 I don’t have any thoughts of killing myself.
I have thoughts of killing myself, but I would 
not carry them out.
I would like to kill myself.
1 would kill myself if I had the chance.
1
10. Crying
0 1 don’t cry anymore than I used to.
1 1 cry more than 1 used to.
2 1 cry over every little thing.
3 1 feel like crying, but 1 can’t.
. Subtotal Page 1
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M ind Garden
SELF-EVALUATION QUESTIONNAIRE 
P lease  provide the following Information:
Name________________________ _^____________________ Date_____
Age _________ :_________  Gender (Clrvle) M F
DIRECTIONS:
A number of statements wfitch people have used to describe themselves are given below. 
Read each statement and then drde the appropriate value to the right of (he statement to 
Indicate how you feel right now, that Is, af this moment Theré are no right or wrong 
answers. Do not spend too much time on any one statement but give the answer which 
seems to describe your present feelings best
ettaAlu. (UUftnlt
STAI Form Y-1
1 .1  feci calm  ..........................  ;................
2. I fee! secure.................................................................
3 . 1 am ten se ...................................................... .................
4. I feel strained..................................................................
5. I feel at case....................................................................
6. I feel upset......................................................................
7. I am presently worrying over possible misfortunes.
8. I feel satisfied.................................................................
9. I feel frightened..............................................................
10. I feel comfortable...........................................................
11. I feel self-confident.......................................................
12. I feel nervous..................................................................
13. I am jittery.................................. ............... .....................
14. I feel indecisive..............................................................
15. I am relaxed.....................................................................
16. I fee! content...................................................... .............
17. 1 am worried...................................................  '........
18. f fee! confused................................................................
19. I feel steady.....................................................................
20. I feel pleasant.................................................................
%
%
© Copyright 1960.1977 by Chartes D. Spielberger All rights reserved STAIS-AD Test Form V
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SELF-EVALUATION QUESTIONNAIRE 
STAI Form Y-2
Name Date
DIRECTIONS
A number of statements which people have used to describe themselves are given 
below. Read each statement and then circle the appropriate value to the right of 
the statement to indicate how you genera///feel. There are no right or wrong 
answers. Do not spend too much time on any one statement but give the answer 
which seem s to describe how you generally feel.
21. I feci pleasant_________ .....------------------------------------------- --------- ------------------
2 2 . 1 feci nervous and restless.............................................. ......................................................
23. I feci satisfied with m yself........................................................................................................
24. I wish I could be as happy as others seem to be...................................................................
25. I feel like a failure .......................................................... .....................................................
26. I feel rested...................................................................................................................................
27. I am “calm, cool, and collected"........................ ;....................................................................
28. I feel that difficulties are piling up so that I cannot overcome them ...............................
29. I worry too much over something that really doesn’t matter.............................................
30. I am happy.....................................................................................................................................
31. I have disturbing thoughts.........................................................................................................
32. I lack self-confidence.................................................................................................................
33. I feel secure..................................................................................................................................
34. I make decisions easily...............................................................................................................
35. I feel inadequate..........................................................................................................................
36. 1 am content..................................................................................................................................
37. Some unimportant tliought runs through my mind and bothers me.................................
38. 1 take disappointments so keenly that I can't put them out o f  my mind.........................
39. I am a steady person  ...........................................................................................................
40. I get in a state o f  tension or turmoil as I think over my recent concerns and interests.
%
\
© Copyright 1968.1977 by Charles D. Spielberger. All rights reserved. STAIS-AD Test Form Y
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' ^  T""-' 1 2 : e '7  ID  : MORDCN CI-DIT TEL : 3 1 S i e 8 2 S S 3 4
COODITION CHECKLIST 
(Beck a t  El., 1987) I SI 
III
COGNITIONS CHECKLIST
Please rate how o ften , regardless o f  the s itu a tio n  you are In, yew have 
the thoughts H ated below. Rate how o ften  you g et the thoughts on the 
sc a le  below by w riting a number beside the thought :
Never have Rarely have Have I t  Usually have Always have
th is  th is  about h a lf th is  th is  thought
thought thought the time thought
U 1 2 3 t>
Thoughts -acalfl Raitlng
1. I'm going to have an accident....................................................................................
2. There i s  something very wrong with.............................................. .................. ......
me
3. Something might happen that w il l  ruin . . . . . . . . . . . . .
my appearance
A. Something awful i s  going to happen t .............................................................
5. I'm lo sin g  ray mind . . . . . . . . . . . . .
6. Something w il l  happen to someone
I Care about........................................................................................... ...........................
P lease now rate how o ften , when you are experiencing pain or phyBlcel 
discom fort, you have the follow ing thoughtsi
Thoughts ■ SpEla Rating
7. ■ What i f  I get s ick  and become an.................................................. ...........................
Invalid
6 . I am going to be In.lurea
9. I might be trapped.............................................................................................................
10 . I. am not a healthy person ........... ...............
11. Vhat i f  no-onc reaches ne in time ...........................
to help
1 2 . I'm going to have o heart attack ....................
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C O P I N G  R E S P O N S E S  I N V E N T O R YÏ  '
î
Part II
P lease  think again about th e  problem  you  described  at the beginning of this 
: 3  Inventory; indicate which of the follow ing you did in connection  with that
situation.
3 . -
YES. YES, YES.
3 once or some­ fairly
# Did you: NO twice times often0 1 2 3
3 1. Think of different ways to deal with the problem ?............. - □ □ □ □@ 2. Tell yourself things to make yourself feel b e tte r? .......... .. . □ □ □ □
3 3. Talk with your partner or other relative
3 about the problem ?.........................;................................. - □ o □ □
a 4. Make a plan of action and follow i t ? ................................... . □ □ □ □
5. Try to forget the whole th ing? ............................ . □ □ □ □
3
6. Feel that time would make a  difference -  the only
3 thing to do was wait? ............................................................ . □ □ □ □
3 7. Try to help others deal with a similar problem ?............... . □ □ □ □
ü 8. Take it out on other people when you felt
3
angry or dep ressed ? ............................................................... □ □ □ □
9. Try to step back from the situation and be more objective? . . □ □ □ □
3 10. Remind yourself how much worse things could be? . .  . . . □ □ o □
3 11. Talk with a friend about the problem? ................................... , □ □ □ □
3 12. Know what had to be done and try hard to
a make things w ork?............... ................................................... □ □ □ □ZM
13. Try not to think about the problem ?...................... .............. □ □ □ □
3
14. Realize that you had no control over the problem ?.......... □ □ □ □
3 15. Get involved in new activities?............................................... □ □ □ □
3 16. Take a chance and do something risky?.................. □ □ □ □
3 17. Go over in your mind what you would say or d o ? ............ □ o □ □
3 18. Try to see the good side of the situation?................. ........ O □ □ □ .
3 19. Talk with a professional person (e.g. doctor,
lawyer, clergy)?................................................................ .. □ o □ □a 20. Decide what you wanted and try hard to get it? . ............... □ □ □ □
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C O P I N G  R E S P O N S E S  I N V E N T O R Y
YES, YES. YES,
once or some­ fairly
Did y o u : NO twice times often
0 1 2 3
42. Think about how this event could change your
life in a positive way? ....................................... □ □ □ . □
43. Pray for guidance and/or s trength?....................: . . '............ □ □ • □ □
44. Take things a day at a time, one step at a tim e? ............... □ □ □ □
45. Try to deny how serious the problem really was? ' □ □ □ □
46. Lose hope that things would ever be the s a m e ? ............... □ □ ■ □ □
47. Turn to work or other activities to help you manage things? . . o □ □
48. Do something that you didn't think would work, but at
least you were doing som ething?....................................... □ □ □ □
This com p letes the Inventory. Thank you very m uch for your help.
(31 - Q uestions about how you handled the problem you described  at the beginning
of this inventory (continued)
3  
9
rdl 
9  
3  
3  
3
a
d
3 
d
'H
J
1
■1
:
:
I
© 1986, Rudolf H. Moos, Center for Health Care Evaluation, Stanford University and 
I Veterans’ Administration Medical Centers, Palo Alto, California. Reproduced with the
permission of the author.
' This measure is part of Assessment: A Mental Health Portfolio, edited by Derek Milne,
j Once the Invoice has been paid, it may be photocopied for u se within the purchasing
Institution only. Published by The NFER-NELSON Publishing Company Ltd, Darville 
I House, 2 Oxford Road East, Windsor, Berkshire SL4 10F, UK. . Code 4900 08 4
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Should clinicians throw out a theory informing clinical understanding if it cannot explain 
everything? Advanced Theory of Mind in Autistic Spectrum Disorders; The way forward?
Theoretical rationale for defîcits in ‘theory of mind’ causing autism’s symptom 
presentation.
Since Kanner described autism in 1943, many attempts have been made to explain the 
developmental disorder. Autism has a genetic basis (Bailey, Phillips and Rutter, 1996) and a 
prevalence of 0.1 per cent (Wing, 1993). DSM-VI diagnostic criteria are ‘The triad of 
Impairments of Social Interaction’: quahtative impairments in sociahsation, communication, 
imagination, and a markedly restricted repertoire of activities and interests coupled with an onset 
before 30 months (Rutter and Schopler, 1992; American Psychiatric Association, DSM-IV, 
1994). ICD-10 criteria are similar to DSM-IV, wherein a child should show abnormal or 
impaired development before the age of three, in three areas; social interaction, communication 
and restricted repetitive behaviour (World Health Organisation, 1994). A large body of research 
proposes that autism is a biologically caused developmental disorder, with multifactorial 
biological causes^ affecting the same (yet unidentified) specific component of the brain via a 
“final common pathway” (Frith, 1989; Baron-Cohen, 1990)^
Following the conclusion that autism had a biological aetiology, research focus broadened 
towards integrating the clinical, genetic, neuropsychological and neurobiological perspectives in 
autism within a model. Morton and Frith’s (1995) model based on current knowledge suggests 
that a single cognitive deficit underhes the ‘triad of impairments’, with all key behavioural 
features of autism mediated through this cognitive deficit (although the biological and 
behavioural sequelae might both be multiple).
In the last fifteen years, a specific cognitive deficit in the ability to represent mental states 
‘Theory of mind’, (ToM) a term corned by Premack and Woodruff (1978), has become one of the 
major research focuses in autism, with over 750 published studies (e.g., Astington, Harris, and 
Olson, 1988; Fodor, 1992; Leshe, 1987). Consensus emerged that subject to individual 
differences due to environmental factors such as; interactions with siblings and conversations 
with caregivers, and individual factors such as; verbal ability and general intelligence (Dunn,
' For example, birth trauma, genetic abnormality.
 ^However, it is important to note that some research contraindicates this proposal.
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Brown, Slomkowski, Tesla, and Youngblade, 1991 ; Pemer, Ruffman, and Leekam, 1994; Bartsch 
and Estes, 1996), ‘normal’ children acquire a ‘theory of mind’ around the age of four (Pemer and 
Wimmer, 1985; Sullivan, Zaitchik and Tager-Flusburg, 1994; Wimmer and Pemer, 1983).
Interest increased in ToM after Baron-Cohen, Leshe and Frith (1985) extrapolated from Leshe’s 
(1987) proposal that a child’s abihty to engage in pretend play rehes on the capacity to hold 
‘metarepresentations’ ; an understanding that people have mental states which can be different 
from the state of the real world and different from their own mental state, a ToM. They 
hypothesised that characteristic deficits in imagination shown by individuals with autism (Wulff, 
1985), were due to an inabhity to hold these ‘metarepresentations’.
Baron-Cohen, Leshe and Frith using the deficit in ToM concept attempted to explain autism’s 
clinical picture, with specific emphasis on two core symptoms of autism; social and imagination 
impairments (Frith, 1989). For example, a lack of emphatic social reciprocity is expected in the 
absence of the abihty to understand intentions and beliefs, but general social desire and simple 
physical contact remain intact as they do not require ToM (Frith, 1994). The theory also predicts 
that any skiU requiring only primary representations (understanding of common concrete 
meaning) should be unimpaired in autism -  thus ahowing for good rote memory, and savant 
abihties, but skihs requiring metarepresentations, such as pretence are impaired (Schopler and 
Mesibov, 1995).
Empirical evidence for deficits in Theory of Mind in people with autism.
Baron-Cohen, Leshe, and Frith (1985) investigated their proposal that autistic children have 
impairments in ToM using Wimmer and Pemer’s (1983) false-behef tasks evolved during 
research into ‘normal’ children’s development of ToM. These tasks have become probe tests for 
ToM and ascertain a person’s abhity to attribute false behefs to others, where prediction and 
explanation of action cannot be based simply on one’s own convictions of the state of the world. 
In other words, in order to pass, particular behefs held by another must be considered and held 
separate from one’s own knowledge.
Initially, they employed the location change ToM Sally-Anne task with people with autism. 
Down syndrome, and ‘normal’ children. In this task, each child was shown a doll scenario in 
which SaUy placed a marble into her basket, left the room, and then Anne took the marble from
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the basket and hid it in a box. When Sally returned, the experimenter asked where Sally would 
look for her marble (the belief question) and two control questions, where was the marble really, 
and where was it in the beginning. All children answered the control questions correctly. 
However, whereas 86% of Down syndrome children and 85% of normal children answered the 
belief question correctly, only 20% of the autistic children did, despite exceeding the former two 
groups in both average chronological and mental age. Learning disabled controls’ success was 
particularly important, suggesting that problems in mmd-reading are specific to autism, and not 
simply due to developmental delay (Baron-Cohen et al, 1985).
Although, there has been variation within the research in the proportion of children on the autistic 
spectrum failing ToM tasks (as low as 10% in Dahlgren and Trillingsgaard, 1996, to 40% in 
Prior, Dahlstrom, and Squires, 1990, and as high as 85% in Reed and Peterson, 1990) their failure 
on first order ToM tasks has been replicated in a significant number of studies with the majority 
of research reporting failure rates above 70% (Happe, 1995; Bowler and Strom, 1998).
More recently, studies have shown that the poor reasoning shown by autistic children on ToM 
tasks extends to related mental state reasoning tasks, such as appearance-reality tasks and level 
two perspective taking tasks, which involve understanding that objects or pictures may look 
different to different people viewing it from other perspectives (Baron-Cohen, Tager-Flusberg, 
and Cohen, 1993). Moreover, high-functioning autistic children have been found to do well on 
physical causation tasks even while failing similar mental state tasks (Baron-Cohen, Leshe, and 
Frith, 1985; Leekam and Pemer, 1991; Leshe and Thaiss, 1992).
The aforementioned results have formed the comerstone of the hypothesis that the core 
impairment in autism is a deficit in ‘Theory of Mind’ (Baron-Cohen, 1995). However, ToM 
explanation of autistic spectmm disorders is subject to criticism in three main areas. First, ToM 
cannot explain ah facets of the disorder, second, research supporting the theory is open to 
methodological critique, and third, the theory cannot explain why a consistent number of people 
on the autistic spectmm pass the ToM tests. These wiU be addressed in tum.
Theory of mind cannot explain all facets of autism
If the cognitive deficit constituting the basis for autism is so narrow and highly specific, why is 
there such a strong association between autism and teaming disabilities (Rutter and Bailey,
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1993)? The majority of people with autism have learning disabilities more than half in the 
severely disabled range (DeMyer, Barton and Norton, 1972; Lockyer and Rutter, 1969; Wing and 
Gould, 1979). However, with the recognition of Asperger syndrome as part of the autistic 
spectrum the majority of people on the autistic spectrum are now thought to have an IQ above 70.
In addition, although it is not difficult to see how impaired ability to understand mental states 
might lead to social and communicative deficits indicative of the ‘triad of impairments’, it is not 
clear how it produces the ritualistic behaviours or unusual cognitive talents found in individuals 
with autistic spectrum disorders (Goode, Rutter and Howlin, 1994; Hart, 1989; McDonnell, 1993; 
Park, 1967). These features need not be specific to the disorder. However, Hermelin and 
O’Conner’s work (1970) predating ToM, demonstrates specific non-social abnormalities in 
autism. For example, difficulties in selectivity and shifting of attention. In summary, ToM 
cannot completely explain a person with autism’s presentation. However, ToM remains one of 
the most influential theories in the area for explaining the “triad of social impairments” (Baron- 
Cohen, 1989).
M ethodological problems with the paradigms employed to show deficits in ‘Theory of 
Mind’.
Wimmer and Pemer’s (1983) ToM paradigms were originally proposed as tests safe from false 
positives (Dennett, 1978). However, studies purporting to show deficits in ToM because of task 
failure have been criticised. It has been proposed that children were not failing to acknowledge 
false behef due to deficits in ToM, but because of impairments in other psychological abihties, 
such as language or memory, or on account of methodological factors, for example, lack of 
motivation (Baron-Cohen, Tager-Flusberg and Cohen, 1993).
Methodological factors
It was suggested that failure on ToM tasks was an artifact of the task structure, caused by 
pragmatic difficulties with the “look” question. This has been countered by Eisenmajer & Prior’s 
(1991) study that produced the same results using a “think” rather than a “look” question.
Sodian and Frith (1992) provided evidence against DeGelder’s (1987) suggestion that children 
failed due to lack of motivation, and Eisenmajer and Prior’s (1991) proposal that failure was due 
to not understanding task instmctions. They examined children with autism’s ability to keep a
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sweet from a puppet competitor by deception and sabotage. The only difference between the two 
conditions was that deception (lying or pointing to the empty location) manipulated the 
competitor’s behefs, while sabotage (locking the box where the sweet was) simply manipulated 
behaviour. Children with autism proved competent at sabotage, but incapable of deception. 
Contrasting the conditions dismisses criticisms based on lack of motivation or failure to 
comprehend instructions.
Criticisms have also been based on the premise that children on the autistic spectrum have 
difficulty in answering ToM tasks because of egocentrism, confusing their own with others’ 
behefs. Pemer, Leekam, & Wimmer, (1987) derived a change in object ToM task, where a child 
is shown a smarties tube and asked, “what is inside?” After answering they are shown that there 
is actuaUy a pencil. The children are then asked what another person who had not seen the ‘real’ 
contents would think was in the tube. A child with ToM should answer smarties. When children 
were requested to comment on their initial behef about the deceptive box’s content (Gopnik and 
Astington, 1988) they found that they believed that their first answer was the same as the correct 
answer, i.e. ‘pencil’. This finding carries important theoretical imphcations, since it suggests that 
development of a ToM pertains also to knowledge of one’s own mind. First, it is inappropriate to 
characterise children’s difficulty in acknowledging false behef merely as a symptom of 
egocentrism, since they even seem ignorant of the representational quahty of their own mental 
states. Second, it argues against the Cartesian position that the mind is transparent to itself, which 
imphed that development takes the form of introspecting and applying insights from one’s own 
mind to others’ minds (Wimmer and Haiti, 1991).
In addition to ToM tasks employing changes in location and objects, the paradigm was extended 
to non-mental forms of representation to counter arguments that people with autism were unable 
to process any form of representation. Leekham and Pemer (1991) used Zaitchik’s (1990) task 
and asked children to take a photograph of an object in one location, before moving it to another 
location and asking where the object was in the picture. Zaitchik’s results found that ‘normal’ 
children found this no easier than the false belief type ToM task. However, Leekham and Perner, 
found that children on the autistic spectmm were able to complete the task despite failing the 
false belief ToM task, suggesting specific problems with mental state representations. These 
findings have been rephcated with other non-mental forms of representation such as drawings and 
maps (Charman and Baron-Cohen, 1992; Leekham and Pemer, 1991; Leslie and Thraiss, 1992).
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A further criticism is that ToM tasks are not naturahstic, employing objects to represent people in 
hypothetical situations. It could be argued that children fail because they cannot detach 
themselves from the knowledge that the dolls are not real, and therefore do not have a mind or 
beliefs. This produces a circular argument for ToM, if autistic children do not have the ability to 
pretend how can they pretend that the doUs will have behefs and thus correctly answer the task? 
Studies indicating that the failure on the task was not due to the scenario being hypothetical, 
include; firstly, Leshe and Frith’s (1988), with people as protagonists in the scenario, finding that 
children with autism performed similarly to the doh scenario (Baron-Cohen et al, 1985), and 
secondly, the aforementioned ‘Smarties’ deceptive box test (Bowler, Briskman and Grice, 1999). 
In summary, research indicates failure on ToM tasks is not due to methodological artifacts.
Failure on the ToM tasks is due to other cognitive defiicits rather than ToM.
Although, it appears that failure is not due to methodological artifacts, ToM tasks have been 
criticised on the basis that impaired ToM experienced by children with autism was due to other 
psychological factors. In answer to these criticisms, children with autism have been shown as 
significantly impaired in ToM development compared to children with Down syndrome (Baron- 
Cohen, et al., 1985), learning disabilities (Baron-Cohen, 1989; Reed and Peterson, 1990), 
emotional disturbance (Frith, Happe, and Siddons, 1994), and specific language impairment 
(Leshe and Frith, 1988; Pemer, et al., 1989).
In addition, it has been suggested that failure might be due to deficits in other cognitive abihties 
such as executive function, as it is hard to design any test tapping only one cognitive abihty 
(RusseU, Saltmars and HiU, 1999). There is broad consensus that executive tasks have two 
components (Diamond, 1991; Pennington et al, 1997). First, abihty to suppress a prepotent but 
incorrect response; second, whilst doing so retaining action-relevant information in working 
memory. Thus, in ToM tasks it is necessary to suppress one’s own tme behef whilst 
simultaneously holding in mind the requirement to answer a question about the protagonist’s 
behaviour. When this is coupled with findings that people with autism have severe executive 
impairments (Pennington and Ozonoff, 1996), RusseU et al (1999), argued that failing ToM tasks 
may be partly due to executive difficulties.
Executive functioning arguments are supported by research using second order ToM tasks 
requiring the capacity to attribute embedded, mental states (e.g. “she thinks that he thinks...”).
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conferring on children the abihty to understand not only a person’s perception of a social 
situation (first-order reasoning) but also different individuals’ concern about the other’s mental 
states (second-order reasoning). Research findings varied in ‘normal’ children; however, under 
optimal conditions (e.g. children were given a memory aid before asked the question), many six 
and seven year olds succeeded suggesting at least a two year lag between first and second-order 
behef attribution (Sulhvan and Winner, 1993; Zaitchik, 1991).
However, it has been suggested that second order tasks may not be testing mental concepts at a 
deeper level than first order tasks, but rather the abihty to embed representations in working 
memory during information processing. RusseU argues that people with autism’s inability to 
embed representations in working memory is revealed in planning tasks such as the Tower of 
Hanoi (Ozonoff, Pennington and Rogers, (1991); Hughes, RusseU, and Robbins, 1994). When 
information processing demands were reduced in Sulhvan, Zaitchik and Tager-Flusberg’s (1994) 
study with normal children, 90% attributed second order false behefs two years earher than 
suggested by previous research (Hogrefe et al., 1986; Pemer and Wimmer, 1985). SimUar 
findings have been shown for children on the autistic spectmm unable to pass second order ToM 
tasks. Tager-Flusberg and Sulhvan (1994) showed that when the executive demands are reduced 
some people with autism can pass second order ToM tasks.
Hughes and RusseU (1993) and RusseU, Mauthner, Sharpe, and TidsweU (1991) suggested that 
faUure is due to specific rather than general problems in executive functioning, for example, 
difficulties in suppressing perceptual sahence and disengaging from the objects real location. In 
support of the argument, RusseU, Jarrold, and Potel (1994) re-interpreted chUdren’s faUure on 
deception tasks within this executive functioning theory, where a chUd has to disengage mentaUy 
from their current knowledge state and refer away from the goal to another location. RusseU et 
al, (1994) state that the ‘inabihty to disengage from the object’, means that they are not able to 
overcome the objects’ perceptual saUence in the real location and deceive their rival. They 
further supported their hypothesis using results derived from Russell’s window task, where a 
child has to indicate an empty location, in order to be rewarded with a sweet.
Although, the aforementioned research provides strong evidence that executive functioning skills 
are required to complete ToM tasks, it does not mean that there are not deficits in ToM. In 
support of ToM, people with autism are not specifically impaired on ZaitchUc’s (1990) false
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photograph task (Leekham and Pemer, 1991; Leslie and Thraiss, 1992), which makes similar 
demands on executive functioning but not on mentahsing.^ In addition. Happe, (1994) questioned 
the methodology and hence conclusions of the 'specific deficit in executive functioning’ studies, 
citing, firstly, Leshe and Frith’s (1988) “tme behef’ task as providing contrary evidence, where it 
is not clear why an inabihty to disengage from an object leads to an incorrect response, and 
secondly, Sodian and Frith’s (1992) study showing that people with autism are capable of some 
degree of disengagement from a ‘baited box’ m the deception/sabotage test.
In conclusion, although, ToM tasks have been comprehensively criticised, research suggests that 
they do provide evidence of a deficit in ToM in the majority of people on the autistic spectmm. 
As a consequence of findings that people with autism also have problems with executive 
functioning, researchers have tried to make connections between the two psychological deficits. 
Executive function deficits may be the result of mentahsing problems, mentahsing problems may 
result from executive function deficits, or both may result from a third factor, such as weak 
central coherence (Happe, 1994).“^
Consequently, the idea that there may only be a single cognitive deficit in autism, such as ToM 
has faded in recent years, although there are still strong claims about primacy and parsimony of 
explanation with tentative and inconclusive suggestions on the theories relationship. For 
example, incorporating the theories in one: dismption at different points of the same brain system 
might conceivably result in breakdown characterised by each theories. Alternatively, Frith and 
Happe suggested that an understanding of autism might rely on the notion of two different 
impaired cognitive systems. A modular system dedicated to processing mental state information 
(ToM) and a more distributed system determining “cognitive style”, (executive functioning 
and/or central coherence) (Frith and Happe, 1999).
People on the autistic spectrum who pass Theory of mind tasks.
Evidence further supporting the notion that deficits in ToM are not the core cognitive deficit in 
autism is the existence of able individuals with autism passing ToM tests. In Baron-Cohen et al’s 
(1985) study, 20% passed, and in a later study (1989) attempting to tackle this apparent
 ^Russell et al (1999) would argue that the false photograph task does not make executive demands of a 
similar severity to the ToM tasks.
Weak central coherence theory is a description of cognitive style rather than a deficit account of autism, 
for a complete explanation see Frith (1989).
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disconfirmation of the theory, further people were found to pass first but not second order ToM 
tasks. Baron-Cohen proposed that some older children could pass first order tests because autism 
might result from a specific developmental delay in acquiring the ToM mechanism. Apparently 
contradicting Baron-Cohen’s findings, both Bowler (1992) and Ozonoff et al. (1991) found that 
adults with Asperger syndrome and high-functioning autism, could also pass second order ToM 
tasks.
The ability to pass first and second order ToM tasks has also been found in children. Studies 
found between 15% (Reed and Patterson, 1990) and 55% (Prior, Dahlstorm, and Squires, 1990) 
of children with autism successfully attributing first-order ToM. Dahlgren and Trillingsgaard’s 
(1996) study found children with Autism and Asperger syndrome but no leaming-disability 
passing first and second-order ToM tasks.
The consistent finding in all studies that a proportion of people on the autistic spectrum can pass 
both first and second order ToM tasks led researchers to examine this group in order to find 
characteristic differences from the ‘failure’ group.
Characteristics of people on the autistic spectrum who pass Theory of mind tasks.
Primarily the focus was on possible relationships between theory of mind and firstly, verbal 
ability due to passers’ greater verbal abihty (Bowler, 1992; Dahlgren and Trillingsgaard, 1996; 
Ozonoff, et al, 1991; Hughes, 1998), and secondly, chronological age as abihty to pass increases 
with age (Bowler, 1992).
Several studies show correlations between ToM performance, verbal intelhgence measures and 
chronological age (Dahlgren and Trihingsgaard, 1996; Happe, 1995). For example, Leshe and 
Frith’s (1988) participants solving ToM tasks tended to have higher chronological and verbal 
mental ages than those who failed. A later study indicated that children passing were over 11.5 
years old and had a mental age of over 5.5 years, consistent with findings in ‘normal’ children 
who require a mental age of between four and seven to answer both first and second order tasks. 
Furthermore, Ziatas, Durkin and Pratt’s, (1998) study showed that children with Asperger 
syndrome can pass ToM tasks at a mean verbal age of 6 years and 4 months. Further evidence 
suggesting a specific relationship between ToM and verbal abihty is the failure to find 
correlations between ToM and non-verbal intelligence measures (Happe, 1993).
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Dahlgren and Trillingsgaard (1996) suggest that the best predictor for the ability to attribute 
mental states is a combination of language competence (Baron-Cohen, 1988; Leslie and Frith, 
1988; Eisenmajer and Prior, 1991; Leekam and Prior, 1994; Ozonoff et a l, 1991a,b; Peterson and 
Siegal, 1995; Sparrevohn and Howie, 1995) and intellectual level. However, this is modified by 
the ratio of discrepancy between chronological age and intellectual age appearing to be more 
important than intellectual age per se; there is a major cognitive, social and emotional difference 
between a child with a chronological age and mental age of seven and an adult with a 
chronological age of twenty five and a mental age of seven (Kinderman, Dunbar, and Bentail,
1998). This suggestion might explain why chronologically younger, more inteUigent children 
with autism in Baron-Cohen’s (1989) study performed better than older, less intelligent children 
with autism despite a lack of difference in mental age. However, it must be remembered that 
many equally advanced children with autism fail. Age and verbal ability may be necessary but 
are not sufficient to ensure success on ToM tasks. Therefore, it is not the case, as suggested 
(Eisnmajer and Prior, 1991), that failure is simply due to lack of verbal ability.
In summary, the probability that children with autism will solve ToM tasks increases with level of 
verbal intelligence, and a lower ratio between mental and chronological age.
How do people on the autistic spectrum pass theory of mind task?
The aforementioned findings have influenced explanations proposed for people with autism 
passing first and second order ToM tasks. These include firstly, autism is due to a delay in the 
acquisition of ToM, with residual difficulties in social interaction (Baron-Cohen, 1989), or a 
remaining cognitive impairment (Happe, 1995). Alternatively, success could be seen not as proof 
of ToM abihty but as evidence of the “hacking out” of some strategy for solving the tasks (Frith 
et al., 1991).
Baron-Cohen (1989) suggested that people with autism are merely grossly delayed in their 
acquisition of ToM, and therefore it is of no surprise that a few autistic people should manage to 
pass these tests eventually. The hypothesis could be disproved by the existence of an autistic 
child passing all tests of ToM at the normal age; as of yet no such child has been found.
Alternatively, Frith, Morton and Leslie (1991) suggest that people on the autistic spectrum pass 
using a non-ToM strategy, “hacking out” a solution using a combination of experience (reflected
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in passer’s higher chronological age), and generalised problem solving skills (reflected by 
passer’s higher IQ). The strategy might be flexible enough to be apphed successfully to shghtly 
different forms of the same task, or might succeed only if the elements of visual access and 
information are spelled out (as they are in false belief and deception tasks, but not in life). The 
possibihty of superior problem solving skills has not been investigated experimentally, although 
it does make testable predictions, for example, abihty to pass ToM tasks could be related to some 
measure of general problem solving skiU in autistic but not control groups. Rivere and 
CasteUanos’ (1988) study supports this idea where good ToM performance was correlated with 
success on a test of operational thinking in autistic subjects; no correlation was found in normal 
three to five year olds (Nunez and Riviere, 1990). If subjects passing ToM tasks succeed using a 
non-ToM strategy, this would explain why they are still sociaUy handicapped due to social 
situations being more complex than the tasks.
A similar argument to Frith, Morton and Leshe’s (1991) ‘hacking out’ hypothesis is Bowler’s 
(1992) proposal that success on ToM tasks m the presence of continuing difficulties in 
sociahsation, is due to a primary psychological deficit in applying existing knowledge. Bowler 
suggests that ‘good’ task performance is based on different mechanisms from normal mentahsing. 
Their understanding of mental states is different from the normal preschooler. For example, even 
the most able people with autism have difficulties appreciating non-hteral speech, such as indirect 
requests, sarcasm, jokes, and metaphorical expressions (Happe, 1993,1994; Ozonoff and Müler, 
1996; Tantum, 1992). Thus, although, more able people with autism might be able to compute 
correct solutions to problems, requiring ToM, they do so by slow and cumbersome methods, 
disrupting the timing of responses, making them appear odd in everyday social interactions 
(Happe et al, 1996).
Further support that they are using strategies rather than ToM to pass tasks comes from the 
recognition that neither first nor second order tests are complex tests of ToM. They are probes 
for four or six-year-old level skills and thus ceiling effects occur with individuals with an 
intellectual age above 6 years (Pemer and Winner, 1985). Baron-Cohen, Jolliffe, Mortimore, and 
Robertson (1997) state that “Perhaps if they had been labelled as such, no-one would have 
thought of them as suitable tests of whether an adult with autism has a fully functioning theory of 
mind”.
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Furthermore, adherence to first and second order ToM tasks leaves the impression that ToM does 
not develop beyond this level. Little is known about how ToM develops beyond approximately 
seven years in ‘normal’ children, when understanding of second-order false beliefs emerges 
(Pemer and Wimmer, 1985; Sullivan, Zaitchik, and Tager-Flusberg, 1994). Does a seven year- 
old have all the “mind-reading” apparatus of an adult? Is further development of social 
sophistication merely a matter of acquiring general knowledge or maturing in domain-general 
cognitive components (e.g. executive functions)? Happe (1998) conducted investigations into 
ToM development in older adults, finding superior ToM abihty compared to younger adults 
suggesting that social understanding does continue to develop with age. The proposal that ToM 
continues to develop past the age of seven and that ToM tasks have a ceiling provides altemative 
explanations to the suggestion that people with autism can pass ToM tasks because they have 
ToM. If they remain without a ‘tm e’ ToM they would still as recognised, stmggle and appear 
odd in everyday social interactions, reporting difficulties understanding people’s thoughts, 
intentions, and actions (Bowler, 1992; Dahlgren and Trillings, 1996; Happe, 1994).
There is therefore a clear need for tests of ToM that go beyond the four to six year old level and 
tap the more subtle and complex mental states involved in everyday life. Baron-Cohen, Jolliffe, 
Mortimore, and Robertson, (1997); Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, and Jolliffe, 1997; and Happe, 
(1994) produced three more “advanced” tests of ToM.
Advanced Theory of Mind tests
Happe’s (1994) study was the first to take ceiling effects of ToM tests seriously. She tested 
adults with autism on an “advanced” ToM task aimed at a normal 8-9 year old’s level, creating a 
series of vignettes where people say things they do not mean literally, e.g. idioms, white lies and 
jokes. These stories provide a more naturalistic, contextually embedded, realistic challenge than 
first and second order ToM tests. The task involves story comprehension where key questions 
either concern a character’s mental state (experimental condition) or physical effects (control 
condition). The stories were written so that normal individuals would interpret motivation behind 
an utterance in only one way. Control stories were presented to test the understanding of physical 
events and check the generality of any comprehension deficit.
Happe’s (1994) study indicated that participant’s performance on ‘strange stories’ was analogous 
to their performance on standard ToM tests. In addition, the stories appeared to reveal
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impairments in social understanding in even the most able people with autism passing first and 
second order ToM tests. She found that adults with autism had more difficulty with mental state 
stories than matched controls, using fewer appropriate mental state terms in their explanations of 
character’s behaviour. People with autism’s ability to correctly answer the joking, lying and 
persuasion type stories, improved as a function of their abihty to pass earlier ToM tests. 
Furthermore, results suggested that appearance/reahty and forgetting stories were too easy and 
sarcasm and double bluff stories were too difficult for a person with autism. Failure could be due 
to the fact that they need to be understood at a third order ToM level; there is an extra level of 
embedding, participants have to metarepresent “he knows they think he will he”, rather than “he 
knows he wih he”. Alternatively, the naturahstic stories and absence of test questions drawing 
attention to sahent elements (feature of other ToM tasks) may reveal difficulties even the most 
able people with autism appear to have in applying their social knowledge in everyday life 
(Happe, 1994).
However, the study was subject to hmitations, particularly in relation to the sample. For 
example, the normal adults were cohege students and therefore, not representative of the range of 
cognitive abihty within the general population. In addition, the average chronological age of the 
people with autism was 20 years; consequently, their abihty to pass could be a function of social 
learning. Finahy, the sample of normal children was smaU and from a limited age group. They 
showed particular difficulty in certain stories, for example, those based on sarcasm. Therefore it 
is unclear whether failure of any of the participants was due to developmental level or ToM 
deficits, again indicating the need for an understanding of ‘normal’ children’s ToM development 
over the age of seven.
JoUiffe and Baron-Cohen (1999) independently rephcated Happe’s original study and aimed to 
find out whether her original findings of a tendency to give context-inappropriate mental state 
explanations would be maintained. It also sought to extend her 1994 study, answering some of 
the methodological criticisms. Their results rephcated Happe’s main findings. Thus, on the 
mentahstic condition, the clinical group was equivalent to the control group in the number of 
mental state justifications used. What distinguished the clinical participants on this condition was 
not a failure to use mental terms (including emotion terms like “hurt”) but a failure to use the 
appropriate mental state term for the story’s context. In comparison to the normal control group 
the clinical group made significantly more context-inappropriate mental state justifications and
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significantly fewer test-appropriate mental state justifications, suggesting a weakness in 
processing mental state information in context.
The fact that the clinical group did not fail to provide answers suggests that they did not have a 
problem in generating responses or any tendency to be less willing to make a response. Similarly, 
the fact that the clinical group did not differ on number of mental state answers suggests that they 
did not have a problem in producing mentalistic answers, rather as stated previously, problems 
providing context-appropriate mentalistic answers.
In summary, Jolhffe and Baron-Cohen (1999) were able to answer some of the criticisms of 
Happe’s (1994) study, and reinforced the finding that the stories are accessing more advanced 
ToM understanding. People with autism seem to show characteristic deficits in advanced ToM 
reflected in impaired social interactions despite being able to pass first and second order ToM 
tasks (Baron-Cohen, O’Riordan, Stone, Jones, and Plaisted, 1999). Research suggests that this 
could be due to an inability to apply their knowledge of mental states (acquired through social 
learning and/or limited ToM capability) to the appropriate social situation.
This review has shown that despite deficits in ToM being perhaps unable to explain all aspects of 
a person with autism’s presentation, initial findings that a percentage of people can pass first and 
second order ToM tasks does not mean as argued that they have mature ToM. It appears that at 
best passers have limited ToM ability and/or are relying on a combination of social learning and 
intellectual ability to ‘solve’ the tasks. In addition, data from normal children and older adults 
suggest that ToM ability continues to develop past first and second order ToM. Therefore, it is 
not surprising that older more able people with autism can pass these basic tests but present with 
residual social problems. Furthermore, in advanced ToM tasks people with autism show 
significant problems in applying knowledge of complex mental states to the correct context. This 
finding supports continuing deficits in ToM and consequently difficulties in social interactions. 
Currently, ToM remains the most mfluential theory in explaining the subtle and gross social 
inpayments characteristic of all people on the autistic spectrum and therefore, valid and refiable 
advanced tests are required to ascertain a person’s level of understanding of ‘theory of mind’.
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Clinical Implications
Historically, able people with autism have often been misdiagnosed or labelled as eccentric due to 
their more subtle social impairments and abihty to pass traditional ToM tasks. Consequently, 
identification of ToM deficits using advanced ToM tasks as a clinical tool could aid the 
diagnostic process. A further use of Happe’s advanced ToM task ‘strange stories’ could be in 
identifying particular difficulties a child has with social understanding such as sarcasm, 
consequently, informing an intervention such as a social skills group aimed at teaching ToM. 
The stories could also be employed in clinical evaluation of an intervention. Reliabihty studies 
for ToM tasks produce mixed results partially due to methodological problems (for example, 
Mayes et al, 1996; Charman and Campbell, 1997), however, Hughes, Adlam, Happe, Jackson, 
Taylor and Caspi (2000) showed that most ToM tasks show good test-retest rehabüity and 
internal consistency, with very strong test-retest correlations between aggregate scores for 
children of all levels of ability. Therefore, although ToM tests appear to be rehable they would 
be subject to practice effects. However, the ‘strange stories’ could counter the phenomena as two 
vignettes are available for each type of social understanding, with one used before and one after 
intervention, and consequently are a superior evaluation tool.
However, before advanced ToM tasks can be employed knowledge is required of children with 
autism’s ability to answer the stories. This is an important factor as m general, autistic spectrum 
disorders are diagnosed in early to middle childhood. In addition, the finding that ‘normal’ 
children display errors on the stories means that normative data needs to be constructed to ensure 
that clinicians are aware of the developmental stages in the acquisition of ToM.
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Happe’s ‘Strange Stories’ - An advanced test of ‘Theory o f Mind’: Understanding of story 
characters’ thoughts and feelings by typically developing children and children on the
autistic spectrum.
Abstract
A specific impairment in ‘Theory o f  M ind’ (ToM), the ability to attribute mental states, was 
proposed to underlie autistic spectrum disorders’ clinical presentation (e.g. Baron-Cohen, Leslie 
and Frith, 1985). This account was challenged by a minority o f  people on the autistic spectrum 
passing tasks requiring firs t and second order ToM  abilities. Happe (1994) created an advanced 
ToM  task ‘Strange Stories’ and found  that they differentiated between adults on the autistic 
spectrum and control groups.
This study replicated Happe ’s (1994) study with typically developing children and children on the 
autistic spectrum to obtain normative data fo r  these groups, and then compared the two groups’ 
performance on the stories.
The study was cross-sectional in design and recruited 90 typically developing children (aged 7 to 
11) from  mainstream primary schools, and 15 autistic spectrum children (aged 7 to IS) from  two 
Child Development Centres. Main experimental measures utilised included: Happe ’s ‘Strange 
Stories ’, two first order ToM  tasks, and one second order ToM  task.
Contrary to Happe ’s findings, the set o f  ‘Strange Stories ’ as a whole did not differentiate between 
this study’s two groups. Higher verbal ability but not higher chronological age was a positive 
influence on the scores o f  autistic spectrum participants. Higher chronological age was a positive 
influence on the performance o f  the typically developing participants.
The results were discussed and interpreted, incorporating ideas from  Leslie’s Theory o f  Mind 
Mechanism and Selection Processor (Scholl and Leslie, 1999), deficits in executive functioning 
and weak central coherence. Clinical implications o f  these findings, methodological limitations, 
and areas fo r  future investigations were also considered.
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Introduction
This introduction will present the concept of autistic spectrum disorders and illustrate the 
commonly associated features. It will then describe a cognitive theory; ‘deficits in Theory of 
Mind’ that offers an explanation of the clinical presentation of the disorder. Theory of Mind, a 
term coined by Premack and Woodruff (1978), refers to the cognitive ability to attribute 
independent mental states, such as beliefs, desires and thoughts, to self and others in order to 
predict and explain behaviour (Premack and Woodruff, 1978). A cognitive modular system, the 
Theory of Mind Mechanism will be outlined, which attempts to ej^plain the cognitive processes 
that lie behind Theory of Mind.
Theory of Mind (ToM) has been operationalised in false belief tasks that have enabled research 
into its presence or absence in both typically developing children and people on the autistic 
spectrum. It will be suggested that although twenty per cent of people on the autistic spectrum 
can pass false belief tasks (Baron-Cohen, Leslie and Frith, 1985), this does not necessarily 
indicate the presence of ToM. Instead they could be passing the tasks by ‘hacking out’ solutions, 
namely using a combination of intelligence and social experience to problem solve (Happe, 
1994). In order to support this argument Happe created an advanced ToM task; the ‘Strange 
Stories’. These stories revealed deficits in understanding social interactions in a group of people 
on the autistic spectrum who had passed other false belief tasks (Happe, 1994).
As a consequence, the ‘Strange Stories’ have been used by clinicians in the process of identifying 
and diagnosing cognitively more able children on the autistic spectrum. However, Happe’s 
(1994) study also showed evidence that typically developing children found it difficult to attribute 
a correct mental state to some of the stories. In addition, Happe’s autistic spectrum participants 
were predominantly adults. Thus, it will be argued that when children on the autistic spectrum 
cannot pass the stories it does not necessarily mean that they have abnormal deficits in ToM, 
rather that any child of their age could find the task difficult. Therefore before the stories can be 
used as a valid clinical tool, normative data needs to be obtained on both typically developing and 
cognitively able autistic spectrum children’s performance on the ‘Strange Stories.’ This research 
aimed to provide normative data on the performance of typically developing children on Happe’s 
‘Strange Stories,’ and then compared their performance with children of a similar chronological 
age on the autistic spectrum.
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Concept of Autistic Spectrum Disorders
In 1943, Kanner identified the developmental disorder of Autism (Kanner, 1943). Over the last 
sixty years, research has refined the features Kanner described as essential to the diagnosis of 
autism. The current DSM-IV diagnostic criteria are the ‘triad of impairments of social 
interaction’: qualitative impairments in socialisation, communication, imagination, and a 
markedly restricted repertoire of activities and interests coupled with an onset before 30 months 
(Rutter and Schopler, 1992; American Psychiatric Association, DSM-IV, 1994). Each of the 
impairments in the triad vary along a continuum, from the severely impaired to the mildly 
impaired form (Wing, 1996). Furthermore, research has shown that autism can occur at any level 
of cognitive functioning (Frith, 1989). Wing (1988) developed the concept of a spectrum of 
disorders in autism to capture this range of manifestations of the same underlying handicap in the 
‘triad of impairments’. The spectrum of autistic disorders based on Wing’s triad has a prevalence 
of 7 per 1000 (Wing, 1993; Ehlers and Gillberg, 1993). This wider autistic spectrum ranges from 
the most profoundly physically and learning disabled person with a co-existing social 
impairment, to the most able, highly intelligent person with social impairment and the other 
features of the triad in only their subtlest form. In addition to clarifying the range of behaviours 
associated with an autistic spectrum disorder, research has focused on the possible cause of this 
developmental disorder.
Investigations suggest that autism is a biologically caused developmental disorder, with 
multifactorial biological features, such as birth trauma or genetic vulnerability (Gillberg and 
Coleman, 1993)\ These multifactorial biological features are proposed to affect the same (yet 
unidentified) specific component of the brain via a “final common pathway” (Frith, 1989; Baron- 
Cohen, 1990).
Morton and Frith (1995) attempted to integrate the clinical, genetic, neuropsychological and 
neurobiological perspectives into a model, and suggested that a single cognitive deficit could 
underlie the ‘triad of impairments’. The key behavioural features of autism are mediated through 
this cognitive deficit (although the biological and behavioural sequelae might both be multiple).
At present, there are three major cognitive deficit theories, which have attracted widespread 
interest. These are: theories of impaired social cognition: theories of impaired executive
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functions: and theories of weak central coherence. This research will focus on a theory of 
impaired social cognition, ‘Theory of Mind’ (ToM).
Deficits in Theory of Mind
The power of this theory (deficits in ToM) is that it can explain at least two of the core symptoms 
(social and imagination impairments) of autism in terms of a single cognitive deficit. In addition, 
it has predictions which are both specific and far-reaching enough to fit the clinical picture of 
autism (Frith, 1989). For example, a lack of empathie social reciprocity is expected in the 
absence of the ability to understand intentions and beliefs, but general social desire and simple 
physical contact remain intact as they do not require ToM (Frith, 1994). The theory also predicts 
that any skill requiring only primary representations (understanding of common concrete 
meaning) should be unimpaired in autism. Thus allowing for good rote memory, and savant 
abilities e.g. superior numerical ability, but skills requiring metarepresentations, such as pretence 
are impaired (Schopler and Mesibov, 1995). Furthermore, a deficit in ToM may account for 
difficulties and delays in language acquisition. This is due to a failure to learn words through 
ostensive communication by reference to the speaker’s intention as well as having no motivation 
to socially interact beyond stating needs (Baron-Cohen, Cox, Baird, Swettenham, Nightingale and 
Morgan, 1996). Therefore, it can be seen that ToM’s particular strength is in explaining the ‘triad 
of social impairments’ (Rutter, 1999).
Cognitive processes proposed to be involved in Theory o f Mind
The cognitive process or processes underlying ToM are still a matter of debate. Leslie suggested 
that “Theory of Mind, arises from an innate, encapsulated and domain-specific part of the 
cognitive architecture, in short, a dedicated modular cognitive mechanism” (Baron-Cohen, 1994; 
Leslie, 1987,1991,1994; Leslie and Happe, 1989, Leslie and Thaiss, 1992; Leslie and Roth, 
1993). Leslie’s entitled this module the Theory of Mind Mechanism (ToMM) (Scholl and Leslie,
1999). The ToMM will be introduced and inter-related with alternative explanations for the 
presentation of people with autistic spectrum disorders, such as weak central coherence, and 
deficits in executive functioning. Although, Leslie’s ToMM comprises the main focus of this 
paper, it is important to note that other authors have argued against the modularity view, 
proposing that theory of mind is better explained by appealing to developing theories. Theory
* However, it is important to note that some research contraindicates this proposal.
Doctorate of Psychology (PsychD) in Clinical Psychology 254
Large Scale Research Project
theories^ propose that a person develops ToM by continually reflecting on and integrating 
experiences of social interaction (Bartsch and Wellman, 1995; Gopnik, 1996; Gopnik and 
Meltzoff, 1997; Pemer, 1991; Wellman, 1990).
Theory o f  M ind Mechanism
Researchers have made tentative and inconclusive suggestions about the relationship between the 
theories of Theory of Mind, weak central coherence, and deficits in executive functioning. For 
example. Frith and Happe suggested that an understanding of autism might rely on the notion of 
two different cognitive systems being impaired, namely a modular system dedicated to processing 
mental state information (ToM) and a more distributed system that determines “cognitive style”, 
(executive functioning and/or weak central coherence). It will be suggested that Leslie’s ToMM 
fulfills the aforementioned criteria, and can in addition to explaining deficits in ToM, also explain 
the deficits in executive function and weak central coherence models of autistic spectrum 
disorders.
The ToMM is a modular system, which spontaneously and post-perceptually attends to 
behaviours and infers the mental states which contributes to them. It interprets situations as 
involving intentional agents, who are represented as holding attitudes to the truth of propositions. 
In short, the ToMM is the innate metarepresentational basis, which imparts the essential character 
of ToM. It is a specific impairment of the ToMM that is proposed to play a key role in autism. It 
is posited that this module relies on another cognitive mechanism to select the relevant 
information for processing. This acts by inhibiting competing possible contents for the belief. 
The mechanism has been entitled the Selection Processor. It may be non modular and may not be 
ToMM specific. In other words, it may be a more distributed cognitive system.
The ToMM enables the child to understand mental states, but this ability is affected by the 
processing limitations of the Selection Processor. For example, to infer the content of 
somebody’s belief when that content is false, the Selection Processor is required to select among 
the possible contents that the ToMM makes available. The ToMM always makes the current 
situation available as a possible and preferred content, because (a) the current situation is a truer 
picture of the world, and (b) beliefs tend to be true. Therefore, passing the ToM task requires this
 ^‘Theory theory’ refers to explanations which attempt to assimilate ToM acquisition to a general account 
of theory acquistion in science (e.g Gopnik and Meltsoff, 1997).
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‘default’ interpretation to be inhibited by the Selection Processor, in order that the weaker false 
content is selected (see Leslie and Polizzi, 1998, for two detailed models of Selection Processor). 
In short, passing the standard ToM task requires both a conceptual competence and a 
performance capability, and failure might simply reflect an immature Selection Processor. How 
can this inform our understanding of the deficit in executive functioning or weak central 
coherence theories of autism?
Executive Functioning
Executive functioning is defined as the set of abilities involved in maintaining an appropriate 
problem-solving framework (Duncan, 1995). It covers higher cognitive processes such as; ability 
to disengage from context; inhibition of appropriate responses; monitoring performance and using 
feedback (Duncan, 1995). Russell, Saltmarsh, and Hill (1999) argue that an executive task has 
various components, specifically to this discussion, a participant has to suppress a pre-potent but 
incorrect response. Thus, deficits in executive functioning could be seen as partly analogous to 
an immature Selection Processor, as the person is unable to overcome the pre-potent response and 
select an alternative response.
Weak Central Coherence
Weak central coherence theory is a description of cognitive style rather than a deficit account of 
autism (Frith, 1989). Frith proposed that autism is characterised by a specific imbalance in the 
integration of information at different levels. Normal information processing tends to draw 
together diverse information to construct higher level meaning in context -  “central coherence”. 
This universal feature of information processing is proposed to be disturbed, and could explain 
both the assets and deficits shown by people with autism. Central coherence theory suggests that 
people with autism are peculiarly free from contextual constraints, and predicts that they are good 
at tasks where attention to local information is advantageous, but poor at tasks requiring 
recognition of global meaning. Thus, it could be posited that the delayed development of the 
Selection Processor cognitive mechanism results in people on the autistic spectrum having 
difficulties in switching between information in order to build up a complete picture of a 
situation. Instead, they focus on the most salient aspects of the presented information, in other 
words the current situation.
Doctorate of Psychology (PsychD) in Clinical Psychology 256
Large Scale Research Project
It has been proposed that deficits in the ToMM and/or the Selection Processor can explain the 
functioning of ToM and thus why people on the autistic spectrum have difficulties in 
understanding other peoples’ beliefs and mental states. Ways of establishing the presence or 
absence of an intact ToM have been developed and operationalised in ToM tasks (e.g. Wimmer 
and Pemer, 1983).
Theory of Mind tasks
ToM tasks aim to tap the ability to attribute false beliefs to dthers, where prediction and 
explanation of action cannot be based simply on one’s own convictions or the state of the world. 
In other words, in order to pass the task, the particular beliefs held by another must be considered 
and held separate from one’s own knowledge. Furthermore, failure on these tasks has not been 
found to be due to methodological or other developmental factors (Pemer and Wimmer, 1985; 
Sullivan, Zaitchik and Tager-Flusburg, 1994; Wimmer and Pemer, 1983). Although, ToM tasks 
have been comprehensively criticised, research suggests that they do tap features associated with 
possessing a Theory of mind (Johnson, 2000, for a review of the literature).
Research has tended to be premised on a common guiding assumption that adults share a 
common ToM, and thus certain abilities (such as predicting action from false belief information). 
Therefore, studies simply investigated when do children ‘get’ the ability in question. For 
example, the most intensively researched question has concemed at what age children typically 
acquire first order ToM, the ability to conceive of (and reason about) someone having a false 
belief.
First order Theory o f  M ind tasks
Wimmer and Pemer (1983) were two of the first researchers to develop and use tasks to try and 
assess the understanding of false belief in typically developing children. In their ‘Maxi/location’ 
task the child participant observed a story enacted with a pair of dolls. One of these was a boy 
called Maxi, who left chocolate in a kitchen cupboard (location A), and then departed from the 
scene. In his absence, the other doll (his mother) entered and transferred the chocolate to another 
cupboard in the kitchen (location B). Maxi did not witness the transfer due to his absence, and 
therefore was ignorant that the chocolate had moved to a new location. The experimenter 
informed the child that Maxi was retuming to the kitchen to get his chocolate, and asked the child 
to judge where Maxi will look (Wimmer and Pemer, 1983). Consistently correct responses on
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this unexpected change ToM task were interpreted as evidence that children understood the role 
of beliefs in guiding behaviour and thus possess first order ToM.
Second order Theory o f  M ind tasks
Children’s ability to ‘solve’ first order ToM tasks, such as the Maxi story, indicated that they 
understood that other people can have different beliefs from themselves. However, the tasks did 
not reveal whether children understood that other people can have different beliefs, from a third 
person, which involves more complex social understanding, second ôrder ToM.
The ability to attribute second-order, or embedded, mental states (e.g “she thinks that he 
thinks...”) confers on children the capacity to understand not only a person’s perception of a 
social situation (first-order ToM) but also different individuals’ concern about the other’s mental 
states (second-order ToM) (e.g Pemer, 1991; Wellman, 1990). It is these sorts of attributions that 
underlie the majority of social reasoning necessary for any sophisticated understanding of human 
action.
Pemer and Wimmer (1985) designed a task to tap children’s understanding of second order ToM 
based on the same paradigm used to investigate understanding of first order ToM (Wimmer and 
Pemer, 1983). They presented children with stories in which two actors, John and Mary, saw an 
ice-cream van at the park where they were playing. Later, each actor was independently 
informed that the ice-cream van had moved from the park to the school, but neither knew that the 
other actor had been informed. Children were asked where John thought Mary would have gone 
to buy an ice-cream. To respond correctly, children must have taken into account John’s 
ignorance of Mary’s knowledge of the tme whereabouts of the ice-cream van..
Development of the ability to comprehend first and second order Theory of Mind tasks
Typically developing children
The main findings of research into the development of ToM in typically developing children 
indicate that children at age four pass first order ToM tasks, and go on to pass second-order ToM 
tasks at around the age of six (Pemer and Wimmer, 1985; Sullivan, Zaitchik and Tager-Flusburg, 
1994; Wimmer and Pemer, 1983). Findings showed more variability for the age of acquisition of 
second order belief understanding. However, under optimal conditions (e.g. children were given 
a critical memory aid before they were asked the question), many six and seven year olds
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succeeded, suggesting that there is at least a two year lag between first and second order belief 
attribution. These individual differences in performance on second order ToM tasks, with no 
sharp improvement at any single age level contrasted with findings that children generally show 
competence on first order ToM tasks at four years (Sullivan and Winner, 1993; Zaitchik, 1991).
Although a principal aim of most ToM research was to establish normative age trends in the 
understanding of mental state concepts, these studies also revealed considerable individual 
differences in the rate of development. These individual differehces included environmental 
factors such as interactions with siblings and conversations with caregivers, and individual factors 
such as verbal ability, gender and general intelligence (Dunn, Brown, Slomkowski, Tesla, and 
Youngblade, 1991; Pemer, Ruffman, and Leekam, 1994; Bartsch and Estes, 1996).
Children with an Autistic Spectrum Disorder
Baron-Cohen, Leslie, and Frith (1985) investigated the prediction that children with autism have 
deficits in ToM using a variation of Wimmer and Pemer’s (1983) ToM tasks. They tested 
children on the autistic spectrum, children with Down syndrome, and typically developing 
children. All children answered the control questions correctly indicating that they 
comprehended the story. However, whereas 86% of Down syndrome children and 85% of 
typically developing children answered the belief question correctly, only 20% of the children on 
the autistic spectrum did, despite exceeding the former two groups in both average chronological 
and mental age. The leaming disabled controls’ success was particularly irnportant, as it 
suggested that problems in ToM were specific to autism, and not simply due to developmental 
delay (Baron-Cohen et al, 1985, Baron-Cohen, 1989; Reed and Peterson, 1990). In addition, 
children on the autistic spectmm have been shown to be significantly impaired in ToM 
development compared to children with emotional disturbance (Frith, Happe, and Siddons, 1994), 
and specific language impairment (Leslie and Frith, 1988; Pemer et al., 1989).
Although, there has been variation within the research in the proportion of children on the autistic 
spectrum failing first order ToM tasks (as low as 10% in Dahlgren and Trillingsgaard, 1996, to 
40% in Prior, Dahlstrom, and Squires, 1990, and as high as 85% in Reed and Peterson, 1990) 
their failure on first order ToM tasks has been replicated in a significant number of studies with 
the majority of research reporting failure rates above 70% (Happe, 1995; Bowler and Strom, 
1998).
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Therefore, it appears that children on the autistic spectrum do show deficits in their ToM ability. 
However, apparently inconsistent with the hypothesis that autistic spectrum disorder is a 
consequence of a failure in the ToM mechanism, is the well documented existence of cognitively 
more able adult individuals with autism who pass ToM tasks. In Baron-Cohen et al’s (1985) 
study, 20% passed, and in a later study (1989) attempting to tackle this apparent disconfirmation 
of the theory, further adults were found to pass first but not second order ToM tasks. Apparently 
contradicting Baron-Cohen’s findings, both Bowler (1992) and Ozonoff et al. (1991) found that 
adults with Asperger syndrome and high-functioning autism^ could pass second order ToM tasks.
The ability to pass second order ToM tasks has also been found in children on the autistic 
spectrum. Studies found between 15% (Reed and Patterson, 1990) and 55% (Prior, Dahlstorm, 
and Squires, 1990) of children with autism successfully passing second order ToM tasks. 
Dahlgren and Trillingsgaard’s (1996) study found that 60% of children with autism and Asperger 
syndrome but no leaming-disability could pass second order ToM tasks.
Although, certain individuals with an autistic spectrum disorder pass the tasks, there is reason to 
believe that their understanding of mental states is different from the effortless automatic ToM of 
the typically developing child of an equivalent chronological age. Evidence for this suggestion 
includes, firstly, that they require much higher verbal ability to pass ToM tasks than do typically 
developing children, and do so at later ages (Happe, 1995). Secondly, even as adults they are 
prone to making tell-tale slips in mental state attribution, such as confusing sarcasm with reality, 
which suggests that they still have problems with understanding other people’s intentions (Happe, 
1994; 1995). Finally, their approach to social tasks has been said to resemble slow, conscious 
calculation unlike typically developing children (Happe et al, 1996). Researchers have examined 
this more able group on the autistic spectrum in order to see whether there were any characteristic 
differences from the ‘failure’ group. These differences could elucidate whether they are passing 
the ToM tasks using true ToM or ‘alternative strategies’ (Johnson, 2000, for a review of the 
literature).
 ^Asperger syndrome and high functioning autism are proposed to both lie on the autistic spectrum and 
refer to people with higher levels of cognitive functioning. Debate exists as to whether they are distinct
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Characteristics of people on the autistic spectrum passing first and second order Theory of 
Mind tasks.
Initially the focus was on possible relationships between ToM and verbal ability due to passers’ 
greater verbal ability (Bowler, 1992; Dahlgren and Trillingsgaard, 1996; Ozonoff, et al, 1991; 
Hughes, 1998), and secondly, chronological age, as ability to pass increases with age (Bowler, 
1992). Several studies have shown high correlations between ToM performance and verbal 
intelligence measures (Dahlgren and Trillingsgaard, 1996; Happe, 1995). Furthermore, the 
failure to find such correlations between ToM performance and nohverbal intelligence measures 
(Happe, 1993) also suggests a specific relationship between ToM and verbal ability. Studies also 
show correlations between ToM performance, verbal intelligence measures and chronological age 
(Dahlgren and Trillingsgaard, 1996; Happe, 1995).
Dahlgren and Trillingsgaard (1996) suggest that the best predictor for the ability to attribute 
mental states to others is a combination of language competence (Baron-Cohen, 1988; Leslie and 
Frith, 1988; Eisenmajer and Prior, 1991; Leekam and Prior, 1994; Ozonoff et al., 1991a,b; 
Peterson and Siegal, 1995; Sparrevohn and Howie, 1995) and general intellectual level. That is, 
the probability that children on the autistic spectrum will solve ToM tasks increases with the level 
of general intelligence, verbal intelligence and chronological age. However, this is modified by 
the ratio of discrepancy between chronological age and intellectual age appearing to be more 
important than intellectual age per se. For example, there is a major cognitive, social and 
emotional difference between a child with a chronological age and intellectual age of seven and 
an adult with a chronological age of twenty-five and a intellectual age of seven (Kinderman, 
Dunbar, and Bentall, 1998). However, research has shown children on the autistic spectrum 
failing ToM tasks with equivalent levels of intellectual ability and chronological age to children 
on the autistic spectrum who pass the tasks. Therefore, higher intellectual ability and 
chronological age may be necessary but are not necessarily sufficient to ensure success on ToM 
tasks, and it is not the case, as suggested (Eisnmajer and Prior, 1991), that failure is simply due to 
lack of verbal ability.
In summary, the probability that children with autism will solve ToM tasks increases with level of 
verbal intelligence, and a lower ratio between intellectual and chronological age. How does this 
inform our understanding of how children on the autistic spectrum are passing the tasks?
disorders on the spectrum (see Szatmari, Archer, Fisman, Streiner, and Wilson, 1995).
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Does passing Theory of Mind tasks indicate the presence of intact Theory o f Mind cognitive 
mechanisms?
Several possible explanations have been proposed for the findings that children on the autistic 
spectrum can pass ToM tasks. These explanations have been informed by the knowledge that 
intelligence and age are important factors in their ability to solve the tasks (Johnson, 2000, for a 
detailed discussion of the primary explanations). However, this study will address only one of 
the explanations; that their success could be seen not as proof of ToM ability, but rather as Frith, 
Morton and Leslie (1991) suggest, that they pass using a non-TôM strategy, ‘hacking out’ a 
solution. It is proposed that they are able to do this using a combination of experience (reflected 
in passers’ higher chronological age), and problem solving skills (reflected by passers’ higher 
level of intelligence). The strategy might be flexible enough to be applied successfully to slightly 
different forms of the same task, or might succeed only if the elements of visual access and 
information are spelled out (as they are in ToM and deception tasks, but not in life).
If children with autistic spectrum disorder passing ToM tasks succeed using a non-ToM strategy, 
this would explain why they are still socially handicapped because social situations are more 
complex than the tasks. For example, they may still show difficulties appreciating non-literal 
speech, such as indirect requests, sarcasm, jokes, and metaphorical expressions (Happe, 1993, 
1994; Ozonoff and Miller, 1996; Tantum, 1992). Thus, although, more able children on the 
autistic spectrum might be able to compute correct solutions to problems requiring ToM, they do 
so by slow and cumbersome methods, which disrupts the timing of their responses, making them 
appear odd in everyday social interactions (Happe et al, 1996).
Further support that they are using strategies rather than ToM to pass tasks comes from the 
recognition that neither first nor second order tasks are complex tests of ToM. Adherence to 
these sorts of tasks leaves the impression that ToM does not develop beyond this level. Yet 
passing these tasks should be considered as relatively early points in the acquisition of a ToM, 
rather than the endpoint. They are probes for four or six-year-old level skills and thus ceiling 
effects occur with individuals with an intellectual age above six years (Pemer and Winner, 1985). 
Baron-Cohen, JoUiffe, Mortimore, and Robertson (1997) state that “Perhaps if they had been 
labeled as such, no-one would have thought of them as suitable tests of whether an adult with 
autism has a fully functioning ToM”.
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Considering the number of studies conducted in this field, it is surprising that, with a few 
exceptions (e.g. Chandler and Helm, 1984; Happe, 1994), we know little about how ToM 
develops beyond the age of approximately seven years, when understanding of second-order false 
beliefs reliably emerges in typically developing children (Pemer and Wimmer, 1985). Recently, 
Happe, Winner, and Brownell (1998) conducted investigations into ToM development in older 
adults (sixty to eighty years), finding superior ToM ability compared to younger adults (sixteen to 
thirty years), thus suggesting that social understanding does continue to develop with age. This 
could be seen as evidence supporting the proposal that the passing df first and second order ToM 
tasks at an older age could be subject to ceiling effects, as the abilities appear to continue to 
develop after the acquisition of second order ToM. Therefore, the passing of the tasks at an older 
chronological age than seven does not necessarily indicate the presence of an intact ToM.
The consistent finding that a proportion of children on the autistic spectrum can pass the tasks, 
and the suggestion that ToM continues to develop past the age of seven, has resulted in 
researchers creating further ToM tasks. These tasks were designed to enable an advanced 
assessment to be made of the presence of ToM abilities involved in understanding the more subtle 
and complex mental states found in everyday life.
Advanced tests of Theory of Mind
Advanced ToM tasks have attempted to counter ceiling effects and provide more contextually 
realistic tasks in which it is harder to ‘hack out’ the mental state answer. Baron-Cohen, JoUiffe, 
Mortimore, and Robertson, (1997); Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, and JoUiffe, 1997; and Happe, 
(1994) produced three more “advanced” tests of ToM. This research focuses on Happe’s 
advanced ToM task, ‘Strange Stories’ as they are used more extensively than the other two tasks 
in clinical practice (Baron-Cohen, O’Riordan, Stone, Jones and Plaisted, 1999).
Happe’s (1994) study was the first to take ceiling effects of ToM tests seriously. Happe tested 
people with autism on an ‘advanced’ ToM task aimed at a typically developing eight to nine year 
old child’s level. In addition to the clinical group. Happe presented the task to a group with 
leaming disabilities, and a group of typically developing adults and children. The task was a 
series of vignettes or ‘Strange Stories’ where people say things they do not mean literally, e.g. 
idioms, white lies and jokes. The twenty-four stories comprised twelve story types: Pretence, Lie, 
White lie. Joke, Idiom, Misunderstanding, Double bluff. Sarcasm, Persuasion,
Doctorate of Psychology (PsychD) in Clinical Psychology 263
Large Scale Research Project
Appearance/reality, Contrary emotion and Forgetting. These stories provided a more naturalistic, 
contextually embedded, realistic challenge than first and second order ToM tasks. The 
naturalistic stories and absence of test questions drawing attention to salient elements (a feature of 
other ToM tasks) were intended to reveal difficulties that even the most cognitively able people 
with autism appear to have in applying their social knowledge to everyday life (Happe, 1994). 
The task involved story comprehension where key questions either concemed a character’s 
mental state (Strange Stories) or physical effects (Control stories). The stories were written so 
people without social deficits would interpret motivation behind ah utterance in one way. The 
control stories were presented to test the understanding of physical events and check the 
generality of any comprehension deficit.
Happe (1994) scored each participant’s performance on the stories and then compared the four 
groups’ average scores using statistical analysis. The results indicated that a participant’s 
performance on ‘Strange Stories’ was analogous to their performance on standard ToM tests. In 
addition, the stories appeared to reveal impairments in social understanding in even the most 
cognitively able people on the autistic spectrum who passed first and second order ToM tests. 
Happe found that people on the autistic spectmm had more difficulty with mental state stories 
than matched controls, using fewer appropriate mental state terms in their explanations of a 
character’s behaviour. However, they tended to give the same number of mental state 
explanations as the typically developing groups, but these tended to be inappropriate to the 
situation. The ability o f people with autism to correctly answer the ‘Joke’, ‘Lie’ and ‘Persuasion’ 
stories, improved as a function of their ability to pass earlier ToM tasks. Furthermore, results 
suggested that Appearance/reality and Forgetting stories were too easy and Sarcasm and Double 
bluff stories were too difficult for a person on the autistic spectmm. Happe proposed that failure 
could be due to the fact that they needed to be understood at a third order ToM level; there is an 
extra level of embedding, participants have to metarepresent “he knows they think he will lie”, 
rather than “he knows he will lie”.
Happe concluded that the ‘Strange Stories’ were a valid measure of advanced ToM skills, which 
revealed deficits in even the most cognitively able person on the autistic spectrum, for example, 
context-inappropriate mental state explanations. Happe suggested that they did not have an 
intact ToM, and instead were using alternative strategies to solve first and second order ToM 
tasks.
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Criticisms of the study
However, the study was subject to limitations, particularly in relation to the sample. For 
example, the typically developing adults were college and university students and therefore, not 
representative of the range of cognitive ability within the general population. In addition, the 
average chronological age of the people on the autistic spectrum was 20 years; consequently, 
their ability to pass could be a function of social learning. Finally, the sample of typically 
developing children was small (twenty-six) and from a limited age range (seven to nine years). 
The typically developing children showed particular difficulty in’certain stories, for example, 
those based on sarcasm. Therefore it is unclear whether failure of any of the autistic spectrum 
participants was due to developmental level or ToM deficits. Consequently, indicating the need 
for an understanding of typically developing children’s ToM development over the age of nine. 
Furthermore, each story type, such as Pretence, contains two stories. The study showed no 
investigation of whether the mental state understanding underlying the two stories was equally 
salient to the participants. For example, that they answer both Joke stories with the same mental 
state explanation.
Replication of Happe’s stories with adults on the autistic spectrum.
Jolliffe and Baron-Cohen (1999) independently replicated Happe’s (1994) original study and 
aimed to find out whether her original findings of a tendency to give context-inappropriate mental 
state explanations would be maintained in adults with autism. It also sought to extend her 1994 
study, answering some of the methodological criticisms. When their study compared the groups’ 
scores on the stories, the results replicated Happe’s main findings. Thus, on the ‘Strange Stories’, 
the clinical group (adults with an autistic spectrum disorder, aged between eighteen and forty nine 
years), was equivalent to the control group (typically developing adults, aged between eighteen 
and forty nine years) in the number of mental state justifications used. What distinguished the 
clinical participants was not a failure to use mental state terms (including emotion terms like 
“hurt”) but a failure to use the appropriate mental state term for the story’s context. In 
comparison to the control group the clinical group made significantly more context-inappropriate 
mental state justifications and significantly fewer test-appropriate mental state justifications, 
suggesting a weakness in processing mental state information in context.
The fact that the clinical group did not fail to provide answers suggests that they did not have a 
problem in generating responses or any tendency to be less willing to make a response. Similarly,
Doctorate of Psychology (PsychD) in Clinical Psychology 265
Large Scale Research Project
the fact that the clinical group did not differ on number of mental state answers suggests that they 
did not have a problem in producing mentalistic answers, rather as stated previously, problems 
providing context-appropriate mentalistic answers.
Jolliffe and Baron-Cohen (1999) were able to answer some of the criticisms of Happe’s (1994) 
study, and reinforced the finding that the stories were accessing more advanced ToM 
understanding. People on the autistic spectrum seemed to show characteristic deficits in 
advanced ToM reflected in impaired social interactions despite being able to pass first and second 
order ToM tasks (Baron-Cohen, O’Riordan, Stone, Jones, and Plaisted, 1999). Research suggests 
that this could be due to an inability to apply their knowledge of mental states (acquired through 
social learning and/or limited ToM capability) to the appropriate social situation.
Clinical implications
As, historically, cognitively able people with autism have often been difficult to identify within 
the wider population due to their more subtle social impairments, they are not necessarily brought 
to the attention of services; instead possibly being simply labelled as eccentric by the general 
population. Happe’s ‘Strange Stories’ could be a valuable clinical tool in the diagnostic process, 
as they seem to identify ToM problems in the most cognitively able people on the autistic 
spectrum. In addition, to aiding differential diagnosis, Happe’s advanced ToM task ‘Strange 
Stories’ could be used to identify particular difficulties a child has with social understanding such 
as sarcasm, consequently informing an intervention such as a social skills group aimed at 
teaching ToM.
In addition, the stories could be used as an outcome measure in the clinical evaluation of an 
intervention. This is due to the fact that the ‘Strange Stories’ unlike first and second order ToM 
tasks, could possibly be developed into a parallel form, on account of the existence of the two 
vignettes for each type of social understanding. One vignette could be used before and one after 
treatment, thereby countering the phenomena of practice effects that other ToM tasks are subject 
to with their single form.
Further questions that need to be asked.
However, before Happe’s advanced ToM task ‘Strange Stories’ can be employed knowledge is 
required of the ability of children on the autistic spectrum to answer the stories, as Happe’s
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(1994) research used participants with a mean age of nineteen years, therefore predominantly 
adults. This is an important factor as in general autistic spectrum disorders are diagnosed in early 
to middle childhood. In addition, the finding that typically developing children display errors on 
the stories means that normative data needs to be constructed to document the variability in 
answers from the various age groups within this group. This information could then be used to 
inform clinicians of the possible developmental stages in the acquisition of ToM. Finally, there is 
currently no evidence that all the stories in the twelve sets are as good in identifying deficits in 
ToM ability or if the pair of stories in each type are equally effective in tapping the proposed 
mental state.
This research proposes to obtain normative data on the ‘Strange Stories’ from a group of typically 
developing children across the chronological ages of seven to eleven, and compare their 
performance with the performance of children of a similar age on the more cognitively able end 
of the autistic spectrum.
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Prim ary Hypothesis
The typically developing children will achieve a higher total score on the ‘Strange Stories’ 
compared to the children on the autistic spectrum. A higher score indicates better performance on 
the stories.
Secondary Hypotheses
There will be a positive effect of age on the total scores on the ‘Strange Stories’ in the typically 
developing group, that is the older the chronological age of the child the higher the total score.
There will be a positive effect of age on the total scores on the ‘Strange Stories’ in the autistic 
spectrum group, that is the older the chronological age of the child the higher the total score.
There will be a positive effect of verbal attribute score (an indication of verbal intelligence) on 
the total scores on the ‘Strange Stories’ in the autistic spectrum group, that is the higher the verbal 
attribute score, the higher the total score.
The two stories in a story type pair will be answered with the same type of mental state response 
by the typically developing group.
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Method
Approval for the study was obtained from Guy’s Research Ethics Committee (see Appendix 1), 
and Lewisham Research Ethics Committee (see Appendix 2).
Participants
Participants with an autistic spectrum disorder.
The participants were identified through two Child Development centres. Criteria for inclusion 
were that they must fulfil the DSM-IV (American Psychiatric Assçciation, 1994) criteria for an 
autistic spectrum disorder, and have a Verbal IQ greater than 70, as Happe (1994) found that 
people require a Verbal IQ of 70 or higher to answer the stories. Professionals from the two 
multi-disciplinary teams had made the diagnosis (independent of the present research), using a 
comprehensive assessment process involving developmental, cognitive, and language 
assessments, and standardised clinical tools such as the Autism Diagnostic Interview (ADI) 
(LeCouteur, Rutter, and Lord, 1989).
Thirty-four children aged between seven and thirteen with the diagnosis of autistic spectrum 
disorder were identified. Their parents were contacted by letter, which informed them about 
study and asked for consent for their child to be included in the research. Thirty families 
consented. In addition to a diagnosis of autistic spectrum disorder, the children had to be able to 
pass first and second order ToM tasks.
All of the thirty children were visited at home and administered first and second order ToM tasks 
(see procedure). If they passed these tasks they were given two verbal sub-tests: Information, and 
Vocabulary from the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children- third edition (WISC-III) 
(Wechsler, 1991), which were prorated to ascertain the child’s verbal abilities. All those who 
scored over 70 were included in the final sample and were given the twenty-four ‘Strange 
Stories’. The final sample comprised fifteen children who had successfully passed both first and 
second order ToM tasks. They were considered the best candidates for possessing ‘true’ ToM, as 
their performance was analogous on both levels.
Typically developing participants.
Ninety children between the ages of seven and eleven in mainstream education were recruited 
from primary schools in Bristol, county of North Somerset, and the borough of Lewisham,
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London. When selecting the schools a directory of demographic information was consulted in 
order to achieve a representative sample that would be comparable to the region from which the 
sample of children on the autistic spectrum were recruited. This procedure aimed to reduce the 
possible impact of environmental factors, such as socio-economic status.
All parents of children between the ages of seven and eleven in the schools (a total of 240), were 
sent an information sheet (see Appendix 3), and letter (see Appendix 4), informing them of the 
aim of the study, procedures involved and confidentiality. The age range of the children was 
narrower than the autistic spectrum disorder participants, as it was expected that they would 
perform better than the clinical group. Parents agreed for their children to be involved by 
returning a signed consent form to the school. Parents were given additional information on 
autistic spectrum disorders on request. None of the parents solicited this information. In total, 
one hundred and three parents (43 per cent) gave consent for their child to be involved.
Children were excluded from the sample if they were on a Code of Practice (Department for 
Education and Employment, 2000). In addition, children were excluded if they were unable to 
pass the second order ToM task administered at the beginning of the testing session (see 
procedure). The first order theory of mind tasks were not given as it was assumed that they 
would be able to pass the tasks at their chronological age if they were typically developing. 
Ninety-two children out of the one hundred and three children in the sample met the criteria and 
were given the ‘Strange Stories’ (nine children were on a code of practice, five were off sick in 
the testing week).
Participant characteristics
Summary information for the participants is presented in Table 1.
Table I - Summary information for participants in the stucfy displayed by group.
Group Typically Developing (n = 90) Autistic spectrum (n = 15).
Mean Range Mean Range
Age (years) 9.12 (s.d= 1.17) 7 - 1 1 10.13 (s.d= 1.64) 7 - 1 3
Gender Male Female Male Female
42 48 13 2
Verbal Attributes Score Mean Range
12.6 (s.d = 3.64) 7 - 1 9
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An unrelated t-test indicated that the typically developing and autistic spectrum participants did 
differ significantly in terms of age (Unequal variance assumed: t = 2.290, d.f = 16.448, p = 
0.036). This was an expected result as the two groups were selected from different age ranges. 
Statistical significance was not calculated for the variable gender as it would be expected that 
autistic spectrum participants would be predominantly male due to the higher number of males in 
the clinical population, for example, from 3:1 in Gillberg (1995) to 15:1 in Wing (1981). The 
mainstream sample comprised approximately equal numbers of male and female participants. A 
verbal attributes score was obtained for the autistic spectrum participants. The verbal attribute 
score was calculated by averaging the two scaled scores from the WISC-III verbal sub-tests; 
Information and Vocabulary. The mean score for the group was 12.6 with a range of 7 -  19. 
This mean verbal attribute score was in the high average range of cognitive functioning (prorated 
Verbal IQ score) .
Materials
Table 2 details which measures were administered to the two groups. Table 3 shows the names of 
the two stories in each type of story, for example. Pretence (Banana and Ship). Details of the 
administration and construction of the measures are in the procedure. The ‘Strange Stories’ can 
be found in Appendix 5.
Table 2 - Measures usedfor each group in the study
Items
■ " ■ ■ ' ' ■
Typically
developing
Autistic
spectrum
Information and Vocabulary sub-tests -  
Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children 
(WISC-III) -  Wechsler (1991).
No Yes
 ^ First order Theory of Mind task
‘Sally-Anne task’ - Baron-Cohen et al. (1985). No Yea
‘Smarties task’ -  Perner et al. (1989). No Yes
: - Second order Theory of Mind task «3=
‘Ice cream van’ - Baron-Cohen (1989). Yes Yes
' ;,V : , Advanced Theory of Mind task
‘Strange Stories’ -  Happe (1994). Yes Yes
Doctorate of Psychology (PsychD) in Clinical Psychology 271
Large Scale Research Project
Table 3 - Set of Strange Stories ’ (Happe, 1994).
Type of Story Story A . Story B Type of Story Story A Story B
Pretence Banana Ship Double Bluff Soldier Ping-pong
Lie Vase Dentist Sarcasm Picnic Politeness
Joke Elephant Haircut Persuasion Kittens Sausages
White Lie Rabbit Hat Contrary , 
Emotion
Swings Painting
Idiom Pigsty Cough Appearance/
Reality
Ghost Santa
Misunderstanding . Glove Peabody ... Forget Doll School
Procedure
Administration of all the measures was carried out according to the procedures used in previous 
research. These are detailed below. All the typically developing and autistic spectrum 
participants were tested individually in a quiet room free from distractions. The room was either 
at the participant’s home (autistic spectrum disorder group) or at school (typically developing 
group).
Theory o f  M ind tasks
First and second order ToM tasks were administered to all autistic spectrum participants.
First order Theory o f  M ind tasks.
The participants were shown Baron-Cohen’s (1985) “Sally Anne” task.
The ‘Sallv Anne’ task.
The examiner manipulated two puppets: one puppet, Sally, had hidden a marble in a basket and 
then left the scene. While she was gone, another puppet, Anne, moved the marble to a box. Sally 
returned and the participants were asked, “Where will Sally first look for her marble?” This was 
followed by two control questions, the reality control question, “Where was the marble now?” 
and the memory control question, “Where did Sally put the marble at the beginning?” All 
participants were required to pass the control questions in order for their responses to the ToM 
question to be considered correct.
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The ‘Smarties’ task (Pemer, Leekam, and Wimmer, 1987) was presented to the participants.
The ‘Smarties’ task
The participants were shown a smarties tube and asked, “What is inside?” After answering they 
were shown that there was actually a pencil. They were then asked what another person who had 
not seen the ‘real’ contents would think was in the tube. Participants with first order ToM should 
have answered “smarties”. They were then asked, “What was really in the tube?” and “What they 
had thought was in the tube in the beginning”. The latter question was asked to ascertain whether 
they were aware that their mental representation had changed and thus showed awareness of their 
own thoughts.
Second order Theory o f  M ind task
The second order ToM task ‘Ice-cream van’ (Baron-Cohen, 1989) was given to both the typically 
developing and autistic spectrum participants. Before hearing the story the participants were 
shown key locations and the characters were named. The experimenter presented the story 
verbatim as shown in Appendix 6. Throughout the story, the experimenter enacted the events. 
Probe and control questions were asked, which are also shown in Appendix 6. The purpose of the 
probe questions was to ensure that the participants were following the story and had correctly 
encoded and remembered the key events. The two control questions were included to assess the 
participants’ understanding of first order knowledge or ignorance (e.g. “Does Mary know where 
the ice-cream cart is?”). One of the two control questions also served as a linguistic control 
because it had the same syntactic structure as the second order ignorance question (e.g. Does John 
know that the ice cream man told Mary he was going to the school?”). Across the probe and 
control questions the number of questions requiring ‘yes’ and ‘no’ responses was carefully 
balanced to avoid response bias. After each probe and control question was answered, feedback 
or correction was provided to the participants. Finally, there were two test questions for which no 
feedback was provided: the second order ignorance question, and the second order ToM question. 
These were asked as open ended questions; however, if the participant gave no response, then a 
forced choice format was used (e.g. Does John know that Mary knows where the ice cream man 
is?” or “Does John not know that Mary knows where the ice cream man is?” The presentation 
order of the forced choice responses was counterbalanced across participants. Before the second 
order ToM question, participants were provided with a memory aid detailed in Appendix 6.
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Wechsler Intelligence Scale fo r  Children (III) (Wechsler, 1991).
If the autistic spectrum participants passed the first and second order ToM tasks, they were then 
given the Vocabulary and Information verbal sub-tests from the WISC-III according to 
standardised procedures in the manual.
‘Strange Stories ’ -  advanced Theory o f  M ind task (Happe, 1994).
If the autistic spectrum disorder and typically developing participants met inclusion criteria then 
the ‘Strange Stories’ (Happe, 1994) were administered. The participants were asked for their 
consent at the beginning of the testing session. They were also informed at the beginning of the 
testing session that they were able to stop at any point and not continue with the stories. This 
point was repeated half way through the testing session. No participants from either the typically 
developing or autistic spectrum groups opted not to complete the stories.
The set of “Strange Stories” consisted of 24 short vignettes, each accompanied by a picture and 
two test questions: the comprehension question “ Was it true, what X said?” and the justification 
question “Why did X say that?” There were twelve types of story, and two examples of each 
story type, shown in Table 2. Each story with its accompanying questions was printed on white 
A5 sheets. The story was also illustrated by a small black and white line drawing depicting the 
significant characters mentioned in the story. These line drawings were simple, but showed 
emotional expressions and the contextual setting. All stories had an identifying word label that 
appeared in the top right hand comer to facilitate scoring.
The experimenter shuffled the ‘Strange Stories’ thoroughly before they were given to the 
participants. The stories were therefore presented in a randomised order to each individual. This 
was done to ensure that any significant effects were not due to story order. As a further safeguard 
the experimenter made sure that the two examples of each type of story never appeared together.
The set of stories was introduced as follows; “Here are some stories, and some questions. I am 
going to read out the stories and I would like you to listen carefully, and help me with the 
questions at the end of each story.” Each story was read out to the participants except where the 
participants preferred to read the story out loud to the experimenter. The story remained in front 
of the participants throughout to minimise memory requirements. At the end of the story, the 
participants were asked the two (or sometimes three) test questions. The first question, “Was it
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true, what X said?” was treated as a test of comprehension. Therefore, although the first response 
was recorded, if the answer was wrong the story was read out again until the participants 
answered correctly or justified their answer and appeared to understand (e.g. it is not literally true, 
but it is not a lie). The second question, “Why did X say that?” was then asked and the 
participants’ responses were noted in full on the score sheet, for later analysis. Positive 
comments were made throughout the testing session to encourage the participants, but no 
feedback was given about the correctness of the answers. Administration was adjusted to the 
requirements of the participants, with repetition of the story of questions where necessary. 
Prompts were given only in order to establish sufficient understanding of each story to correctly 
answer the “Was it true?” question. So, for example, participants might be reminded in the White 
lie story that Peter did not like his aunt’s hat, by the additional prompt, “What did Peter think of 
the new hat?” The participants were given as long as necessary and were encouraged to read the 
story a second or third time for themselves in order to facilitate their explanation for the story 
character’s utterance. All participants finished the stories in one session, although sessions varied 
in length from twenty to forty minutes.
Scoring procedure for the ‘Strange Stories’
Scoring was based on Happe’s scoring procedure (Happe, 1994) and Happe was consulted by the 
author before scoring began. Participants were scored for both their answers to the 
comprehension and “Why?” questions. For the comprehension question, participants’ original 
responses were noted, along with any amendments. The justification given in response to the 
“Why” question were rated as either correct or incorrect. A justification could be incorrect 
because it involved errors about the facts given in the story, or because it involved an inference 
that was inappropriate as a reason for the story character’s utterance. For example, in the Pretend 
story (Banana), in which Emma is playing with a banana and pretending it is a phone, the 
justification “Emma is about to eat the banana,” would be scored as incorrect because it includes 
a factual error. A justification that “Emma was only joking” would also be scored as incorrect, 
because in the context of the story it is not appropriate to interpret the utterance as a joke.
The correct justifications were also scored as either involving psychological (mental) states or 
physical states. Many of the story character’s utterances could be justified correctly either in 
terms of psychological or physical states. For example, in the Joke story where the boy calls a 
dog an elephant, this can be correctly explained by the physical justification, “The dog is big like
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an elephant,” or the psychological state justification “He is just joking.” Psychological state 
answers included all those that referred to thoughts, feelings, desires, traits, and dispositions. 
Psychological state justifications included terms such as like, want, happy, cross, afraid, know, 
think, joke, pretend, lie, please, hurt, expect and to fool. Justifications were scored as physical 
state when they referred to non-mental events, such as physical appearance, action of objects, 
physical events, and outcomes. Physical state answers included terms such as big, looks like, to 
get rid of them, to sell them, because of the X (object), or to not get a physical outcome such as 
being put in jail, having a filling, getting told off, or mugged.
In addition, a correct psychological answer was given two points if it was a full and complete 
answer. For example, in the Persuasion (Sausage) story where Brian tries to get more sausages, 
an answer referring to an intention to mislead, persuade or make another character feel sorry for 
him would be awarded two points, whereas an answer that alluded to rather than specified, mental 
state knowledge such as referring to the outcome (to get more), simple trait (greedy), or simple 
desire (wants more sausages) would only get one point. It was also noted if participants gave an 
inappropriate mental state. In each case a single score was given per story, giving the participants 
credit for their “best” answer. That is, if participants gave one correct answer and one 
inappropriate answer, the correct answer was taken. Similarly, if a participant’s answer alluded 
to or mentioned both physical and psychological states, the justification would be scored as 
psychological state.
In summary, participants obtained a score for their ‘best answer’. They could either give a 
correct psychological (mental state) or physical answer. A mental state answer was either scored 
as one or two points depending on its complexity. The total score obtainable for the ‘Strange 
Stories’ ranged from 0 to 48.
Reliability of scoring
As mentioned previously. Dr Francesca Happe, author of the ‘Strange Stories’ (Happe, 1994), 
was consulted regarding the scoring criteria. The subjective judgement involved in scoring the 
justifications made a reliability check necessary. A second rater, naïve to the hypothesis being 
tested, and blind to the identity and diagnosis of the subjects, was given thirty participants’ 
answers randomly selected from the two groups. The second rater was asked to score the 
participants’ answers according to the scoring criteria. The degree of concordance was calculated
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for each story type separately, and ranged from 93% to 100%. In all, 27 justifications received 
discordant ratings; 12 of these were given by the typically developing participants, and 15 by the 
autistic spectrum participants'*.
A third rater rated the discordant stories. An average score was then taken from the three scores.
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Results
The stories were scored according to Happe’s criteria outlined in the method. A total score for 
each participant was then calculated. Various checks had to be made on the data in order to 
address the main hypothesis that the typically developing group performed better than the autistic 
spectrum group on the ‘Strange Stories’ using statistical analysis, specifically that there was no 
significant difference between the two groups in their comprehension of the stories. In addition, 
that gender was not an influencing factor on performance, as the typically developing group 
comprised 53% of females compared to the autistic spectrum group jvith only 13% of females.
Linguistic comprehension
On the ‘Strange Stories’ all but 8 participants; six of the typically developing participants and two 
of the autistic spectrum participants, scored 24 out of 24 on their first attempt at the “Is it true?” 
question, which was regarded as a measure of linguistic comprehension. These errors were 
mainly due to confusion over the sense of ‘true’ intended in the question (e.g. in the Sarcasm -  
Politeness story some participants said that although the mother’s statement was not literally true, 
it was not untrue to use that expression as she “Was being sarcastic”). Mann-Whitney statistical 
analysis showed that the two groups did not differ significantly on the number of incorrect first 
answers to the “Is it true?” question. Overall, these findings suggested that both groups were able 
to comprehend the stories to the same level, and therefore any subsequent incorrect answer was 
not due to a lack of verbal understanding.
Does gender affect the typically developing participants ’ total score on the tests?
Previous research (Bartsch and Estes, 1996) has indicated that females can show earlier 
acquisition of ToM abilities. Therefore, before the typically developing participants’ answers 
were analysed as a group, an unrelated t-test^ was carried out to see whether gender affected total 
score on the stories. The males’ mean score on the stories was 27.00 (s.d 5.96) and the females’ 
mean score on the stories was 28.02 (s.d 5.68). An unrelated t-test with gender as the 
independent variable and total score as the dependent variable indicated that gender did not 
significantly affect total score on the stories (t = -0.831, d.f = 88, p = 0.408). Thus, the results did 
not have to be split by gender for the general analysis.
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Comparison of the performance of the two groups on the ‘Strange Stories’.
Do typically developing participants have a higher total score on the stories than the autistic 
spectrum participants?
Total scores for the groups showed normal distribution as indicated by a histogram and 
calculation of z scores, thus permitting the use of parametric statistical tests. The mean score was 
29.41 (standard deviation = 5.48) out of a possible total of 48 for the typically developing 
participants, with a range of 14 to 40. The mean score was 26.27 (standard deviation = 9.50) out 
of a possible total of 48 for the autistic spectrum participants, with a’range of 1 to 38.
Due to the difference in the number of participants in each group, Levene’s test for equality of 
variances was carried out to test for homogeneity of variance needed to validate the use of a t-test 
with assumed variance. The test was significant (F = 6.734, p = 0.011), and therefore variance 
was heterogeneous between the groups. T-tests used in analysis were therefore based on equal 
variances not assumed. An unrelated t-test showed no significant difference between the two 
groups (independent variable) and total score (dependent variable), (equal variance not assumed: t 
= 1.247, d.f = 103, p = 0.231). This suggested that there was no difference in the performance of 
the two groups on the stories.
This was an unexpected result. However, as previous research has shown that people on the 
autistic spectrum are more likely to provide physically based answers to stories (Happe, 1994), it 
was possible that the autistic spectrum participants’ scores comprised a higher proportion of 
correct physically based answers compared to the typically developing participants. Therefore, a 
difference may have been found if they were only given credit for mental state answers. Further 
analysis was carried out to identify whether a scoring system that only gave a score for correct 
mental state answers and not physical state answers would reveal differences. This was an 
alteration to Happe’s study and scoring procedure. However, only scoring an answer correct if it 
referred to a mental state was in accordance with the use of the stories as an advanced ToM task. 
Consequently, with the new mental state scoring system the correct physical state answers were 
categorised as being incorrect as they did not refer to a mental state^.
 ^Total scores for the typically developing group showed normal distribution as indicated by a histogram 
and calculation of z scores, thus permitting the use of parametric statistical tests.
 ^It is important to note that this does not mean that the physical state answers were not literally correct.
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Adapted scoring system
The justifications given by the participants in response to the “Why?” question were scored as 
correct or incorrect. A correct mental state answer either scored two points or one point 
depending on its complexity, generating a total possible score of 48 (same criteria as with 
Happe’s scoring). An incorrect answer was given as 0, but to ensure that information was not lost 
was either rated as a physical state answer, incorrect mental state answer or don’t know.
Typical answers given by the participants for each story and the appropriate scoring are contained 
in Appendix 7, with examples from the Persuasion -  Sausage story detailed in Table 4.
Table 4 - Example o f the adapted scoring system.
Brian is always hungry. Today at school it is his favourite meal -  sausages and beans. He is a very greedy 
boy, and he would like to have more than anybody else, even though his mother will have made him a 
lovely tea when he gets home! But everyone is allowed two sausages and no more. When it is Brian’s turn 
to be served, he says, “Oh, please can I  have four sausages, because I  won V be having any tea when I  get 
home!”
Is it true, what Brian says? Why does he say that?
Two point mental state answer -  ‘He wanted her to feel sorry for him, to persuade her to give him
more sausages’.
One point mental state answer -  ‘He is hungry and wanted to get more’.
Incorrect mental state answer -  ‘He doesn’t want to have any tea’.
Physical answer - ‘To get more sausages’.
Do typically developing participants have a higher total score on the stories than the autistic 
spectrum participants with the altered scoring criterion?
The individual groups both showed normal distribution of their total score as indicated by z 
scores. The mean score was 27.54 (standard deviation = 5.80) out of a possible total of 48 for the 
typically developing participants. The mean score was 23.73 (standard deviation = 9.75) out of a 
possible total of 48 for the autistic spectrum participants. However, again due to the difference in 
the number of participants in each group, a Levene’s test for equality of variances was carried out 
to test for the homogeneity of variance needed to validate the use of a t-test with assumed 
variance. The test was significant (F = 6.517, p = 0.12), and therefore variance was 
heterogeneous between the groups. T-tests used in analysis were therefore based on equal 
variances not assumed. An unrelated t-test showed no significant difference between the two 
groups (independent variable) and total score (dependent variable), (equal variance not assumed; t
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= 1.47, d.f = 103, p = 0.161). This suggested that there was no difference in the performance of 
the two groups on the stories despite the revised scoring criterion.
Although there was no statistical difference between the two groups’ total scores, they could have 
been performing differently on individual stories that could act as possible discriminators 
between the two groups. For example, the total number of two and one point answers given for 
the stories. Therefore a comparative analysis of the types of answers given by the two groups 
was conducted. ’
How did the two groups ’performance compare to each other on the individual stories?
The twenty-four stories comprised twelve story types: Pretence, Lie, White lie. Joke, Idiom, 
Misunderstanding, Double bluff. Sarcasm, Persuasion, Appearance/reality, Contrary emotion and 
Forget. The two groups of participants’ answers were examined to see how they performed on 
each story type. Table 5 shows the percentage for each type of answer (mental state: combined 
one and two point answers; or incorrect answers: physical, incorrect mental state, and don’t 
know), for each story type. The table expresses the numbers in each group as a percentage to 
enable a comparison between the two different size groups: autistic spectrum and typically 
developing.
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Table 5 - Percentage o f mental state and incorrect answers given by the groups for each story type. 
Typically developing group; total n = 90 Autistic spectrum group: total n = 15
(n = x) equates to the number o f participants giving that type o f answer in the group.
Type of story Mental state answer Incorrect answer
Typically dev. Autistic
spectrum
Typically dev. Autistic
spectrum
Pretence 90% 77% 10% 23%
(n = 81) (n = l l ) (n = 9) (n = 4)
Lie 87% 87% , 13% 13%
(n = 78) (n = 13) (n = 12) (n = 2)
Joke 28% 27% 72% 73%
(n = 25) (n = 4) (n = 65) ( n = l l )
White Lie 94% 83% 6% 17%
(n = 85) (n = 12) (n = 5) (n = 3)
Idiom 45% 43% 55% 57%
(n = 41) (n = 6) (n = 49) (n = 9)
Misunderstanding 81% 67% 19% 33%
(n = 73) (n = 10) (n=17) (n = 5)
Double Bluff 52% 63% 48% 37%
(n = 47) (n = 9) (n = 43) (n = 6)
Sarcasm 72% 70% 28% 30%
(n = 65) ( n = l l ) (n = 25) (n = 4)
Persuasion 87% 80% 13% 20%
(n = 78) (n = 12) (n = 12) (n = 3)
Contrary emotion 88% 77% 12% 23%
(n = 79) (n = 12) (n = 11) (n = 3)
Appearance/reality 74% 47% 26% 53%
(n = 67) (n = 7) (n = 23) (n = 8)
Forget 18% 7% 82% 93%
(n=  16) (n = 1) (n = 74) (n = 14)
Typically developing participants.
Table 5 indicates that at least seventy five per cent of the typically developing participants 
appeared to find it easier to give mental state answers for the story types of Lie, White Lie, 
Pretence, Contrary Emotion, Misunderstanding and Persuasion. At least fifty per cent of the 
participants gave a correct mental state answer for the Appearance/Reality, Double Bluff and 
Sarcasm story types. At least twenty five percent of the participants gave a correct mental state 
answer for the Joke and Idiom stories. Finally, only eighteen per cent of the participants were 
able to give a correct mental state answer to the Forget stories.
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Autistic spectrum participants.
Table 5 indicates that at least seventy five per cent of the autistic spectrum participants appeared 
to find it easier to give mental state answers for the story types of Lie, White Lie, Pretence, 
Contrary Emotion and Persuasion. At least fifty per cent of the participants gave a correct mental 
state answer for the Misunderstanding, Double Bluff and Sarcasm story types. At least twenty 
five percent of the participants gave a correct mental state answer for the Joke, Idiom, and 
Appearance/Reality stories. Finally, only seven per cent of the participants were able to give a 
correct mental state answer to the Forget stories.
A two way cross tabulation analysis was conducted between groups to ascertain which of the two 
groups were significantly more or less likely than chance to give a one point mental state answer, 
a two point mental state answer, or an incorrect answer to each individual story. Group was the 
independent variable, with type of answer (one point mental state, two point mental state, or 
incorrect) as the dependent variable. A summary of the results is shown in Table 6. Only three 
stories reached significance; Pretence -  Ship (Chi-squared = = 9.00, d.f., 2, p = 0.011),
Misunderstanding -  Peabody (Chi-squared = X  ^= 7.32, d.f, 2, p = 0.026) and Appearance/Reality 
-  Santa (Chi-squared = X  ^= 14.835, d.f., 2, p = 0.001). Two stories also showed a trend towards 
statistical significance; Contrary Emotion -  Swings (Chi-squared = X  ^= 5.41, d.f., 2, p = 0.067), 
and Double-bluff -  Soldier (Chi-squared = X  ^= 5.08, d.f., 2, p = 0.079).
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Large Scale Research Project
Are the individual groups significantly more or less likely than chance to give a mental state, or 
incorrect answer to the five stories?
Two way cross tabulation analysis showed that only three of the stories appeared to show any 
differences between the groups, and a further two stories showed a trend. An additional analysis, 
namely one-way within group Chi-squared analysis, was conducted on these five stories to look 
at the type of answers given by the groups. The types of answers were divided into three 
categories (two point mental state, or one point mental state or incorrect answer). The results are 
detailed in Table 7. ’
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Large Scale Research Project
Significant results were interpreted using the data to verify which of the three categories (two 
point mental state, one point mental state, or incorrect answer), was more likely than chance to be 
given by the participants in the two groups.
Typically developing group
Table 7 indicates that the typically developing group was significantly more likely than chance to 
give two point mental state answers to four of the stories; Ship (Pretence), Swings (Contrary 
Emotion), Peabody (Misunderstanding), and Santa (Appearance/Reality). The typically 
developing group was less likely than chance to give a one point mental state answer to the 
Soldier (Double-bluff) story.
Autistic spectrum group
The autistic spectrum group was significantly more likely than chance to give a two point mental 
state answer to the Peabody (Misunderstanding) story. The autistic spectrum group were no more 
or less likely than chance to give either type of mental state answer or an incorrect answer to the 
Ship (Pretence), Swings (Contrary Emotion), Santa (Appearance/Reality) and Soldier (Double­
bluff) stories.
These results suggested that there were two stories that the typically developing group were 
significantly more likely than chance to give a two point mental state answer, whereas the autistic 
spectrum group were no more or less likely to give any type of answer. These were. Ship 
(Pretence), and Santa (Appearance/Reality). In addition, two of the stories that had shown a trend 
towards significance in the two-way Chi-squared analysis also showed this pattern. These were 
Swings (Contrary Emotion) and Soldier (Double-bluff). Therefore, only these four stories were 
likely to be discriminators of mental state understanding between the two groups.
Both groups were significantly more likely than chance to give a two point mental state answer to 
the Peabody (Misunderstanding) story. The significant overall result between the two groups 
appears to be due to the typically developing group performing better than the autistic spectrum 
group on the two point mental state answers, and the autistic spectrum group providing more 
incorrect answers than the typically developing group.
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In summary, the following stories appeared to be the strongest discriminators between the groups 
(typically developing group was significantly more likely than chance to give a two point mental 
state answer, whereas the autistic spectrum group was no more or less likely than chance to give 
any type of answer); Ship (Pretence), and Santa (Appearance/Reality). The Swings (Contrary 
Emotion) and Soldier (Double-bluff) stories also showed a trend towards being discriminatory 
between the groups.
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Does a typically developing child’s chronological age affect their performance on the 
stories?
Research has shown that ToM skills increase as typically developing people get older (e.g. Happe 
et al., 1998). Therefore, a Pearson’s r correlation was conducted between the variables of 
chronological age (independent variable) and total score (dependent variable) for the typically 
developing participants (r = 0.447, n = 90, p = <0.01). This indicated that there was a positive 
correlation between age and total score, i.e. the older a child’s chronological age, the higher the 
total score. However, age can only account for 20% of the total variance in total score. This 
relationship is illustrated in Graph 1.
Graph 1 — Relationship between total score on the ‘Strange Stories’ and chronological age for the typically 
developing participants.
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Does an autistic spectrum disorder child’s chronological age affect their performance on the 
stories?
Research has shown that the relationship between chronological age and intellectual age is an 
important predictor of whether a person on the autistic spectrum will be able to pass ToM tasks 
(e.g. Leekam and Prior, 1994). The closer their mental to chronological age the more likely that 
they are to pass the tasks (Dahlgren and Trillingsgaard, 1996). A Pearson’s r correlation was 
conducted between the variables of chronological age (independent variable) and total score 
(dependent variable) for the autistic spectrum participants (r = 0.328, n = 15, p = 0.233 (not 
significant)). This indicated that there was no relationship between age and total score.
Does an autistic spectrum disorder child’s verbal attribute score affect their performance 
on the stories?
The verbal attribute score was examined using Pearson’s r correlation, which showed that there 
was a significant positive relationship between verbal attribute score (independent variable) and 
total score (dependent variable) for the autistic spectrum participants (r = 0.662, n = 15, p = 
0.007). Verbal attribute score accounts for 44% of the total variance in total score. Therefore, 
the higher the autistic spectrum disorder child’s verbal attribute score (an indication of verbal 
intelligence), the higher his or her total score on the stories. Graph 2 illustrates this relationship. 
These findings were in accordance with literature that suggests that verbal intelligence is the more 
important variable in the ratio than chronological age, in predicting whether a child on the autistic 
spectrum will pass ToM tasks (Eisenmajer and Prior, 1991).
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Graph 2 -  Relationship between total score on the ‘Strange Stories ’ and verbal attribute score for the 
autistic spectrum participants.
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Verbal Attribute Score
Are the two stories in a story type pair equally effective in tapping the same mental state?
As mentioned in the introduction, previous research has assumed that each of the two stories that 
contribute to a type of story, for example. Persuasion (Kitten and Sausages), are tapping the same 
type of mental state understanding (Happe, 1994; Jolliffe and Baron-Cohen, 1999). However this 
study’s results suggested that firstly, not all of the stories in the twelve types were as good in 
identifying deficits in ToM ability, and secondly, that each story within each story type was not 
equally effective in tapping the proposed mental state. For example, in the Pretence story pair. 
Ship appeared to be a strong discriminator (e.g. typically developing group was more likely than 
chance to give a two point mental state answer, whilst the autistic spectrum group was no more 
likely than chance to give any answer). In contrast, Banana did not discriminate between the 
groups (e.g. both groups performed similarly on the stoiy).
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This hypothesis was investigated by analysing the typically developing group’s answers. Only 
the typically developing group’s answers were analysed, as it would be expected that they would 
be more likely to give correct mental state answer to the stories than the autistic spectrum group. 
The answers given by each participant were ranked as either 0 (incorrect), 1 (one point mental 
state) or 2 (two point mental state), for each story in the pair (e.g. Banana and Ship - Pretence), 
and analysed as a pair using Wilcoxon repeated measures.
Wilcoxon repeated measures analyses of the pairs of stories in sevfen stoiy types: Pretence, Lie, 
Joke, White Lie, Double-bluff, Sarcasm, and Appearance/Reality showed no significant 
differences between scores within the pair. Therefore, they appeared to be equally effective in 
generating the same type of answer from the participants.
Wilcoxon repeated measures analyses of the pairs of stories in the other five story types: Contrary 
Emotion (z = -3.210, p = 0.001), Forget (z = -3.549, p = <0.001), Persuasion (z = -3.007, p = 
0.003), Misunderstanding (z = -3.615, p = <0.001), and Idiom (z = -3.262, p = 0.001), showed a 
significant difference between scores within the pair. This suggests that they were not equally 
effective in generating the same type of answer from the participants.
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Discussion
This study obtained normative data on Happe’s (1994) ‘Strange Stories’ from a group of typically 
developing children across the chronological ages of seven to eleven. Their performance was 
compared with the performance of cognitively able children on the autistic spectrum of a similar 
chronological age. It was predicted that this study’s main findings would replicate Happe’s 
(1994) results, specifically that the ‘Strange Stories’ would differentiate a typically developing 
group from a group on the autistic spectrum. The typically developing group would achieve a 
significantly higher total score on the stories compared to the autistic spectrum group. Although 
the results had to be interpreted cautiously due to the small size of the autistic spectrum group, the 
results from this study did not replicate Happe’s main findings. An un-related t-test conducted on 
the total scores of the two groups did not show any significant difference between the two groups’ 
performance. This could be due to the fact that Happe’s scoring system gave credit for correct 
physical answers, and people on the autistic spectrum had been generally found to have no 
difficulty in producing physical answers to social stories (Happe, 1994). Therefore the stories 
were scored again using an altered scoring system that only rewarded mental state answers. An 
un-related t-test conducted on these new total scores for the two groups still found no significant 
differences between the two groups’ performance. Although, the stories as a set appeared not to 
differentiate between the two groups, analysis of the groups’ performance on individual stories 
revealed that three of the stories did discriminate between the groups, and two stories showed a 
trend towards discriminating between the groups.
A further objective of this study was to examine the relationship firstly, between chronological 
age and performance on the stories for both groups, and secondly, between verbal ability and 
performance on the stories for the autistic spectrum group. When the results were subjected to 
statistical analysis, greater chronological age was found to have a positive influence on the 
performance of the typically developing group, but not the autistic spectrum group. Verbal 
ability was a significant performance factor for the autistic spectrum group as higher verbal 
ability correlated positively with better performance on the stories.
The final hypothesis of this study was that the two stories within a story type were not necessarily 
equally effective in elucidating the same mental state. For exarriple, in the Persuasion story type, 
children did not give the answer, “He/she wanted to persuade her to ...” for both the Kitten and 
Sausages stories. Statistical tests indicated that seven of the story types, namely. Pretence, Lie,
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Joke, White Lie, Double-Bluff, Sarcasm and Appearance/Reality comprised story pairs that 
appeared to be answered in a similar way by typically developing participants. In contrast, the 
Contrary Emotion, Forgetting, Persuasion, Misunderstanding and Idiom story pairs did not seem 
to be answered in a similar way by the typically developing participants, suggesting that they 
were not necessarily perceived in the same way by the group. In this discussion, explanations for 
the aforementioned findings, and the implications for clinical work will be explored and 
integrated with other research findings.
Why did the set of ‘Strange Stories’ not differentiate between the two groups?
In answering this question several factors need to be considered; each of these will be evaluated 
in turn.
Group and experimental factors
Various factors pertaining to the experimental methods used in the study, or the composition of 
the two groups could have created ‘noise’ that resulted in the data being skewed towards atypical 
results, which were not representative of the general population of typically developing and/or 
autistic spectrum children. These factors are discussed in the following section.
Gender of the autistic spectrum participants
The autistic spectrum group showed a bias towards males. Thus, this study could have had a 
higher number of males on the autistic spectrum compared to the other studies that did find a 
difference between the two groups. Therefore, the findings could be due to the effect of gender, 
where males on the autistic spectrum are better at the stories than females. There is some support 
for this suggestion, as some research has indicated that males on the autistic spectrum are 
generally superior in answering ToM stories (Gillberg, 1998). It is proposed that this is due to the 
proportionally higher number of females than males on the autistic spectrum presenting with co- 
morbidly low levels of cognitive functioning. It is suggested that females require higher levels of 
global damage to the brain than males, before they manifest the symptomatology of autistic 
spectrum disorders (Gillberg, 1998). However, since Happe (1994) and Baron-Cohen et al. 
(1999) did not specify the gender of their participants on the autistic spectrum, it is hard to make 
comparisons with these data sets. Furthermore, one should note that Happe did not suggest that 
the ‘Strange Stories’ would be affected by gender, as deficits in ToM are not proposed to be 
gender specific. Hence, the stories, as a tool for establishing the presence or absence of ToM,
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should be valid for both genders. In support of this statement, this study found no significant 
difference between the two genders’ total scores in the typically developing group.
Group size
The lack of a significant result could be due to the different sizes of the two groups, which might 
have influenced the power of the statistical tests. A power analysis conducted a priori was 
calculated at p = 0.7 for the sample size (see Appendix 9). This analysis indicated that a sample 
size of 16 participants in each group was required for a large effect, which was predicted on the 
basis of previous research. However, it proved extremely difficult to obtain a sample of autistic 
spectrum participants who fitted the inclusion criteria. This was due firstly, to the fact that the 
diagnosis is rare in the general population, and secondly, that the number of children on the 
autistic spectrum who can pass first and second order ToM tests is relatively low.
Age of the participants in the two groups
If the autistic spectrum group were older than the typically developing group, they could have 
used their ‘extra life’ experience to ‘hack out’ the answers to the stories. Therefore, the stories 
would not have appeared to differentiate the two groups. Participants in the autistic spectrum 
group were drawn from a broader age range of seven to thirteen years compared to seven to 
eleven years in the typically developing group, and were significantly older as indicated by an un­
related t-test. It therefore is possible that chronological age was a confounding variable in the 
results. However, it is important to note that no significant correlation was found between total 
score on the ‘Strange Stories’ and chronological age in the autistic spectrum group.
Did this study’s autistic spectrum group have a higher verbal ability than other studies’ 
participants from the autistic spectrum?
It is possible that the autistic spectrum group had a higher verbal ability than the typically 
developing group. This might lead them to perform better than an average ability group of 
participants on the autistic spectrum, as ToM ability has a strong relationship with verbal ability. 
This explanation seems likely as the autistic spectrum group’s average verbal attribute score (an 
indication of verbal intelligence), was in the high average range of cognitive ability. Whereas, 
the typically developing group was drawn from a population with normally distributed 
intelligence as indicated by their school performance. Thus the stories might have differentiated 
the groups if an average ability group of children on the autistic spectrum had been compared to
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the typically developing children. However, since a verbal attribute score for the typically 
developing children was not obtained, it is impossible to draw any firm conclusions about this 
hypothesis.
However, it is important to recognise that the verbal attribute score was only an estimate of the 
autistic spectrum group’s verbal intelligence quotient. In this study, the estimate of verbal 
cognitive functioning was obtained using sub-tests from the WISC-III: Information and 
Vocabulary. Evidence that these sub-tests provide valid estimates of verbal intelligence was 
developed primarily from research with typically developing children. Research into the 
cognitive ability of people on the autistic spectrum has shown that some have superior skills on 
certain aspects of cognitive functioning. Therefore, these sub-tests might not be a good estimate 
of verbal intelligence for this group (Ehlers, Nyden and Gillberg, 1996). For example, able 
people on the autistic spectrum often show a particular interest in factual information (Frith and 
Happe, 1994), and therefore the bias of the Information sub-test towards both ‘facts’ and 
‘science’ might mean that they perform better on this than their overall level of cognitive 
functioning. This has implications for the study, as the ability of the autistic spectrum group 
could be overestimated, and thus any interpretation relating to the verbal attribute component 
should be cautious.
Various factors relating to methodology and group composition have been discussed with 
reference to their possible influence on the finding that, contrary to expectations, the ‘Strange 
Stories’ as a set did not appear to differentiate the two groups. A possible confounding factor 
seems to be verbal ability, with the autistic spectrum group appearing to be more cognitively able 
than the typically developing group. A further confounding factor might be the older 
chronological age of the autistic spectrum group. Tentative suggestions for the influence of 
verbal ability and chronological age on the solving of ToM tasks will be discussed later in the 
discussion.
Are the stories a valid test o f  Theory o f  Mind?
This section will examine the possible reasons why the three stories: Ship (Pretence), Santa 
(Appearance/reality), and Peabody (Misunderstanding) differentiated between the two groups, 
and why the Swings (Contrary Emotion), and Soldier (Double-bluff) stories might have shown a 
trend to differentiate between the groups. However, before these issues are explored, the
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assumption that a correct answer to the comprehension question indicated that participants 
actually understood the story, will be addressed.
Do the comprehension questions actually indicate that the child has understood the stories?
The questions that follow the stories comprised a comprehension question, for example, “Was it 
true, what x said?” followed by the ToM question aimed at elucidating the participant’s 
understanding of the rationale for the story characters’ behaviour. It is presumed that if the 
participants can answer the comprehension question correctly, then they have understood the 
story. However, some authors have suggested that correct answers might only indicate that a 
child shows recognition of difference, namely, that the story does not make sense (Frith and 
Happe, 1999). This suggestion has gained some support from this study, as the children did not 
always appear to be processing the stories correctly. For example, in the complex Solider 
(Double-bluff) story, children will answer, “No” to the, “Was he telling the truth?” question on at 
least forty per cent of occasions when the character was telling the truth. This is presumably 
because they expect him to lie to save his tanks. On pronipting they had to refer back to the story 
to find the correct answer. This suggests that they answered the question believing that they had 
processed all the information. This also occurred in the School (Forget) story. The children 
correctly stated for the comprehension question that “It was not true what he said”, but when 
asked the question, “Why?” the answers were often based on incorrect assumed information. For 
example, they believed that the boy in the school had played truant rather than the real situation 
where his friend was off sick. It appeared that in both these examples, the children may not 
necessarily have read the story as a whole word for word, but were making assumptions based on 
their experiences and what they think ought to have happened rather than the actual data in the 
story. These aforementioned examples bring into question Happe’s assumption that a correct 
answer to the, “Was it true?” question always indicates correct understanding of the stories. 
Instead on some occasions, participants may answer correctly on the basis of ‘noticing a 
difference’. In addition, it also indicates that the information processing demands of the story 
might influence a child’s ability to give a ‘correct answer’.
Doctorate of Psychology (PsychD) in Clinical Psychology 299
Large Scale Research Project
PFhy did the some stories appear to differentiate between the two groups?
The stories that appeared to differentiate the two groups were, Ship (Pretence), Santa 
(Appearance/Reality)^ and Peabody (Misunderstanding) stories, and the stories that showed a 
trend towards differentiating the groups were Swings (Contrary Emotion), and Soldier (Double­
bluff). All the stories except Peabody (Misunderstanding) were more likely than chance to 
receive a two point mental state answer in the typically developing group, whereas, the autistic 
spectrum group were no more likely than chance to give a particular answer. Peabody 
(Misunderstanding) was more likely than chance to be given an incorrect answer and less likely 
than chance to be given a two point mental state answer by the autistic spectrum group compared 
to the typically developing group.
A typical incorrect answer for the Santa (Appearance/Reality) stories was based on a physical 
answer, “Because they are dressed like one,” whereas a good two point mental state answer was, 
“He was trying to make her think that he was Santa, so she wouldn’t get upset”. Possibly, the 
autistic spectrum group perceived the physical answer as the most salient, and as it fitted the 
‘scenario’, they did not tend to ‘search’ for alternative answers using problem solving. The 
aforementioned explanation could also apply to the Ship (Pretence) story as incorrect answers 
tended to be based on the physical form of the play, “Because it looks like a ship”. In contrast, 
typically developing children might have been looking for a rationale that involved ‘fooling’ the 
other person in the scenario, possibly because they had experienced or understood the behaviour 
at a deeper level due to presence of a ToMM.
In the Peabody (Misunderstanding) story the typically developing group gave more two point 
mental state answers and less incorrect answers than the autistic spectrum group. It could be 
suggested that the autistic spectrum group either knew or didn’t know the answer to the story. 
Their incorrect answers could be argued to be based on social safety rules taught to children by 
their parents, for example, “You have to be careful when out at night” and “You can’t be sure 
when out alone if someone is a thief’. It could be suggested that the general situation outlined in 
story was more salient to them when working out their answer than the information that he 
wanted to know the time. In contrast, when they gave the correct answer, it could be suggested
’ This is contrary to Happe’s (1994) finding, where she suggested that the Appearance/Reality stories were 
too easy for the autistic spectrum participants. However, this could be due to her giving credit for correct 
physical answers, e.g. ‘He looks like Santa’.
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that they had not used or were not aware of the social safety rules and therefore, did not weight 
this information more heavily than other information in the story.
Although the difference between the autistic spectrum and typically developing groups on the 
Soldier (Double-bluff) and Swings (Contrary Emotion) did not reach significance and only 
showed a trend, it may be helpful to look at how the groups tackled these stories. In the Soldier 
(Double-bluff) story, the typically developing group was more likely than chance to either give a 
two point mental state answer or an incorrect answer, whereas, the autistic spectrum group was 
no more or less likely than chance to give any answer. This suggests that the typically developing 
group either ‘knew’ the answer or ‘had no idea’. In contrast, the autistic spectrum group gave as 
many one point as two point answers. In addition, their incorrect answers were mainly of the 
incorrect mental state answer type. This could suggest that they were actively trying to work out 
the answer through problem solving, as a one point answer indicates some understanding of the 
thinking process, but not complete comprehension. A two point answer could be seen as a correct 
solution, whereas an incorrect mental state answer is an incorrect solution. Behavioural 
observations appeared to support this proposal that the autistic spectrum group seemed to be 
actively working out the story, supporting the ‘hacking out’ hypothesis. For example, they would 
re-read the text, ask for clarification, and give the answer in stages, which mirrored the problem 
solving process. These behaviours were also observed in the typically developing group when 
they had problems answering the Soldier (Double-bluff) story. These observations could suggest 
that when typically developing children were not aware of an ‘immediate’ mental state answer, 
they resorted to similar techniques as the autistic spectrum disorder group, giving what they 
perceive to be the most ‘sensible’ mental state answer. Consequently, giving inappropriate 
mental state answers could be due to a ‘natural’ human response from all individuals when 
attempting to rationalise and understand situations using mental state reasoning. However, it is 
impossible to verify this proposition as this study did not measure response times, which could 
reflect extra time taken to ‘problem solve’, or ask the participants how they derived their answers. 
Although, as Happe (1994) points out “The fact that autistic people appear to recognise that these 
stories require answers in the realm of mental state language is itself surprising and intriguing”.
An autistic spectrum participant’s incorrect answer to the Swings (Contrary Emotion) story 
tended not to recognise that a person could feel two things at the same time. For example, a 
typical answer from the autistic spectrum group was, “She is lying to her mum”. It could be
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argued that they are using a problem solving ‘hacking out’ technique that looks for a definitive 
answer. Therefore, it struggles with the possibility that a person can have two different emotions 
at the same time. Further confounding this process, as mentioned previously, autistic spectrum 
participants are hypothesised by Frith and Happe (1989) to have a specific impairment in 
extracting meaning in context, and a preference for processing local versus global information. 
Thus, weak central coherence could lead them to focus on one of the child’s answers, which then 
would lead them to try and ‘discredit’ the other answer and information. In addition, this would 
suggest that in general the autistic spectrum group was more likely to give an inappropriate 
mental state as the result of their problem solving being based on incomplete information. In 
contrast, the typically developing group was not as likely to give an inappropriate mental state as 
they are not proposed to have weak central coherence.
Explanations of why these stories might be more difficult for the autistic spectrum group are 
speculative, and consequently qualitative research into the participants’ reasons for their answers 
would be necessary to investigate these ideas.
Why did most stories not differentiate between the two groups?
This section will examine the possibility that no difference was found between the two groups’ 
total scores because the ‘Strange Stories’ as a set were not tapping abilities that related to an 
advanced understanding of ToM. Some tentative ideas can be suggested as to why the stories did 
not differentiate between the two groups based on observations made during testing, typical 
answers, and trends of scores for the two groups. It will be suggested that for both of the groups 
it was too easy to ‘work out’ the mental state answer in some of the stories. In contrast, other 
stories were more likely to either generate physical answers as the most salient option, or generate 
incorrect mental state answers due to their complexity.
It is important to stress that these explanations are conjectural and that further research is 
necessary to determine the validity of these ideas, for example, qualitative research into the 
participants’ reasons for their answers, and timing of responses.
The story types that might fall in the ‘too easy’ group are those where both groups showed a 
tendency to give mental state answers (Pretence (Banana; typically developing group 82% and 
autistic spectrum group 74% and Ship; typically developing group 98% and autistic spectrum
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group 80%) Lie (Vase; typically developing group 98% and autistic spectrum group 93% and 
Dentist; typically developing group 75% and autistic spectrum group 80%) White Lie (Rabbit; 
typically developing group 93% and autistic spectrum group 80% and Hat; typically developing 
group 95% and autistic spectrum group 87%) and Persuasion (Kittens; typically developing group 
81% and autistic spectrum group 74% and Sausages; typically developing group 92% and autistic 
spectrum group 87%)). These stories could be argued to be common situations that are 
experienced by all children from an early age.^ Consequently, the autistic spectrum group might 
be answering these stories using their ‘hacking out’ technique baSed on ‘life experience,’ and 
problem solving skills rather than a ToM. This replicates the previous problem noted with ceiling 
effects in first and second order ToM tasks. However, these stories might be able to differentiate 
between the two groups, if using qualitative analysis, the autistic spectrum group’s answers were 
found to have been good enough to gain the same points as the typically developing group but 
were not as detailed. For example. Happe (1994) found that autistic spectrum participants 
answering the ‘Strange Stories’ tended to give the same type of mental state answers to different 
situations, for example, “It is a joke”, interspersed with physical state answers. In this study, 
when the hypothesis that the autistic spectrum group would give a few mental state answers, 
which fitted well enough with the scenario to gain one point was examined, only limited support 
for it was found. In general, the autistic spectrum participants’ correct mental state answers were 
varied, often detailed, and tailored to the pertaining situation. As mentioned previously, to finally 
address this idea, qualitative analysis of the two groups’ answers would have to be conducted.
Two stories seemed to generate physical state answers from the two groups when the incorrect 
answers were examined for type; these were the Elephant (Joke) and Pigsty (Idiom) stories. All 
but three of the incorrect answers to the Elephant (Joke) and the Pigsty (Idiom) stories were of the 
physical state type. In the Elephant (Joke) story, 77% of the typically developing group, and 80% 
of the autistic spectrum group gave physical state answers. In the Pigsty (Idiom) story, 68% of 
the typically developing group, and 74% of the autistic spectrum group gave physical state 
answers. This could suggest that the aforementioned stories did not encourage mental state 
answers in the first instance. It could be that physical answers to the stories were more salient, 
and therefore, the selection processor selected the most obvious fit answer without examining 
further mental state explanations. There is some support for this hypothesis. For example, in the
Happe (1994) also found that the autistic spectrum group could correctly answer the Lie and Persuasion 
stories.
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Elephant (Joke) story, a typical answer was, “Because it is big like an elephant”. However, if 
participants were then asked a supplementary question “What was he trying to do?” they would 
often produce a mental state answer such as, “Make a joke”. This answer was not scored as the 
stories were administered strictly to Happe’s protocol. Thus participants, particularly from the 
typically developing group could give a mental state answer, if they thought that it was required 
to explain the story in more detail. This supports the most salient answer idea.
Finally, certain stories such as Forget tended to generate incorrect m’ental state answers from both 
groups, when the incorrect answers were examined for type, for example Doll; typically 
developing group 70% and autistic spectrum group 93%, and School; typically developing group 
95% and autistic spectrum group 93%.^ The correct mental state answer or an alternative 
physical state answer could have been too difficult to elucidate from the text. As mentioned 
previously the participants could have been trying to make the best sense of the story using a 
problem solving method to give what they perceive to be the most ‘sensible’ mental state answer, 
which produced incorrect mental state answers.
This section has suggested that possibly participants give the most obvious answer to a situation, 
whether mental state or physical, rather than attempt to find a more complex answer. However, if 
after giving a physical answer they were prompted by the experimenter to think more deeply 
about the reasoning behind the behaviour, they appeared to be able to generally generate the 
appropriate mental state answer (particularly in the case of the typically developing group). 
Clinically this suggests that if adults continue to prompt a child to think more deeply about the 
reasoning behind the behaviour, then their skills could improve and the questioning could become 
more self-directed. There is some support for this proposal, in that firstly, professionals who deal 
with people’s mental health problems, and thus think about the people’s rationale for behaviours, 
show superior ToM skills. Secondly, that with increasing age there is an increase in ToM skills 
(Happe, Winner, and Brownell, 1998).
If participants were unable to find an answer (either physical or mental state, that matched the 
behavioural situation), both groups appeared to endeavour to produce a ‘mental state’ answer that 
was generally incorrect. Typically developing participants seemed to tend to only give incorrect
Interestingly, this is contrary to Happe’s (1994) findings, whereby she deemed the forget stories as ‘too 
easy’.
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mental State answers on longer and more complex stories. This was possibly due to participants 
having to remember a lot of information and thus perhaps being influenced by memory abilities. 
As mentioned previously, in these situations assumptions made by the participants about the 
character’s behaviour often appeared to be based on previous experience and beliefs, possibly in 
an attempt to ‘economise’ on information processing. The children on the autistic spectrum would 
be subjected to an even greater level of loss of information that was required to ‘solve’ the 
problem, than the typically developing children due to weak central coherence, which could lead 
them to focus on local information in preference to global information. Consequently, they were 
not ‘consciously aware’ of all of the available information, and/or were limited in their ability to 
recognise relationships between pieces of information. Therefore, they were more likely to give 
inappropriate mental state answers, as found in Happe (1994) and Baron-Cohen et al’s (1999) 
study.
Examination of the stories that did not differentiate the two groups has suggested possible factors 
that could have been affecting the likelihood of a typically developing or autistic spectrum group 
participant giving a mental state answer. These include: cognitive deficits, problem solving 
skills, memory and information processing demands, salience of a mental or physical state 
answer, and ‘life experience’.
The previous two sections have explored the possibilities that a lack of a difference between the 
two groups on the stories as a set was due to experimental factors, and/or because the stories were 
not tapping the proposed level of mental state understanding. The main experimental factor that 
could have had an effect on the results was probably the higher verbal ability and chronological 
age of the autistic spectrum group than the typically developing group. When the stories were 
examined as a set, some appeared to be ‘too easy’ too solve, and thus did not differentiate the two 
groups. Other stories seemed to be ‘too hard’ for the majority of both groups. Interestingly, the 
methods used to solve these ‘too hard’ stories, and the type of answer given, appeared to be 
similar for both groups. Finally, a few stories did appear to differentiate the two groups. These 
stories were suggested as being easy for the typically developing group, whereas, the majority of 
the autistic spectrum group appeared to have found them too hard.
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In the following section a tentative model will be suggested to explain why typically developing 
and autistic spectrum groups gave the answers they did to the ‘Strange Stories’, with reference to 
the aforementioned findings and the Theory of Mind Mechanism (ToMM).
Structure of the Theory of Mind Mechanism and its possible relationship to general 
intelligence, specifically problem solving skills.
Leslie’s Theory of Mind Mechanism combined with the Selection Processor provides the 
framework for the tentatively proposed theory derived from this study’s findings. It is proposed 
that, in this study, the typically developing participants have a fully functioning ToMM. 
However, the ToMM in isolation is unable to ‘solve’ ToM situations without the Selection 
Processor ‘selecting out’ the relevant information, whilst ‘repressing’ the salient but incorrect 
interpretation. Consequently, the ability of the ToMM to correctly solve ToM tasks depends 
upon the level of functioning of the Selection Processor, and in turn, the quality and quantity of 
the information that it processes. The theory derived from this study proposes that the Selection 
Processor’s functioning is augmented by age, via the mechanisms of social learning, and 
cognitive ability, specifically problem solving ability. Thus, as a child develops, the ability of the 
Selection Processor to select the relevant information and transfer it to the mechanism for 
interpretation is enhanced. Furthermore, it is suggested that the ToMM amplifies the importance 
of mental state information in the Selection Processor, leading to an increased likelihood of a 
mental state solution.
In contrast, it is proposed that a person on the autistic spectrum has deficits in the ToMM. The 
proposed deficits in their ToMM results in mental state information being treated equally to other 
information. Consequently, their ability to give a mental state answer relies on an interaction 
between three factors, specifically, the salience of mental state information, the Selection 
Processor selecting this information, and problem solving abilities. In turn, the Selection 
Processor relies on the quantity and quality of information available to process. Weak central 
coherence might result in information being lost. In addition, executive functioning problems 
would make it difficult for the individual to switch between pieces of information in the 
evaluation and problem solving process. Thus, the most salient and/or ‘sensible’ answer would 
be selected first, which could either be a physical or mental state solution. If neither were 
‘obvious,’ then a combination of the Selection Processor and problem solving skills would utilise
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the available information to give a best-fit answer. This answer often takes the form of an 
inappropriate mental state answer.
This theory would suggest that cognitively less able individuals on the spectrum who do not have 
such developed problem solving skills, would find it more difficult to select out information that 
would aid in the interaction with their Selection Processor. Therefore, one would predict that a 
child on the autistic spectrum’s ability to answer ToM stories is not so much dependent on 
chronological age but on cognitive ability. This study lends some shpport to this proposal in that 
no significant correlation was found between total score and age for the autistic spectrum 
participants. Whereas, a significant positive correlation between the verbal attribute score and 
total score was shown by the participants on the autistic spectrum. Additional support from this 
study for the effortful information processing argument, is anecdotal evidence from the testing 
session. It was observed that the autistic spectrum participants sometimes appeared to take longer 
to answer the stories than the typically developing participants. Other researchers have 
mentioned this finding (Astington, Harris, and Olson, 1988). It could be suggested that this delay 
in answering might be due to their consciously calculating the answers using problem solving 
techniques and experience.
Thus, this tentative theory proposes that the ability to solve ToM tasks is not purely a function of 
an intact ToM in either typically developing or autistic spectrum children. An individual’s ability 
to problem solve, retain and select information, and level of exposure to the social situation in 
question, also appear to be important factors in being able to interpret social situations. I would 
suggest that a person on the autistic spectrum who is able to ‘solve’ first order, second order, and 
advanced ToM tasks uses predominantly problem solving skills facilitated by social experience. 
The ‘solving process’ is subject to the influence of memory and information processing 
constraints. The information processing constraints are confounded by weak central coherence 
and problems with executive functioning. This results in people on the autistic spectrum not 
necessarily having all the information required to ‘solve’ the problem, and/or produces 
difficulties when they are trying to ‘switch’ between salient and less salient pieces of task 
information. Thus, as a story’s complexity increases, either due to the level of mental state 
understanding that is required or due to the level of information processing and memory 
demands, the problem solving ability of the person on the autistic spectrum comes under pressure. 
Information is lost due to problems with weak central coherence, and/or memory, and they have
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difficulty weighting the different pieces of information, necessary to give the correct answer. In 
these situations, they generally ‘give it their best shot’ and will produce an inappropriate mental 
state answer.
Typically developing children are also subject to the same processing demands. However, they 
do not ‘lose’ information from the system due to central coherence problems. Experience and 
their fully functioning ToMM gives additional weighting to any mental state information, and 
mental state solutions produced by problem solving. This may taake it seem easier for the 
typically developing children to produce mental state answers. However, as with the autistic 
spectrum children, if there is a more salient, equally correct physical state explanation, they 
appear to tend to give this physical state answer. Although they are able to give the mental state 
answer if so directed.. This answering behaviour is possibly due to processing ‘economy’. If  a 
mental state is not familiar to the typically developing child, and/or the information is complex, 
and/or there is no highly salient physical or mental state answer, then, like people on the autistic 
spectrum group, they will endeavour to give a mental state answer through problem solving.
How would this theory explain the answering behaviour of the two groups?
The stories that appeared to be ‘too easy’, as stated previously, were tapping mental states that 
were common situations encountered at an early age (e.g. Lie, White Lie, Pretence and 
Persuasion). Consequently, experience of these types of social interactions would be high. In 
addition, the stories were simple and short. Thus, arguably they did not produce as large a 
demand on memory or information processing as some of the more complex stories, such as 
Double-bluff. Therefore, even those in the younger age range of typically developing participants 
would not be challenged by these stories due to the presence of an intact ToMM and need for a 
minimally developed Selection Processor. The autistic spectrum participants who did not have an 
intact ToMM would be able to use the combination of experience and problem skills to ‘solve’ 
the task with the aid of the Selection Processor.
In contrast, the stories that did seem to differentiate the group were tapping slightly less common 
social situations (namely Pretence, Appearance/Reality, Contrary Emotion, and Double-bluff and 
Misunderstanding). In addition, these stories often presented a salient ‘physical’ answer, or 
required high memory demands and processing abilities. A salient ‘physical’ answer was 
therefore more likely to be given by the autistic spectrum participants, as they did not have the
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fully functioning ToMM, which would give additional weight to a mental state answer. In the 
high memory demand and processing ability stories, the typically developing participants would 
be able to use their ToMM, Selection Processor, and problem solving skills to solve the stories. 
In contrast, the autistic spectrum participants would not have benefited from priority being given 
to mental state information, as they did not have a fully functioning ToMM. Furthermore, they 
would possibly have to contend with higher levels of information loss due to central coherence 
deficits. Therefore, the autistic spectrum group were less likely to be able to utilise their ‘hacking 
out’ techniques and correctly solve these stories. ’
Summary
Happe (1994) proposed that the ‘Strange Stories’ appear to reveal impairments in social 
understanding in people with an autistic spectrum disorder. However, this study has shown that 
only a few of the stories appear to discriminate between children with and without an autistic 
spectrum disorder. The possible reasons for these findings were discussed.
In addition, a tentative theory of the influences on, and the functioning of the Selection Processor 
and the ToMM was proposed for both typically developing and autistic spectrum disorder 
children. Important factors that were proposed to affect the ability of a child in either group to 
‘solve’ ToM tasks, include general intelligence (specifically problem solving skills), executive 
functioning, memory, complexity of the presented information, frequency of the experience of the 
particular mental state, and the presence or absence of the ToMM mechanism. If  the 
aforementioned factors were matched between the groups (specifically verbal IQ, memory, and 
problem solving ability), it is hypothesised that there would be a difference between the 
performance of the two groups on achieved total score on the ‘Strange Stories,’ with the typically 
developing group showing superior ability.
Methodological issues and areas for future research.
This study attempted to replicate Happe’s (1994) study with a broader age group of typically 
developing children, in order to establish normative data on this group, whilst contrasting this 
group with a similarly aged group of children on the autistic spectrum. Thus methodology was to 
some extent constrained to that within the original study. However, factors that make this a 
stronger study include the significantly larger group of typically developing children from a wider 
age range. This enabled an investigation of whether typically developing children’s performance
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significantly improved with chronological age. The large sample size also facilitated the 
recognition of individual differences in answers to the stories, within and between age groups. In 
addition to the benefits of having a larger typically developing sample than Happe’s (1994) study, 
this study also examined a larger group of cognitively more able children on the autistic 
spectrum.
However, it is important to note that the autistic spectrum group was proportionally smaller than 
the typically developing group in this study. A bigger sample of children on the autistic spectrum 
should be tested, within the existing age range. In addition, if a larger number of typically 
developing children were tested, this would enable an examination of how children within certain 
age ranges answer specific stories. This could provide more information about the developmental 
stages of the Selection Processor, and the applicability of specific stories as differential tools for 
certain age groups. For example. Double-bluff would be passed by the majority of typically 
developing children at the age of ten, whereas children on the autistic spectrum would not pass 
this story at the same age.
This study also attempted to look at the effect of verbal ability on the scores of the autistic 
spectrum group as an influencing factor on a child on the autistic spectrum’s ability to answer the 
stories. However, as mentioned previously, the verbal attributes score was only an estimate of the 
verbal IQ of the autistic spectrum participants. Therefore, it would be advantageous if in a further 
study a full measure of verbal IQ was obtained for the group. If  verbal IQ scores were also 
obtained for the typically developing group, comparisons of the two groups’ performance on the 
stories could be made after partialling out verbal IQ as a confounding factor.
The tentative model proposed suggests that people on the autistic spectrum’s ability to ‘solve’ 
ToM tasks is influenced by memory capacity and problem solving ability. Evidence for these 
factors was predominantly from behavioural observations in testing sessions, and informed by 
other studies (e.g. Jolliffe and Baron-Cohen, 1999; Sparrevohn and Howie, 1995; Scholl and 
Leslie, 1999; Russell, Saltmarsh, and Hill, 1999; Ozonoff, Pennington, and Rogers, 1991; Baron- 
Cohen, O’Riordan, Stone, Jones, and Plaisted, 1999). Objective evidence should be obtained in 
order to validate the model. Thus, in a future study, measures of these factors could be 
introduced to investigate the effect of these skills on the ability to answer the ‘Strange Stories’.
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Initially, the study used Happe’s scoring for the stories, which was later refined to exclude 
physical state answers. Both scoring criteria were felt to be subject to false positive effects, as the 
mention of the ‘correct mental state’ within the answer was generally enough to gain one point, 
despite superfluous information also being offered that was irrelevant to the story. In addition, 
children would often give detailed superior answers, which at most could gain two mental state 
points. Qualitative research looking firstly, at the quality of the answers given by both groups 
could enable the scoring system to be further delineated in order to give credit for superior 
expression of mental state understanding. Secondly, examining the children’s verbalisation of the 
process that they use to answer the stories could reveal vital differences between the two groups. 
This could provide further evidence for the proposed theory.
Although Happe attempted to make the ‘Strange Stories’ more naturalistic and realistic than the 
first and second order ToM tasks, the stories are still subject to problems with ecological validity. 
The stories are presented in a written form and there are no time constraints placed on the speed 
of answering. Therefore, autistic spectrum participants are able to refer back to the text to 
minimise memory demands, and extract further information to aid their ‘hacking out’ technique. 
The stones’ context also places them in an observer role, rather than as a participant in the social 
situation. It could be argued that as an observer, they are more likely to be equally attentive to all 
the characters’ behaviours. In contrast, if they were a participant they are more likely to be 
attentive to their own thoughts, and behaviour than the other person in the scenario. Therefore a 
future study could adapt and develop the stories into role-plays, which can be enacted in front of 
or with the child as a participant. It would be suggested that the children on the autistic spectrum, 
who can pass the stories in test conditions, might still show characteristic deficits in their 
understanding of the mental states involved in the scenarios, providing further evidence for the 
‘hacking out’ hypothesis.
Finally, if a future study was both longitudinal and cross-sectional, an examination could be made 
of both individual and group differences in the development of the ability to answer the stories. 
A concurrent examination of the development of other cognitive abilities such as memory could 
possibly enable the production of a correlation matrix analogous to the weightings in the 
proposed theory. For example, are memory constraints more likely to influence an answer than a 
salient physical answer?
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Clinical implications
This study has expanded clinical knowledge on how typically developing and autistic spectrum 
children answer the ‘Strange Stories’ by using a larger and better matched sample of participant 
than other studies to date (Jolliffe and Baron-Cohen, 1999; Happe, 1994). It has suggested that 
the current clinical practice of using the set of stories to indicate the absence or presence of 
abilities related to ToM, thus aiding the differential diagnosis process, is not necessarily a valid 
use of the stories, as false negatives could result. For example, children on the autistic spectrum 
could appear to have ToM even when they did not, as they could ariswer the stories using mental 
state answers. However, this study has suggested that possibly three of the stories, and an 
additional two others with further investigations to confirm the trends, could be a valuable 
clinical tool in the diagnostic process, as they seem to identify ToM problems in the more 
cognitively able children on the autistic spectrum. Although, clinicians should be aware, as 
revealed in this study, that there is a large amount of individual difference in ability in both 
typically developing children and children on the autistic spectrum. In addition, the ability to 
answer ToM tasks, specifically ‘Strange Stories,’ has been suggested to be subject to other 
factors, such as cognitive ability, problem solving and memory. Therefore, when the stories are 
applied clinically other cognitive measures should be investigated to address the possibility of the 
child on the autistic spectrum ‘hacking out’ the answers.
Happe (1994) had suggested that the ‘Strange Stories’ could be used as an outcome measure. 
However, contrary to Happe’s expectation none of the pairs of stories could be used as an 
outcome measure in the clinical evaluation of an intervention. This is due to the fact that there 
were no story types where both stories in the pair differentiated between the two groups. Stories 
that do not differentiate between the two groups arguably do not fulfill the criteria of being a 
measure of abilities associated with advanced ToM.
In conclusion, this study has highlighted the importance of evidence based practice, whereby, 
clinicians need to examine research studies and clinical tools for validity before utilising them 
with clients. Contrary to clinical expectations, it was found that Happe’s ‘Strange Stories’ as a 
set do not differentiate between typically developing and cognitively able autistic spectrum 
children. Further research, initially replicating this study and then focusing on refining the 
scoring criteria and developing further modes of application could produce a useful clinical tool
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for practitioners working within the field in understanding the acquisition, development of, and 
deficits in ,‘Theory of Mind’.
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Guy's Research Ethics Committee
Guy's Hospital, London SEI911T 
Chairman: Professor Steven Sacks
Administrator; Mrs Valerie Heard 
Email: valerie. heard (cDkc]. a c .u k
L o W ®Founded 1829
University of London 
Tel: 020 7955 5000 Ext. 5 .1 8 1  
Fax:020 7955 4303
Ms Anne Johnson 
14 W ontner Road 
14 W ontner Road 
Balham
London SW 17 7QT
Dear Ms Johnson
Re: LEW/00/04/13 An advanced test of theory of mind: understanding of story characters' thoughts and
feelings by "normal" children and children on the autistic spectrum  
Lewisham application form (unsigned, undated)
Patient Information sheet and letter to parents
Stories: Vase, Banana, Ship, Dentist, Rabbit, Elephant, Haircut, Hat, Glove, Cough, PIg-stye, Mrs Peabody,
Picnic, Soldier, Ping-pong bat. Politeness Kittens, Painting, Swings, Sausages.
DR FRANCEscA HAPPE, DR SARAH USTER-BROOK, JANINA S2YNDLER. AGREED WITH PROFESSOR GILUAN BAIRD AND 
KATlNGo GIANNOUUS ON G u y ’S  SITE
This Study was taken to the Guy's Research Ethics Committee m eeting held on W ednesday 26 
July 2000 and was given reciprocal approval. I confirm that the patient information sheet and 
consent form used on this site should be on appropriate departmental headed paper, giving 
contact name(s) and telephone number(s).
Permission is granted on the understanding 
that:
Any ethical problem arising in the course of the project w ill be reported to the Committee.
Any change in the protocol or subsequent protocol amendments w ill be forwarded to the Committee using the enclosed 
form. The principal investigator should have seen and approve any such changes and this needs to be indicated in the 
forwarding letter to the Committee. Please also send a copy of the amendment approval letter issued by whichever 
LREC originally reviewed and approved this study.
A brief report will be submitted one year after commencement, thereafter annually, and after completion of the study. 
Continuing approval is dependent upon this report.
Approval is given for research to start within 12 months of the date of application. If the start is delayed beyond this 
time, applicants are required to consult the Chairman of the Committee. P lease notify th e  C om m ittee of the  date  of 
com m encem ent fo r reco rd  purposes.
i)
ii)
iii)
iv)
A  list o f members in attendance is enclosed. 
Yours sincerely
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Chairman: Steve Bullock Chief Executive: Michael Scott Tel: 020 8333 3000
Web; www.uhl.ac.uk
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Ms Anne Johnson ,
14 Wontner Road 
Balliam
London SW17 7QT 
Dear Ms Johnson
Protocol: An advanced test of theoiy of mind: Understanding of story characters thoughts and feelings by
"normal" children and children on the autistic spectrum
RefNo: 00/04/13 (please quote in all correspondence)
Thank you for your letter of W  May 2000. All the Committee's concerns have now been addressed and your study is 
now approve on the understanding that you will follow the protocol as agreed.
it is your responsibility as the researcher who made the application to notify the Local Research Ethics Committee 
immediately you become aware of any information which could cast doubt upon the conduct, safety or an unintended 
outcome of the study for which approval was given.
If there are amendments which, in your opinion or ophiion of your colleagues, could alter radically the nature of the 
study for which approval was originally given, a revised protocol should be submitted to the Committee.
It is the expectation of the Committee that research records are kept secure and accessible for a minimum period of 10 
years.
Members of the Committee would like to be kept informed of the progress and outcome of the study and therefore ask that 
a report is submitted annually or a copy of the results are sent to the administrator on completion of the study.
It is my duty to draw your attention to the fact that ethical approval does not give you permission to carry out the work in 
the Lewisham Hospital NHS Trust This must be confirmed with the Research and Development Department®.
Yours sincerely
Annette Jeanes 
Vice Chair
Telephone communication with Annette Jeanes confirmed that the Research and Development 
Department of Lewisham Hospital NHS Trust did not have to approve tlie study as firstly, participants 
were not patients of Lewisham Hospital and secondly, that there were no direct clinical or financial 
implications on services.
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INFORMATION SHEET
An advanced test of theory of mind: Understanding of story characters’ thoughts and 
feelings by typically developing children and children on the autistic spectrum.
Anne Johnson -  Clinical Psychologist in training, University of Surrey.
Invitation Paragraph
Your child is being invited to take part in a research study. Before you decide, it is important 
for you to understand why the research is being done and what it wül involve. Please take 
time to read the following information. Further information can be obtained by contacting 
Anne Johnson, Clinical Psychologist in training at the University of Surrey, Guildford, 
Surrey, on (01483) 259441.
Thank you for reading this.
What is the purpose of the study?
Researchers proposed that people with an autistic spectrum disorder have problems in 
understanding social interactions. Clinician’s use simple social tests to help them diagnose 
children on the autistic spectrum. However, some people who have been diagnosed with an 
autistic spectrum disorder are able to pass these simple tests. Researchers suggested that they 
were not sensitive enough to detect the subtle social problems found in ‘more able’ people on 
the autistic spectrum.
Francesca Happe (1994) created a series of stories about everyday situations where people say 
things that they do not mean literally. For example, ‘you talk the hind leg off a donkey’. 
Happe found that the stories could show impairments in social understanding in even the most 
able people with autism, who were able to pass the original simple tests.
However, Happe’s study did not examine children on the autistic spectrum’s abüity to answer 
the stories. In addition. Happe’s study also showed that children who are not on the autistic 
spectrum also have problems in answering some of the stories. Therefore, it is also important 
to find out whether children in mainstream education can answer the stories. This 
information wiU aid clinicians in assessing children with complex social and communication 
problems.
Aims of the research
To find out how children who are not on the autistic spectrum answer the stories.
To find out how children who are on the ‘more able’ end of the autistic spectrum answer the 
stories.
To find out whether these two groups of children answer the stories differently.
Does my child have to take part?
If you decide that you are happy for your child to take part, please sign the consent form 
enclosed with this form. If you decide that your child can take part you are still free to 
withdraw them at any time and without giving a reason.
W hat will happen to my child if they take part?
The whole study will last for a year, between June 2000 and June 2001. Each chüd in the 
research will only be involved for one hour. In the hour your child will be taken out of the
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classroom by thé researcher. They will be taken to a quiet room at home or at school. The 
researcher will explain what is going to happen in the hour. Your child will then be asked to 
listen to some stories, an example of a story is included at the end of this sheet. When your 
child has read the story they will be asked two questions, “Was it true, what X said?” and 
“Why did X say that?”. There is no right or wrong answer. Your child will be given positive 
feedback throughout the session. At the end of the session, the chüd will be thanked and 
taken back to the classroom.
Individual feedback wül not be given to the children in mainstream education as the results 
will be anonymous. The parents of the children on the autistic spectrum wül be able to 
receive feedback.
All information coUected about your chüd during the course of research wiU be kept strictly 
confidential. However, if a chüd discloses any information that suggests that they or another 
chüd is in danger, a professional may be informed.
W hat are the possible benefits o f taking part?
Although, there wül be no direct clinical benefit for your chüd to take part in the study. The 
information we get from this study may help us to assist clinicians in earher diagnosis of 
chüdren on the more able end of the autistic spectrum, aUowing them earlier access to 
resources and services.
W hat will happen to the results o f the research study?
The results of the study wül be written up and submitted for publication. It would be 
expected that the study wül be published in early 2002. A copy of the pubhshed results can 
be requested from the University of Surrey, Guüdford. The chüdren wül not be identified in 
any report or pubhcation.
Who has reviewed the study?
The Lewisham Research Ethics committee, Guy’s Research Ethics committee and the 
Lewisham Education Research Ethics committee has reviewed and approved the study.
Study supervisors
Dr Sarah Lister-Brook - Senior Lecturer, University of Surrey.
Consultant Clinical Psychologist, Kingston and District Community 
Health Trust.
Janina Szyndler - Consultant Clinical Psychologist, South London and Maudsley 
NHS Trust.
Dr Francesca Happe - Senior Research FeUow, South London and Maudsley NHS Trust. 
Thank you for agreeing for your chüd to take part in the study.
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Letter to participants’ parents
Anne Johnson
Clinical Psychologist in training 
Department o f Psychology 
University o f Surrey 
Guildford 
Surrey
Dear Parent
My name is A nne Johnson and I am a Clinical Psychologist in training on the 
University o f Surrey’s Doctorate in Clinical Psychology. As part o f our training, we 
have to carry out and submit a research project.
My research project is entitled An advanced test o f  theory o f mind: U nderstanding of 
story characters thoughts and feelings by children. The project is supervised by Dr 
Sarah Lister-Brook, Consultant Clinical Psychologist, Francesca Happe, Research 
Fellow and Janina Szyndler, Consultant Clinical Psychologist.
1 am writing to request permission for your child to be a participant in the research. I 
enclosed an information sheet detailing the study. M r “”””, headm aster o f $$$$ has 
agreed that your child’s school will take part in the study. At the bottom  o f this sheet 
is tear off slip that you can return to the school indicating your consent for your child 
to be involved in the study.
Please do not hesitate to contact myself, for further information.
Yours sincerely
Anne Johnson
Clinical Psychologist in training.
I do/do not {delete as appropriate) give perm ission for my child  ____________________to
take part in the study.
S igned:______________________ Parent/Guardian.
Date:
Doctorate of Psychology (PsychD) in Clinical Psychology
Large Scale Research Project
Appendix Five
‘Strange Stories’ -  Happe, 1994.
I
i l!
n i l
ÎÎ
ii
Ii
c  z:
JÎ
a  5  ou
i n  
1 1 ^ ?
II  
11
It.l
III
S -a .t: 
1 1 1
n
it
' t
s  5
&
S' r
Ii
§ 2
î“=
n
if
l l
H .£
c. c 
o "
i!
I f
0 ■“
■s a
1
= SC == C5
til
t  2
«
Ï U
«
M-O
It
S  2
!iiili
Ilf
« o
Î!
1Î
iê
ÎI
ÏÎ
cn
e -
•3
I
it
o =" 
& Z
1 "  il
I
2  g £
Hi
IP
lli
.= oM CA
Ü 5
*3
w 5 ,c
Doctorate of Psychology (PsychD) in Clinical Psychology 327
Large Scale Research Project
w CO
&
"3
o:c.R
O
2
o
g"-3
il
il
I
g : : | ;liHt
i P i !
lîii
Doctorate of Psychology (PsychD) in Clinical Psychology 328
Large Scale Research Project
= -fi
•5 -g 42llî
i l î ^
« C M
M V
2 £ ? r
S3 2  s  . 2  s
g
•S
u g
•S
ü
8O*3
:  ^  
f  s i  ü s  a  g:
Doctorate of Psychology (PsychD) in Clinical Psychology 329
Large Scale Research Project
t f t  CO
I
"‘I
%
8
c
8o•a
#
J
Doctorate of Psychology (PsychD) in Clinical Psychology 330
Large Scale Research Project
î||
i î
o g 2
Si^
> g S
Îlî
!i
ÎI
11
1 1
i l
m i
ÎIiî
II l l
CAO•a s
ll
î!
Il'
Ê =
il
b
•a
2
K
ej
£
3
Doctorate of Psychology (PsychD) in Clinical Psychology 331
Large Scale Research Project
II
“  c  
-■ 5R CJ ^ i
P  o
V)
«
I f
c 
*’* *a
•- g
Is
if
•s
ll
g > ^ s
»
f
111
Hi
l i t
%
M
f  I
i . î
% c/a za
C'.
E
"3
*P
Oc.
Ù)B
^  W
co
E
%
•E E
I I
J
p. *=
g I i
Doctorate of Psychology (PsychD) in Clinical Psychology
332
Large Scale Research Project
/
U 5f
11
II 
II;
lîi
^ 1 - 1
Doctorate of Psychology (PsychD) in Clinical Psychology
333
Large Scale Research Project
E m
2 2 ^
« c 2  3 ^ Æ
e»»"O
1
b
I
C.
CiÆ
^ =
.2
o
oo
>»
Euc>
uo
o
o
JS
o C“*t" Mu XX c
5
c»«
"3
1OJC
I
b
C
S
Ë.
3
t
Doctorate of Psychology (PsychD) in Clinical Psychology
334
Large Scale Research Project
•a
I
"a
f
Cis
?
a
2'•B
>»
c
s
o O
B 1
R
c. ■a £
I oc % "u o 2o 0
01 s £ %
d %.a .hR
Ë
JS
L. >5 c
i
1
R
c
2
«
2
R
c
K
c 15 V .£
RCm R .£"5
C
R 3O 5o
U
%
*£
A i.3
|3
*5
Cfic
E
2
«
•3u 4>SuoR j= R RQ w *w J=
«
oT3
i:
Doctorate of Psychology (PsychD) in Clinical Psychology
335
Large Scale Research Project
.S£ m .2
O ■% 00
« 5 .2,
“? tfl
11if
^ • 1
11 
.a b
i'ill
I Î
ll
I ' rso
la '4-t5 to
5 .£ f
I « 
.2
I i= s
11
1
.2
JS
&
Î
ER
& .S  !
!i
Doctorate of Psychology (PsychD) in Clinical Psychology
336
Large Scale Research Project
ccÜ
h = t  e
w
i i i i i r
£ 1.5 I f  a =
W Üu
>» CD I
i m p
Cfl
s n
■a
Doctorate of Psychology (PsychD) in Clinical Psychology 337
Large Scale Research Project
o u
II
s Os |
2 -g  £>*S
I I8 l l  I ao „
2 J 2 £  « - o - s j r
““ . r i l l  | 1
o oM o’
1 1
fl
S . 2 = -5
cn
rS K
« 1 §
ERen «
g E C.t CJ
2  « J=
2
!}
105^61
«
i l l
s a"
"ll
Ii
i i
ii
l i
Îs
Ec s'
8
I
.§
5 I
•s
6
.ë
V
•g
s
£  R
U
6
îi
il
il
1 !
P
M 2
<1 
■ m
tj
l i
î î
l i s
î i .=
m
! l
5  ë
»  Æ
il
*? 2
o o 
o
en cn 
11
11
U
l.f !
o «
il
, = ï i H î  
. i l l î ê î i f
i
•en c 
11
es en 55 |
>l!i
i i i l
• g l
o  en
•g-2.
ii
%
1
s
a
Ip
iu
io.
a
R
g
O
Doctorate of Psychology (PsychD) in Clinical Psychology
338
Large Scale Research Project
Appendix Six
Second order Theory of Mind Task 
Ice Cream Van -  (Baron-Cohen, 1989).
John and Mary are playing together in the park. They see the ice-cream van coming. Mary 
really wants to buy an ice-cream cone but she doesn’t have any money. She feels sad. The 
ice-cream man says to Mary: “Don’t be sad, you can go home and get some money. I’ll be 
here all day long.” So Mary goes home to get some money to buy an ice-cream cone. See, 
there goes Mary to her house to get some money. John stays in the park and plays.
Probe Question One — ‘‘Why did Mary go home?”
Probe Questiori Two -  “What did the ice-cream man tell Mary?”
Now, John sees the ice-cream van start to move away. John asks, “Hey, where are you 
going?” The ice-cream man says, “I’m going to the school to sell ice-cream. I can sell more 
ice-cream at the school”. So the ice-cream van starts driving to the school to sell ice-cream 
there. See, there goes the ice-cream van to the school.
Probe Question Three — “What did the ice-cream man tell John?”
Now, John goes off to his house to have some lunch. Mary is at her house getting money for 
ice-cream. Mary walks outside her house and sees the ice-cream van going by. “Hey, where 
are you going?” asks Mary. “I’m going to the school to sell ice-cream”, says the ice-cream 
man. Mary says, “Well, I’m so glad I know that. Now I have some money to buy an ice­
cream cone, so I will follow you to the school”. The ice-cream man and Mary go to the 
school.
(After they get to the school two opaque screens are placed in front of the park and the 
school).
Remember the little boy John?
Probe Question Four -  “Does John know the ice-cream man went to the school?”
Linguistic Control Question -  “Does John know that the ice-cream man told Mary he was 
going to the school?”
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Nonlinguistic Control Question -  “Does Mary know where the ice-cream van is?”
Second Order Ignorance Question -  “Does John know that Mary knows where the ice-cream
Now, John has finished his lunch and he goes over to Mary’s house to play with her. John 
knocks on the door. Mary’s mother comes to the door. John asks her, “Where’s Mary?” 
Mary’s mother says, “Mary went to buy an ice-cream cone”. So John goes off to find Mary.
The experimenter holds the John doll in front of Mary's house, facing towards the 
participant).
Memory aid -  “Now, remember, John does not know that the ice-cream man told Mary where 
he was going.
Second Order Theory of Mind Question -  “Where does John think Mary went to buy an ice­
cream cone?”
Justification Question-“Why?”
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Appendix Seven
Examples of the typically developing and autistic spectrum participant’s answers to the 
‘Strange Stories’, scored with the adapted scoring system.
Key: 2T  - Two point mental state answer.
IT -O n e  point mental state answer.
MSx -  Incorrect mental state answer.
0 -  incorrect answer (other type).
Pretence (Banana and Ship)
2 T  -  She is pretending.
2 T  -  She/They are making believe.
2T  - Cause she/they are making it up and imaging.
I T -  She/they are playing.
MSx-So she can trick her friend.
MSx -  She/they want to make people laugh.
MSx -  It is like a joke.
0 -  Trying to get out of something.
0 -  Because maybe they don’t like it and it will squash on their cheek.
0 -  She is mucking about.
Lie (Vase)
2T  - She lied because she didn’t want to get told off.
2T  - She thought her mum would get cross if she told the truth.
2T  - She didn’t want to get into trouble so she lied.
I T  - She didn’t want to get told off.
IT  - She didn’t want to get in trouble.
IT  - She doesn’t want to be blamed.
IT  - She didn’t want to get in trouble so she blamed the dog.
0 -  to get the dog in trouble.
Lie (Dentist)
2T  - He knows that if he admits to a toothache he will have to go to the dentist, so he lies. 
2T  - He lies because he is scared of having a filling.
2T  - He hates going to the dentist, so he doesn’t want to go and Hes.
2T  - He doesn’t like going to the dentist so he is hiding it from her by lying.
2T  - He doesn’t want his mum to know so he hes.
2T  - He doesn’t want to go to the dentist so he hes.
2T  - He knows that if he admits to a toothache then he wiU have to go to the dentist.
IT  - He doesn’t want to hurt his teeth.
I T  - Because he hates going to the dentist.
IT  - Cause he didn’t want to go to the dentist.
0 -  So he doesn’t have to go to have a filling.
Joke (Elephant)
2T  - It is just like a joke.
IT  - To make her feel happy.
MSx -  It is just a saying.
MSx -  He is just being sarcastic.
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0 -  Cause it is really big.
0- Cause it is really big like an elephant.
Joke (Haircut)
2T  - It is a joke.
2T  - It looks so short he is pretending for a joke that it cut her hair.
2T  - To be funny he is saying a joke.
MSx -  Because he thought that she was buUied by a lawnmower.
MSx -  But she hasn’t, he just thinks she has.
MSx -  He is trying to be sarcastic.
MSx -  He doesn’t like her hair.
MSx -  He thought that her hair looked like it had.
0 -  He is making it up.
0 -  Cause she has really short hair 
0 -  Cause it looks hke it.
0 -  Making it up
White lie (Rabbit)
2T  - She wanted her parents to be happy.
2T  - She didn’t want to upset/hurt her parents.
2 T  - She didn’t want her parents to get cross.
2 T  - To stop them thinking that they had wasted their money.
2T  - So she would not disappoint her parents.
2T  - It is a white he.
MSx -  She wanted to play a trick on them.
0 -  Because when you get a present you are meant to say that you like it. 
White be (Hat)
2 T  - He doesn’t want to hurt her feelings.
2T  - It is a white he.
2T  - He wants his aunt to be happy.
2T  - He doesn’t want to upset his aunt.
2 T  - It would be a bit rude if he told her the truth.
I T  - He doesn’t want to get into trouble.
I T  - She would be very angry.
MSx -  He was being sarcastic and trying to be funny.
MSx -  Because he wants to play a trick on her.
Idiom (Pigsty)
2 T  - It is an expression.
2 T  - It is a metaphor.
MSx -  Because she doesn’t hke her son.
0 -  Cause it is reahy messy.
0 -  Cause it looks hke one.
0 -  Cause it is a pigsty.
0 -  It is hke there are pigs in the room.
0 -  Mums are reahy out of order and exaggerate.
0 -  Because she doesn’t see any pigs behind him.
Idiom (Cough)
2T  - It is just a saying.
2T  - It is just an expression.
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2T  - It is a metaphor.
IT  - It is a joke.
MSx -  He is being sarcastic.
MSx -  He wanted to scare her a bit.
MSx -  Because she is pretending and wants to miss school.
0 -  Cause she keeps coughing.
0 -  It sounds like there is.
0 -  Because it sounds like a frog.
0 -  Because a frog would block your throat.
Misunderstanding (Glove)
2T  - He thought the poHceman was trying to get / going to arrest him because he knew he had 
robbed the shop.
2T  - He thought the poHceman knew he had burgled the shop.
I T  - He thought I am never going to get away.
I T  - He thought the poHceman would take him away.
I T  - He thought he was going to be arrested.
MSx -  He didn’t want to go to jaü.
MSx -  He wanted to go to jail.
MSx- He didn’t want the poHceman to know he was a robber.
MSx -  He wanted to teU the truth.
MSx -  Cause he wanted to admit it.
MSx -  He thought the poHceman was too young to take him to jaü.
MSx -  He thought he had a gun and was going to shoot him.
0 -  Because he is dressed as a burglar.
0 -  Lots of other poHceman arrest him, if he teUs the truth he gets less punishment.
Misunderstanding (Peabody)
2T  - She thought he was going to hurt her.
2T  - She thought he was a robber.
2T  - She assumed he was going to rob her.
0- Cause she can’t be sure when out alone if someone is a thief.
0 -  In case he comes up and takes it.
0 -  Cause she didn’t know the time.
0 -  She probably had been robbed before in a simüar situation.
0 -  Cause you can’t be sure when out alone if someone is a thief.
Double bluff (Soldier)
2T  - It is a double-bluff.
2 T  - He knew they would think he would He.
2T  - He told the truth to confuse them, as he knew they thought he would He.
IT  - To make them think he was lying.
IT  - Cause he was reaUy clever.
MSx -  He didn’t Hke the blue army and preferred the other army to find the tanks.
MSx -  He didn’t want to get shot.
MSx -  He doesn’t want to be called a liar.
MSx -  He doesn’t want to go to jaü.
MSx -  He was scared.
0 -  He was a spy for the other army.
0 -  He told them so he could warn his army.
0 -  Because he said they were there.
0 -  They didn’t listen to him because he was a prisoner.
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0 -  Otherwise they might kill him.
Double bluff (Ping-pong)
2 T  - He thinks his brother is lying, so he looks in the other place he says.
I T  - Cause Simon is a big liar.
I T  - Cause he never tells the truth.
MSx -  He thought simon was telling the truth.
MSx -  He thinks he told the truth.
MSx -  Cause he believes him.
0 -  Cupboard is the best place to hide it.
0 -  Loads of places to hide in a cupboard.
0 -  Cause he said so.
Sarcasm (Picnic)
2 T  - She was being sarcastic.
I T  - She was angry and didn’t mean it.
I T  - She is making fun of him.
MSx -  She thought is was going to be sunny.
MSx -  Cause she wanted to trick him.
MSx -  She didn’t want him to find out she doesn’t like it.
MSx -  To make her brother happy.
MSx -  Cause the boy lied to her.
MSx -  It is an old saying.
MSx -  She was really cross.
MSx -  It is sort of a joke.
MSx -  She is using a metaphor.
0 -  Because it is not nice and sunny.
0 -  She is making a silly comment.
0 -  Because he said it was going to be a lovely day.
Sarcasm (Politeness)
2T  - She is not being serious, she was being sarcastic.
2 T  - She wants the girl to be polite to her, so she is being sarcastic.
I T  - She wants her daughter to have manners.
I T  - She wants her to take notice.
I T  - Cause she thinks it is rude, she doesn’t mean it really.
I T  - She is angry.
I T  - She is angry and exaggerated.
I T  - She was telling her that she was being rude.
MSx -  She is lying.
MSx -  She doesn’t want to be horrible to her daughter.
MSx -  It is an old saying.
MSx -  She is using a metaphor.
0 -  She is being difficult.
0 -  Cause she wasn’t being very polite.
0 -  You must always say thank you.
Persuasion (Kittens)
2T  - She was trying to persuade Jill to buy a kitten.
2 T  - She wanted her to take a kitten, saying it would make her want one.
2T  - JUl loves the kittens and if she thinks they will be hurt, she will then take one.
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2T  - She really wants her to buy one, so she tells her that as she knows she wouldn’t want 
them hurt.
2T  - She is trying to make Jill want to buy one.
I T  - She wanted Jill to buy a kitten.
MSx -  To make her feel unhappy.
MSx -  Cause she wanted to keep them for herself.
MSx -  She doesn’t really want to give her one.
0 - To make her buy one.
Persuasion (Sausages)
2T  - He was trying to persuade her to give him some more sausages.
2T  - He wanted her to feel sorry for him, so she would give him more sausages.
I T  - He is greedy and wants to get more sausages.
I T  - To get more sausages cause he hkes them.
I T  - He wants to He get more sausages, cause he loves sausages.
I T  - He is hungry and wanted to get more.
I T  - To see if he could get more.
MSx -  He doesn’t want to have any tea.
Contrary emotion (Painting)
2 T  - She doesn’t want to make her friend upset as she was sad for herself but pleased for her. 
2 T  - She is sort of happy for her friend, she is also sad.
2 T  - She wanted to win, so was sad, but was pleased for her friend.
2 T  - She was feeling them both at the same time.
2 T  - She doesn’t want her friend to think she is jealous, so she is happy for her as weU.
I T  - She doesn’t want to fight with her friend.
I T  - She doesn’t want to break up friends.
0 -  She wanted to say yes to everyone.
Contrary emotion (Swings)
2 T  - She wants to go but is scared of the dog.
2 T  - She is scared of the dog so won’t go past even for the swings.
2T  - She doesn’t want to get scared by the dog, but doesn’t want her mum to know that she is 
cause she wiU make her go to the swings cause she Hkes them.
2 T  -  She didn’t want her mum to know that she was scared of the dog, so she pretended she 
didn’t want to go.
2T  - She didn’t want her mum to know that she wanted to go to the swings as she would 
make her go past the dOg who she was scared of.
I T  - She doesn’t want to walk past Mr Jones house.
I T  - She doesn’t want to walk past the dog.
I T  - She is scared of the dog.
MSx -  She is lying cause she is embarrassed about being scared.
MSx -  She wanted to do something at home.
0 -  Because of the dog.
0 -  Because she would have to go past the dog.
Appearance/reality (Ghost)
2 T  - He is trying to scare him.
2 T  - He is not reaUy a ghost, but he wants Mr Brown to think he is one.
I T  - He doesn’t want Mr Brown to work out who he is.
I T  - He doesn’t want anyone to guess who he was.
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I T  - He is having fun.
I T  - he is trying to pretend to be a ghost.
MSx -  He thinks he is a ghost.
MSx -  Because it is Halloween and he is dressed up as a ghost.
0 -  Getting into the party mood.
0 -  Because he is dressed up as a ghost.
Appearance/reality (Santa)
2T  - Cause he wants the children to be happy and think he is Santa.
2 T  - He wants the children to think he is Santa.
2T  - He wants them to believe.
2T  - He is pretending to be Santa.
MSx -  He doesn’t want to he to Alice.
MSx -  He wants to be Santa.
MSx -  He was told to act hke Santa.
MSx -  He thinks he is Santa, but he is not.
0 -  Because he is dressed up as Santa.
Forget (Doll)
2 T  - She had forgotten.
I T  - She thought she might have brought it in.
MSx - She wanted her mum to think that she had brought it in.
MSx- She doesn’t want her mum to know.
MSx- She doesn’t want her mum to worry.
MSx- She doesn’t want to get told off.
MSx- She doesn’t want her mum to get mad.
MSx -  Because she wanted to trick her mum.
Msx -  She didn’t want to go out in the rain.
MSx -  She wanted to get rid of the doU.
MSx -  She didn’t want her mum to reahse that she hadn’t brought it in.
MSx -  She didn’t want her doU.
Forget (School)
2T  - He forgot his friend was away.
IT  - He was not sure.
MSx -  He didn’t want her to know that he wasn’t at school.
MSx -  just so his mum would think he had a good day and would let him go and play. 
MSx -  because if he told the truth his mum would have asked lots of questions.
MSx -  maybe he didn’t like John, and imagined he wasn’t in school.
MSx -  he didn’t want his mum to feel sorry for him.
MSx -  he didn’t want to worry his mum.
MSx -  he might want to go round and play.
MSx -  he doesn’t want his mum to know he was ill.
MSx -  because he might not know why the other boy wasn’t there.
MSx -  he doesn’t want to go to school.
MSx -  he was lying.
MSx -  he didn’t know.
0 -  “I don’t know.”
0 -  Perhaps he was John’s friend and didn’t want to say he was absent.
G -  cause he was iU
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Appendix Eight 
Power analysis
G* Power was used a priori to ascertain the sample sizes required to find a large sized 
significant effect between the groups. The test assumed one-tail direction of effect as it would 
be expected from previous research (e.g Happe, 1994) that the typically developing group 
would achieve a higher score on the ‘Strange Stories’ compared with the autistic spectrum 
group. G* Power suggested with a predicted large effect size, a minimum sample of 32 was 
required, or with a medium effect size, a minimum sample of 78, to obtain a power of p = 0.7. 
Since a large effect was expected, 32 was taken as the minimum sample size (sixteen in each 
group).
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